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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, STRUCTURES, AND LINKAGES IN A
COLOMBIAN URBAN BARRIO

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION,
STRUCTURES, AND LINKAGES
IN A COLOMBIAN URBAN BARRIO

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School
of the University of Notre Dame
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Notre Dame, Indiana

March, 1981

TO MY WIFE, GLORIA, AND OUR CHILDREN,
WHOSE LOVING PATIENCE, UNDERSTANDING,
AND SACRIFICE MADE THIS POSSIBLE

PREFACE

My interest in the Colombian political system, and in the role of the residents of poor urban barrios in that system, developed from my master's thesis, Demographic Policy in Colombia (1979). While that thesis presented an overall view of national policy responses to the dramatic population increase of the 1960's and 1970's in Colombia, and to the resultant social, economic, and political consequences of such growth, the theme of the present study is derived from a narrower aspect of the Colombian demographic explosion - the phenomenon of rural-to-urban migration and the subsequent formation of enclaves of urban poverty in the nation's major cities.

Although there have been other studies examining the origins, characteristics, motivations, and attitudes of the settlers of these so-called marginal barrios of the Third World, relatively few of those studies have focused on the political participation of these urban pobladores, on the structures they use to channel their political activities into the larger political system, and on the political linkages which exist between the political system of the barrio and that of the municipal government. This is especially true in the case of Colombia. It is with this deficiency in mind that I decided to do a detailed investigation, or case study, of a Colombian marginal

barrio. My underlying motivation was to determine if, and analyze how, the inhabitants of that urban barrio were participating in the Colombian political system.

In order to more clearly and fully understand the Colombian political system at the national, municipal, and barrio levels, field research in Colombia was a necessity. Such research was carried out during a three and one-half month period from December, 1979, to March, 1980. A variety of methodological procedures was used in Colombia. They included documentary research (newspaper files, government documents, university archives);¹ the use of key informants to gain access to, and information on, the specific urban barrio in which the investigation was carried out; semi-structured depth interviewing of municipal politicians and barrio leaders; a sample survey technique within the barrio; my observer status within the municipality and the marginal barrio; and the gathering of biographical information on barrio and municipal political figures.

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter I defines the objectives of the present study and discusses salient aspects of the theoretical model employed in the investigation. Chapter II describes the physical context within which the research was carried

¹All passages and references extracted from Colombian newspapers, government publications, journals, books, etc. were translated by the author.

out. It examines those demographic and socio-economic factors of the local barrio, the city of Cali, and Colombia which provide insight into the situation of the marginal masses in the nation's urban areas and especially in the barrio popular San Judas Tadeo.

Chapter III focuses on the political structures of Cali and San Judas Tadeo and the political linkages, both particularistic and collective, which exist within the barrio and between the barrio and the municipal political system. These structures and linkages are analyzed from the perspective of the national political system in which the regime type and political party system are important contextual factors.

Chapter IV investigates the extent of the political participation of the inhabitants of San Judas Tadeo along two dimensions - voting and membership in communal organizations. This investigation, using a direct survey approach, analyzes the participation and non-participation of those inhabitants within the larger contexts of Caleño and Colombian society. It also takes into account such contextual factors as political culture, patterns of political socialization, and the land tenure problem of San Judas Tadeo which have directly influenced the political behavior of the residents of the barrio.

Chapter V presents the conclusions of this study. It analyzes the findings and interprets their theoretical

implications within the contexts of Colombian politics and society. Moreover, it suggests areas where further research is warranted, research designed to help political scientists in their efforts to understand the dynamics of the political systems of the marginal barrios of Colombia and also intended to contribute to a general understanding of the role of the urban poor in the political systems of the Third World.

In summary, the present study is a behavioral and structural analysis of the Colombian political system as it functions at the level of a specific marginal barrio of Colombia. On the structural level it focuses on the institutions, organizations, and power configurations that exist within San Judas Tadeo and which link the barrio to the municipal political system. On the behavioral level it analyzes the extent of two modes of the political participation of the residents of that marginal barrio.

In the course of preparing this dissertation, I was fortunate to receive the cooperation of many friends and colleagues both in the United States and Colombia. I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Judith de Campos of the Universidad del Valle and to Dr. Rodrigo Losada Lora of FEDUSARROLLO in Bogotá for their cooperation and guidance. I am especially grateful to all those residents of the barrio San Judas Tadeo of Cali, Colombia, from whose time

and knowledge I was able to profit greatly by gaining more insight into the complexities of the Colombian political system at the local level. Foremost among them are my dear friends, Sigifredo Bonilla and his family, who, besides serving as invaluable assets to my research in San Judas Tadeo, accepted me into their home as a member of the family. I also wish to express my gratitude to Professors John J. Kennedy, Peter R. Moody, Jr., and Claude Pomerleau, C.S.C., of the University of Notre Dame, for their helpful comments and suggestions regarding the present study. Above all, I am indebted to my advisor, Professor Michael J. Francis, from whose constant guidance and encouragement I benefitted immensely.

Financial support for this study was kindly provided by the Zahm Foundation, the Institute for International Studies, and the Department of Government and International Studies, all of the University of Notre Dame. Without this support, it would have been impossible to carry out the field work in Colombia.

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I. OBJECTIVES AND MODEL

This study has three major objectives:

Objective A: to examine and analyze the extent of two types of political participation manifested by the inhabitants of a Colombian barrio popular;¹

¹The term barrio popular is used in this study to refer specifically to those barrios of Cali that fall within the two lowest categories of the socio-economic typology devised by the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) to classify the nation's urban barrios (see Appendix A). The term tugurio is used to refer to those barrios which fall within the lowest category of DANE's typology. In this respect, a tugurio is a sub-class of a barrio popular. Tugurios usually correspond to "invasion" barrios and are defined by DANE as sites of "provisional homes constructed without any determined plan and which do not generally have sewer services, electric light, etc." See DANE, ed., Colombia Política: Estadísticas, 1935-1970 (Bogotá, 1972), p. 5. An "invasion" barrio is "an illegal...settlement on public and private lands." See A. Eugene Havens and William L. Flinn, "The Power Structure in a Shantytown," Internal Colonialism and Structural Change in Colombia, eds. Havens and Flinn (New York: Praeger, 1970 a), p. 99. Such invasions are usually organized in advance and are a very common occurrence within or near the municipal limits of Cali. A "pirate settlement" (barrio pirata or barrio clandestino) is "an illegal subdivision in which small parcels of unimproved land are sold without official permit" (Havens and Flinn, Power Structure, p. 99). Although the contract between buyer and seller is legal, the acquisition of land within a "pirate settlement" violates, in some respect, the specifications of the municipal housing code. A "controlled clandestine settlement" is a settlement given semi-legal status through the efforts of sympathetic government officials and politicians. See Rodrigo Losada L., Problemas Legales e Institucionales de la Vivienda Popular en Cali (Cali: Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Municipal, 1979 a). An "urbanización" is a legal subdivision designed according to city specifications and provided with some public services (Havens and Flinn, Power Structure, p. 99). The

Objective B: to describe and examine the political organizations and structures used by the residents of the barrio popular in order to influence the allocation of essential resources, both within the barrio and from the municipal level;

Objective C: to investigate the diverse types of linkages which serve to connect the voluntary associations of the barrio popular to the policy-making arena of the larger political system as well as those institutions within the barrio which link the local residents to the barrio "influentials."

These three objectives deal with the behavioral, structural, and linkage components of the political system of a Colombian marginal barrio, a barrio composed largely of migrants from the rural area. Insight into these three political phenomena will contribute knowledge to the ongoing study of the role of the urban migrant in the political systems of Third World countries. Moreover, the study will clarify those specific contextual

general term "marginal barrio" is used throughout the present study to include all of the above terms. Marginal barrios outside of the Colombian context include the Chilean callampa, the Peruvian barriada, the Brazilian favela, the Venezuelan rancho, the Mexican colonia proletaria, the Argentine villa miseria, and the Panamanian barriada bruja among others.

factors which, in the case of a marginal barrio of Colombia, serve to influence the political behavior of its residents. In short, this study is concerned with the types of political participation, structures, and linkages which exist within a specific cultural and geographic context.

It has been suggested that, contrary to the claims of socio-political studies carried out in the 1950's and 1960's, there is a substantial amount of political participation among the members of the lower socio-economic strata of Latin American cities.²

²Booth cites numerous studies offering evidence in support of this claim. See John A. Booth, "Political Participation in Latin America: Levels, Structure, Context, Concentration, and Rationality," Latin American Research Review, XIV (1979), 32-34. For specific country studies, see Henry A. Dietz, "Some Modes of Participation in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Lima, Peru," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, V (Spring, 1977), 63-77; Shepard Forman, "The Extent and Significance of Peasant Political Participation in Brazil," paper presented at the Seminar on the Faces of Participation in Latin America: A New Look at Citizen Action in Society, San Antonio, Texas, November, 1976; Richard Moore, Assimilation and Political Organization Among the Urban Poor: The case of Guayaquil, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1977; Talton F. Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); John A. Booth, "A Replication: Modes of Participation in Costa Rica," Western Political Quarterly, XXIX (1976), 627-633; and John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Peasants as Activists: A Reevaluation of Political Participation in the Countryside," Comparative Political Studies, XII (April, 1979), 29-59.

The present study evaluates the political participation and non-participation of the pobladores (settlers) of San Judas Tadeo³ in light of this claim. In this regard it offers a contextual analysis of how universal political features are conditioned by specific factors within Colombian society and culture.

In the present study the investigator makes the conscious effort to examine particular aspects of the Colombian political system from the point of view of Colombian culture and society and not to evaluate them in terms of social and political concepts endemic to his own environment. The application of such implicit concepts to different cultural contexts tends to result in a subjective, value-laden analysis whose conclusions are biased and lack objectivity.

Notwithstanding this attempt at objectivity, the investigator has inevitably been influenced by the conceptual models of the Colombian political and social systems offered by other scholars who have previously done empirical research in Colombia. Since a holistic analysis of the national political system of the Colombian nation was beyond the scope of the present study,⁴ the

³Hereafter referred to as San Judas.

⁴Chapter III superficially reviews the political system of Colombia. For more exhaustive studies of that system, see John D. Martz, Colombia: A Contemporary Political Study (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962); Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions:

conceptual models of Colombian politics and society provided by those scholars have influenced the methodologies and conclusions of the study. These models, however, were subject to modification based on the findings of the empirical research carried out at the local level in Cali and in the barrio popular San Judas.

The conceptual model of the Colombian political system used in the present study suggests that the system is hierarchic, elitist, and dominated by the two traditional political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. These parties, consisting of vertically-linked structures from the national to the local levels, transcend class divisions and have mass followings based on personalistic attachments and patron-client relationships. Furthermore, the nature of elite conflict between the Liberal and Conservative power structures has historically shaped the pattern of mass mobilization and politicization within the nation. This long tradition of partisan struggle for control of the nation's political system has continued to the present day despite the ideological convergence which has taken place between the two political parties.

Military Rule and Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957); Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); and Edwin Corr, The Political Process in Colombia (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1972).

The major success of the Liberal and Conservative parties has been their flexibility, in times of crisis, which has enabled them to withstand the challenges and pressures brought on by twentieth century social unrest, economic woes, and political "third forces." This flexibility has permitted the parties to maintain popular support and to continue to offer the Colombian people the most direct means of participation (albeit controlled participation) in the national, regional, and local governmental systems.

Participation in the Colombian political system, as in any political system, is primarily motivated by self-interest. Such political participation may take one of two forms. It may be either private or public (Roberts, 1970:20). The former refers to voting, involvement in patron-client dyadic contracts, and the formation of individual attitudes, that is, to behavior not easily visible to others. The latter type of political participation involves more overt kinds of political behavior such as active membership in political organizations and civic associations as well as campaigning.

The present study measures the extent of electoral participation among the pobladores of San Judas and also measures the extent of membership in partisan-oriented voluntary associations among those residents. In effect,

this study examines aspects of both the private and public political behavior of the inhabitants of San Judas and suggests explanations for the high degree of non-participation, as measured by those two variables, in the barrio and municipal political systems.

Participation in a political system does not necessarily imply influence upon the policy-making process of that system. Rather participation for the purposes of the present study is perceived as "meaningful" to individuals if those persons are able to, or think they are able to, achieve their goals through a consciously chosen form of political behavior. In other words, urban pobladores may vote not because they hope to affect the decision-making process of the city administration but because their vote may represent a moral obligation on their part to a patrón in exchange for material benefits from the same. This type of political behavior, very common among the rural and urban poor of Colombia, is considered meaningful to those poor even though it exerts little impact within the policy-making arena of the local political system.

Closely related to this concept of political participation is that of the politics of cooptation in which it is claimed that the political participation of the poor is channelled through elite-established and -controlled political structures so as to control popular

dissent, maintain the stability of the regime, and keep the inegalitarian social structure intact.⁵ It is the view of the present study that cooptative policies exist to varying degrees under many types of governmental systems and, while they may tend to depress political participation and perpetuate elite rule, the urban poor can, to a limited degree, articulate demands and influence the government's pattern of resource allocation by using the cooptative structures designed to provide them with access to the larger political system. In the case of a country like Colombia in which an imminent social revolution seems very unlikely and in which authoritarian means, such as the use of the military to repress deviant (by elite standards) social and political behavior, are very accessible to the governing elite, the judicious use and exploitation of these

⁵Many political scientists make the distinction between the "spontaneous mass action" (Kline, 1974:282) of the lower classes and the politicization of those classes by cooptative mechanisms used by paternalistic, elite-controlled regimes in an effort to manipulate the political behavior of the masses. In the latter case, the political elite control all economic, cultural, political, military, bureaucratic, and ecclesiastic channels so as to limit social mobility and involvement in the political system to those peasants who are willing to conform to elite standards and values (Torres R., 1971). In this manner, the regime has "a formidable capacity for coopting potential opponents and absorbing dissident interests without destroying the basic structure of social and political domination" (Schmitter, 1972:97).

cooptative structures by the urban poor may provide them with benefits which they may not otherwise be able to acquire. In this respect the urban pobladores may be perceived as rationally adapting to a situation which they are unable to change and reluctant to challenge.

The concept of the rational adaptation of the rural migrant to the urban environment is directly related to that of the political participation of the urban poblador in Latin America. Alejandro Portes asserts that

the Latin American poor tend to operate in terms of rational adaptation to the existing social structure....Patterns of political behavior exhibited by the urban poor in Latin America can...be characterized as deliberate manipulations of available channels for survival and mobility rather than as either careless abandon...or militant opposition (1976:72).

In the case of Mexico, Wayne Cornelius has found that

migrant reluctance to become political activists and confront the system does not result from irrationality, false consciousness or a lack of awareness that they are being manipulated by the government; rather it reflects a rational adaptation to the rules of the political game, a low propensity for risk-taking and an awareness of which kinds of political action are rewarded by the authorities and which kinds are likely to be ignored or violently repressed (1975:233-234).

Thus both the studies of Portes and Cornelius imply that the participation of the urban poor through cooperative structures imposed on them by elite-dominated

regimes is a realistic and rational reaction of those poor to the political system of the urban environment. In this sense the concepts of the politics of cooptation⁶ and rational

⁶Country-specific studies of the politics of cooptation among Latin American governments are provided by David Collier, "Squatter Settlement Formation and the Politics of Cooptation in Peru," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 1971; David Collier, Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976); Diego Robles Rivas, "Development Alternatives for the Peruvian Barriada," in Latin American Urban Research, II, 229-237, eds. Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972); Sara Michl, "Urban Squatter Organization as a National Government Tool: The Case of Lima, Peru," in Latin American Urban Research, III, 155-178, eds. Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973); Henry A. Dietz, "Urban Squatter Settlements in Peru: A Case History and Analysis," Journal of Inter-American Studies, XI (July, 1969), 353-370; Susan Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Alejandro Portes, "The Politics of Urban Poverty," in Urban Latin America, eds. Alejandro Portes and John Walton (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976); James Petras, Political and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Wayne A. Cornelius, "Urbanization and Political Demand-Making: Political Participation Among the Migrant Poor in Latin American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXVIII (September, 1974), 1125-1146; Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Roger D. Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971); Ignacio González Camus, "¿Duermen las Juntas de Vecinos?" Hoy (Santiago de Chile), May 10-16, 1978, pp. 20-25; Richard Moore, "The Urban Poor in Guayaquil: Modes, Correlates and Context of Political Participation," in Political Participation in Latin America, Volume II: Politics and the Poor, eds. Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth (New York: Holmes and Meier, forthcoming); Richard Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture

adaptation⁷ are applied to the Colombian context in this study.

in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969); Franz Vanderschueren, "Political Significance of Neighborhood Committees in the Settlements of Santiago," in The Chilean Road to Socialism, ed. Dale L. Johnson (Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1973); and John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Images of Political Participation in Latin America," in Political Participation in Latin America, Volume I: Citizen and State, eds. Booth and Seligson (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978.) For the use of corporatist policies as cooptative mechanisms in Latin America, see Kalman Silvert, "National Values, Development, and Leaders and Followers," International Social Science Journal, XV (1964), 560-570; and Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," World Politics, XV (January, 1973). For studies of cooptative policies within the Colombian context, see John J. Bailey, "Pluralist and Corporatist Dimensions of Interest Representation in Colombia," in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, ed. James Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, pp. 259-302; Harvey Kline, "Interest Groups in the Colombian Congress: Group Behavior in a Centralized, Patrimonial Political System," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, XVI (August, 1974), 274-300; Emil B. Haney and Wava G. Haney, "Social and Ecological Contradictions of Community Development and Rural Modernization in a Colombian Peasant Community," Human Organization, XXXVII (Fall, 1978), 225-234; Camilo Torres Restrepo, "Social Change and Rural Violence in Colombia," in Revolutionary Priest: The Complete Writings and Messages of Camilo Torres, ed. John Gerassi (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 188-244; and G. G. Drake, "Social Class and Organizational Dynamics: A Study of Voluntary Associations in a Colombian City," Journal of Voluntary Action Research, I (July, 1972), 46-52.

⁷For other studies on the mass participant rationality of the urban poor in the Third World, see Alejandro Portes, "Rationality in the Slum: An Essay on Interpretive Sociology," Comparative Studies in Society and History, XIV (June, 1972), 268-286; Wilbur A. Chaffee Jr., "Entrepreneurs and Economic Behavior: A New Approach to the Study of Latin American Politics," Latin American Research Review, XI (Fall, 1976), 55-68, and "A Rational Choice Model of Mass Participation in Politics," paper presented at the Southwest Political Science Association

Implicit in the present discussion of the conceptual model of the Colombian political system and the participation or non-participation of the urban poblador in that system is the controversial concept of marginality. The underlying process from which the concept of the marginal masses emerged was the extensive rural-to-urban migration which took place in Colombia and many of the Third World countries in the post World War II era. Prior to the 1970's, many social scientists supported the conventional Park-Wirth thesis of recent migrant behavior

Meeting, Dallas (April, 1977), and "Let Jorge Do It: A Rational Choice Model of Political Participation," eds. Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, Political Participation in Latin America, Volume II: Politics and the Poor (New York: Holmes and Meier; forthcoming); John R. Mathiason, "Patterns of Powerlessness Among the Urban Poor: Toward the Use of Mass Communications for Rapid Social Change," Studies in Comparative International Development, VII (Spring, 1972), 64-88; Moshe M. Czudnowski, "A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1968), 878-888; Alain Touraine and Daniel Pecaut, "Working Class Consciousness and Economic Development in Latin America," ed. Irving Louis Horowitz, Masses in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press; 1970); Steven M. Neuse, "Voting in Chile: The Feminine Response," eds. John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, Political Participation in Latin America, Volume I: Citizen and State (New York: Holmes and Meier; 1978); John A. Booth, "Reason, Political Activism and Democracy: A Test of Participant Rationality in Costa Rica," paper presented at the Southwest Political Science Association Meeting, Dallas, April, 1977, and "Are Latin Americans Politically Rational? Citizen Participation and Democracy in Costa Rica," eds. Booth and Seligson, 1978, op. cit.

in the urban environment.⁸ The thesis, influenced by Marx's theory of social-class struggle and Durkheim's concept of anomie, emphasized

the anomic, integrative, disorienting, depersonalizing features of urban life and entry into the urban environment manifested in psychological maladjustment, poorly defined social roles, the breakdown of the traditional value system and controls on deviant behavior, the weakening of family and kinship ties and the decline of religious life (Cornelius, 1971: 108-110).

Besides these characteristics endemic to the migrating masses, it was also claimed by social scientists that the migrants to the urban sector were consciously alienated from the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres of society through elite-imposed policies of exclusion. These policies were claimed to have elicited two distinct and opposing responses from the urban poor. Some scholars claimed that the new urban milieu forced the migrant to live in a spirit of resignation and fatalism, attitudes which were passed on from generation to generation, inevitably creating a collective psychology

⁸ See Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); Philip Hauser, "The Social, Economic and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in Industrialization and Society, eds. Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (The Hague: Mouton, 1963); Tomás José Sanabria, "Urbanization on an Ad Hoc Basis: A Case Study of Caracas," in The Urban Explosion in Latin America, ed. Glenn H. Beyer (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 337-345; and Havens and Flinn, Power Structure, op. cit.

which reinforced the futility of self-initiation, emphasized the present over the future, and generally impeded progress and adaptation to the modernizing influences of the urban context (Lewis, 1961: xxiv). This was the "culture of poverty" thesis which claimed that "the feeling of hopelessness and despair arose from the realization by the members of the marginal communities... of the improbability of their achieving success in terms of the prevailing values and goals" (Lewis, 1966:21).

Other scholars refuted the "culture of poverty" thesis with its emphasis on resignation and the pervading sense of futility. They considered the marginal masses to be potential radical forces which could be mobilized into revolutionary militants in order to overthrow the existing elite-dominated regime. Their theory of the "disruptive migrant"⁹ hypothesized that rising levels of

⁹For a good review and critique of the "disruptive migrant" theory, see Joan M. Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty and Instability in Developing Nations, Occasional Papers in International Affairs #22 (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1969). For studies which claim to support this theory of the radical marginal, see Kingsley Davis and Hilda Golden, "Urbanization and the Development of Pre-Industrial Areas," Economic Development and Cultural Change, III (1954); C.M. Haar, "Latin America's Troubled Cities," Foreign Affairs, XLI (April, 1963), 536-549; E.J. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics," in The Politics of Conformity in Latin America, ed. Claudio Véliz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 43-65; William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1959); Barbara Ward, "The Uses of Prosperity," Saturday Review, August 29, 1964, pp. 191-192; James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," The American

deprivation, frustration, and alienation among the urban poor would not cause them to involuntarily submit to the exigencies of the situation but, on the contrary, would impel them to unite in a common effort to seek social justice, economic benefits, and political reform.

Sociological Review, XXVII (February, 1962), 5-13; Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (September, 1967), 265-280; Frank Bonilla, "Rio's Favelas: The Rural Slums Within the City," American Universities Field Staff Reports, VIII (1961); Paul E. Hadley, "Latin America: Retreat from Violence?" Western Political Quarterly, XI (June, 1958), 385-387; and Roger Vekemans, "Marginalidad, Incorporación e Integración," Boletín #37 (Santiago de Chile: DESAL, 1967.)

A related theory among students of the socio-political school of urbanology is the "second generation radicalism" theory which hypothesizes that "the longer the residents remain in the shantytown, the more they show feelings of political alienation because they realize that any additional upward mobility is improbable" (Flinn and Camacho, 1969:57). The thesis is based on the assumption that the first generation migrants to the city experience upward mobility in relation to their previous social status in the rural environment. However, the second generation, not having experienced life in the rural sector, is born into the urban area and perceives very little opportunity for upward mobility. As the gap between their aspirations for such mobility and their actual achievements and success toward that goal widens, they become further alienated from society and take out their frustration through political radicalism and extremism. See Daniel Goldrich et. al., "The Political Integration of Lower Class Settlements in Chile and Peru," Studies in Comparative International Development, I (1967-1968), 1-22; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Ray, op. cit. One of the chief critics of this theory is Joan Nelson, 1969, op. cit. In a related study, Cornelius found that recent migrants to Mexico City are usually more passive than native-born urban residents and also show more deference to government officials. See Wayne A. Cornelius, Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 228.

During the last two decades, social scientists have used empirical research to criticize and refute the Park-Wirth, "culture of poverty," and "disruptive migrant" theses of urban sociology. Cornelius, whose research has focused on the colonias proletarias of urban Mexico, claims that those theses

were never adequately tested, had a strong normative basis and broadly conceptualized the population flow into cities as an undifferentiated mass responding in the same fashion to a given set of conditions or stimuli, to which all migrants to large cities are presumably exposed (1971: 108-110).

Moreover, Cornelius claims that

of greatest importance from the standpoint of general theory-building... are not the static aspects of the problem but the types and sequences of events through which the migrant becomes exposed to, and then internalizes, the value systems and behavior patterns of the larger urban society and polity (1971: 118-119).

Janice Perlman asserts that the traditional model of marginality is invalid because it

assumes that in a functioning system the inter-connections between sub-portions tend to be mutually satisfactory and beneficial to all. It is perfectly possible however to have a stable system which is balanced to the advantage of some through the explicit or implicit exploitation of others. Exploited groups in such a situation are not marginal but very much integrated into the system, functioning as a vital part of it. In short, integration does not necessarily imply reciprocity (1976: 244-245).

Cornelius, Perlman, and others revised the traditional concept of marginality. Their findings suggest that, rather than being alienated from the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres of society, the urban poor are integrated into those spheres, but the manner in which they are integrated prohibits them from exercising effective influence. That is, recent studies assert that integration into society does not imply active participation in the determination of the goals of that society¹⁰ and may, in fact, be characterized by a pervading atmosphere of powerlessness for a majority of the members of that society.

Perlman exemplifies this recent view of marginality. In her study of the powerlessness of the favelados of Rio de Janeiro, her data indicate that the underlying suppositions of marginality theory are almost universally untrue. Although Brazilian society may be divided into two sectors, she maintains that characterizing these as "marginal" and "integrated" is deeply deceptive because

¹⁰For studies supporting this assertion, see Lisa R. Peattie, "The Concept of 'Marginality' as Applied to Squatter Settlements," in Latin American Urban Research, IV, eds. Wayne A. Cornelius and Felicity M. Trueblood (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), 101-109; and Bryan Roberts, Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of Urbanization in the Third World (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978). Also see the remarks of Aldo Solari in Beyer, ed., op. cit., p. 195.

it allows analysts to avoid the recognition that both sectors are integrated into society, but on very different terms. Favelados are not marginal to Brazilian society but integrated into it "in a manner detrimental to their interests." They are not socially marginal, but rejected, not economically marginal but exploited, and not politically marginal but repressed (1976: 195).

The findings of the present study lend support to the new concept of marginality and reject the previous theories which asserted that the residents of the marginal barrios were alienated from society. My field research in Colombia supports the claim that, on the cultural level, the migrant readily adapts to many of the cultural features of the urban environment while simultaneously transferring aspects of his traditional culture to the urban milieu. It also supports the claim that, on the social level, the newly arrived migrants have aspirations for social mobility not unlike those of the members of the higher socio-economic levels of the populace. The urban poor may be rejected by those upper classes in their quest for mobility, but they still optimistically seek to achieve their aims despite overwhelming obstacles. Ultimately the success or failure of this quest depends largely upon their degree of integration into the economic sphere where land speculation, income concentration, capital-intensive industrialization, the availability of

credit, and other features of the capitalist-oriented economic systems of Colombia serve to exclude the urban poor from the benefits of economic growth (Bryan, 1978: 138).¹¹

Finally, the present study supports the claim that, on the political level, the urban pobladores are not forcefully excluded from the political system. They have the option of participating in that system through the cooperative and partisan voluntary associations of the barrio popular, of establishing patron-client dyadic contracts with barrio "influentials," or of voluntary non-participation in the political system. If the pobladores choose to refrain from political activity they do so not because they are coercively excluded from the political system but because of reasons internal to the individual. These include among others, a lack of interest in politics, disillusion with the traditional party system, and the perception that the costs of the traditional types of political behavior outweigh the potential benefits to be

¹¹Perlman and Eckstein have applied the dependency paradigm to the concept of marginality as it manifests itself in Brazil and Mexico respectively. The present study has not pursued the relationship between dependency and marginality in the Colombian context. Further research is needed to investigate the feasibility of applying the dependency syndrome to the marginality of the Colombian poblador. See Eckstein, *op. cit.*, and Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

derived from such behavior.¹² At any rate, those who do participate in the local political system confine their actions to parochial and personal matters. In this respect the arena of their political participation is defined by their socio-economic status.

The present study therefore views the Colombian social system as one complex, integrated whole within which social stratification and structural differentiation exist as in any society.¹³ Those who live at the bottom of the socio-economic scale do not represent socially disorganized and politically disoriented masses excluded from the rest of society. They are integrated into Colombian society; but their power to influence the development and evolution of the political, economic, and social processes of that society are severely limited because of structural factors¹⁴ within Colombian society which inculcate and perpetuate the attitudes and values of the dominant classes (Perlman, 1976). The present

¹²For studies on the political participation of the urban poor from the political economy perspective, see Booth, 1979, *op. cit.*; Gordon Tullock, Toward a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968); Moshe M. Czudnowski, Comparing Political Behavior (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); Charles W. Anderson, Political and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967); Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); and Chaffee, 1976, *op. cit.*

¹³The duality which exists within the Colombian social system is examined in Chapter II.

¹⁴These socio-economic and political contextual factors are discussed in the following chapters.

study does not attempt to look at the kinds of behavior, the beliefs, and the aspirations of the dominant classes as normal and those of the remaining sectors of Colombian society as deviant or marginal. Rather it views both as components of the same social system (Peattie, 1974: 107).

II. THE CONTEXT

Chapter II describes the physical context of this study. Since a basic premise of the investigation is that the nature of the behavioral, structural, and linkage components of any political system is determined by specific contextual factors within the polity, this chapter seeks to define those factors which have directly influenced the political behavior, structures, and linkages of the pobladores of San Judas. To this end, Chapter II examines salient demographic, social, and economic features of Colombian society as well as the land tenure problem of San Judas. Other contextual factors such as regime type and the party system are examined in Chapter III.

Demographic Features

San Judas is a barrio popular of Cali. It is situated in the southeast sector of that city and forms part of a huge conglomeration of lower-class urban barrios which stretches to the east and north, eventually reaching the Cauca River (see Figure 1.)




FIGURE 1. City of Cali with Barrio Limits
SOURCE: Arquidiócesis De Cali (Cali: Arquidiócesis De Cali, 1979), pp. 296-297.

San Judas is one of approximately 220 barrios within the municipal limits of Cali.¹ The city itself is situated in southwestern Colombia in the Cauca River valley between the western and central ranges of the Andes Mountains. It was founded in 1536 by the Spanish explorer Sebastián Belalcázar and was officially designated a municipality by Law 131 of 1863. Presently it ranks behind Bogotá and Medellín as the third largest city in Colombia with a total population estimated at 1,133,703 as of November, 1979.²

Cali is the principal city of Valle del Cauca,³ one of the twenty two departments which, along with eight national territories, comprise the total area of Colombia. The department's 1980 estimated population was 2,643,858.⁴ A large percentage of these Vallecaucanos lived in urban areas,⁵ especially in Cali which, in 1980, contained almost 43% of the total departmental population.

¹According to a spokesman at Planeación Municipal of Cali, one of the requirements for a community to be officially designated a barrio by the municipality is that it must have at least 1,000 housing structures or 7,000 residents.

²According to statistics provided by the Administrative Department of Municipal Planning of Cali.

³The municipality of Cali is one of 42 municipalities in Valle del Cauca.

⁴See Arquidiócesis de Cali, Departamento de Sociología Religiosa, Arquidiócesis de Cali (Cali, Colombia), June, 1979, p. 5.

⁵As of 1977, the total population of Valle del Cauca was 2,445,900. 81.4% of this population was urban; 18.6% was rural. See Gobernación del Valle del Cauca, Valle del Cauca Anuario Estadístico, 1977 (Cali: Departamento Administrativo de Planeación, May 1979), p. 27.

The rapid population growth of both San Judas and Cali is the result of two distinct demographic processes at work in Colombia. The first process is the rate of population increase which, in the case of Cali, has averaged well over 4% per year for the past three decades.⁶ This demographic explosion, characteristic of the entire nation, has occurred as birth rates have soared and death rates declined since 1950.⁷ The 1951 census estimated the national population at 11,548,377. By 1964 and 1973 this figure had grown to 18,090,000 and 21,070,115 respectively. The United Nations estimated the 1975 population at 24,717,000 which made Colombia the fourth largest Latin American nation in terms of population.⁸

Besides Colombia's high annual rate of population increase, the country has also experienced a major redistribution of its population. Because of this demographic displacement, the urban population of the nation grew from less than 38% of the total population in 1938 to 52% in 1964 and to 70% in 1979 (Mora-Rubio, 1979:16).

⁶See DANE, Pérfil Estadístico Valle del Cauca/Cali, Bogotá, Colombia, 1979, p. 9.

⁷For precise statistics, see Juan Luis de Lannoy and Gustavo Pérez, Estructuras Demográficas y Sociales de Colombia (Bogotá: CIS, 1961); CIAS, La Revolución Demográfica (Bogotá, 1966); and Howard I. Blutstein, Area Handbook for Colombia (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.)

⁸The 1980 national census was postponed until at least 1986 because of funding difficulties. But it is safe to assume that by 1980 the national population was greater than 27 million.

This process of rural-to-urban migration, the most salient feature of which has been the growth of marginal barrios on the urban peripheries,⁹ has been influenced by geographic regionalism so that by 1973 Colombia had ten cities, including Cali, with populations of over 200,000. These cities represented 33.5% of the total population for that year (Blutstein, 1977:25). Moreover, between 1964 and 1973 the population of Colombia's four largest cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, and Barranquilla) increased by 53.4% (Blutstein, 1977:34) largely because of the rural-to-urban migration phenomenon.

⁹For studies on the diverse aspects of these marginal barrios in Colombia, see Ramiro Cardona Gutiérrez, "Investigación Nacional Sobre Marginalidad Urbana En Colombia," America Latina (Rio de Janeiro), XI (1968 b), pp. 128-134; Georges Vernez, "El Proceso de Urbanización de Colombia," Revista de la Sociedad Interamericana de Planificación, September, 1971, pp. 14-34; A. Eugene Havens and William L. Flinn, "The Power Structure in a Shantytown," in Havens and Flinn (eds.), Internal Colonialism and Structural Change in Colombia (New York: Praeger, 1970 a), pp. 93-107; and Michael Whiteford, The Forgotten Ones: Colombian Countrymen in an Urban Setting (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1976). For studies on the formation of these barrios in other Third World nations, see Appendices B and C. A summary of these studies within the Latin American context is provided by the bibliographic essays of Francine F. Rabinovitz, Felicity M. Trueblood, and Charles J. Savio, "Introduction: Latin American Urban Research, 1970," in Latin American Urban Research, I, edited by Rabinovitz and Trueblood (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), 11-42; and of Wayne A. Cornelius and Robert V. Kemper, "Recent Urban Studies in Latin America, 1974-1976," in Metropolitan Latin America: The Challenge and the Response, edited by Cornelius and Kemper (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 279-342.

This migration phenomenon has been the primary factor in the rapid increase in size of Cali's population over the last thirty years.¹⁰ By 1973, 55.42% of the city's inhabitants had immigrated to that urban center from elsewhere and only 44.58% of the Caleño residents of that year were natives of the city. Of the immigrants, 32.8% had emigrated from other municipalities within Valle del Cauca and 67.2% had emigrated from areas outside of the department.¹¹ Table 1 shows the place of birth of the official 1973 population of Cali. 37.2% of that population was born outside of Valle del Cauca. These figures are helpful in trying to determine the migratory patterns of those immigrants now residing in Cali.¹²

¹⁰For a discussion of this phenomenon in the case of Cali, see El País (Cali), August 11, 1979. Powelson provides personal insight into the establishment of a Caleño invasion settlement, Nueva Colombia, in John P. Powelson, "The Land Grabbers of Cali," The Reporter, XXX (January 16, 1964), 30-31.

¹¹See DANE, "Migración Interna y Concentración Poblacional, 1964-1973," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, No. 314 (Bogotá: DANE, September, 1977), p. 47, Cuadro 19.

¹²There are several theories offering explanations of the migration and urbanization processes in Colombia and other Latin American countries and of the role of the marginal barrio in the urban context. One prominent theory asserts that migration is not simply a movement from a completely rural environment to the city (Flinn, 1969: 205) but that it is a movement in which the individual first migrates to a transition zone (zona negra) in the urban core before moving to the barrio popular on the city's periphery (Flinn, 1969; Cardona G., 1968 b, Sattler, 1969; Bonilla, 1961; Michl, 1973). This theory has been refuted by those who see a decline in the role of the urban center as a gateway for immigrants to the city. These scholars claim that pirate settlements have replaced the inner-city tugurios as the transition zone (Vernez, 1973). Still

TABLE 1
POPULATION, ACCORDING TO BIRTH PLACE,
CALI, 1973

Place of Birth	Living in Cali (1973)
Bogotá	16,515
Antioquia	28,145
Atlántico	1,935
Bolívar	848
Boyacá	5,246
Caldas	43,864
Cauca	67,486
César	106
Córdoba	636
Cundinamarca	11,424
Chocó	6,730
La Guajira	26
Huila	19,130
Magdalena	848
Meta	927
Nariño	40,999
Norte de Santander	1,484
Quindío	29,261
Risaralda	29,017
Santander	4,875
Sucre	451
Tolima	34,055
Valle del Cauca	607,346
Intendencias, comisarías, and no information	10,353
Foreigners	6,201
Total	967,908

Source: DANE, "Población por Lugar de Nacimiento Según Residencia Actual en Departamento y Capital, 1973," reprinted in DANE, "Migración Interna y Concentración Poblacional, 1964-1973," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, No. 314 (Bogotá: DANE, Sept., 1977), pp. 34-36, Cuadro 6.

others support the "step-migration" theory in which the campesino's migration pattern is a succession of movements from the rural environment through small towns and cities until he finally reaches the marginal barrio of the nearest regional urban center (Herrick, 1965; Hutchinson, 1963). In this manner the campesino undergoes a process of a gradual acculturation which aids him in his adaptation to life in the marginal barrio.

Table 2 indicates the population growth rates of Cali since 1905. The data point out that the 1950's marked the beginning of the city's population explosion in terms of absolute numbers. This explosion was influenced by both the high birth rates rate of growth in the city and by the large influx of migrants to Cali from less urbanized and rural areas.

TABLE 2
POPULATION OF CALI AND RATE OF
POPULATION GROWTH, 1905-1979

Year of National Census	Population	Rate of Growth (%) from Previous Census
1905	30,740	----
1912	27,747	-9.7
1918	45,525	+64.1
1928	122,847	+169.8
1938	101,883	-17.1
1951	284,186	+178.9
1964	637,929	+124.5
1973 ^a	923,446	+44.8
1979 ^a	1,182,000	+28.0

^aFigures based on projection from 1973 national census.
Source: Arquidiócesis de Cali, Arquidiócesis de Cali (Cali: Departamento de Sociología Religiosa, June, 1979), p. 284, Cuadro 1.

These two demographic phenomena have had implications for the nation's political system as well as for that of Cali. The high rate of population increase has broadened the base of the nation's age pyramid and consequently has

increased the pressures on all the administrative levels of the political system for social services, educational facilities, etc..¹³ But that high rate, together with the extension of suffrage to women(1957) and to eighteen-year olds (1977), has also contributed to a dramatic increase in the size of the country's potential electorate.¹⁴

Table 3 presents the age breakdown, according to sex, of

TABLE 3
POPULATION BY SEX, ACCORDING TO AGE GROUP,
CALI, 1973

Age Groups	Total Population	Men		Women	
		Number	%	Number	%
0 - 4 yrs.	110,635	55,775	6.15	54,860	6.05
5 - 9	120,222	60,194	6.64	60,028	6.62
10 - 14	121,573	59,813	6.59	61,760	6.81
15 - 19	113,444	48,991	5.40	64,453	7.11
20 - 24	91,944	39,414	4.35	52,530	5.79
25 - 29	70,767	31,929	3.52	38,838	4.28
30 - 34	58,108	27,065	2.98	31,043	3.42
35 - 39	50,984	22,829	2.52	28,155	3.10
40 - 44	43,530	20,420	2.25	23,110	2.55
45 - 49	34,084	15,617	1.72	18,467	2.04
50 - 54	27,878	13,092	1.44	14,786	1.63
55 - 59	20,024	9,314	1.03	10,710	1.18
60 - 64	16,879	7,795	0.86	9,084	1.00
65 and over	27,018	11,648	1.28	15,370	1.69
Total	907,090	423,896	46.73	483,194	53.27

Source: DANE, XIV Censo Nacional de Población (Bogotá: DANE, 1973), reprinted in DANE, Perfil Estadístico: Valle del Cauca/Cali (Bogotá: DANE, May, 1979), p. 13, Cuadro 1.6.

¹³As of 1970, 31.72% of the national population was under ten years of age. See Blutstein, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁴As of 1970, the 10-19 year age group comprised 25.54% of the total population of Colombia. *Ibid.*, p. 43. By 1980 these same individuals were all eligible to vote.

Cali's 1973 population. It can be seen that women outnumber men in every age group above the five-nine year group.¹⁵

A similar breakdown for San Judas is presented in Table 4. Here again women outnumber men in almost all the

TABLE 4
POPULATION BY SEX, ACCORDING TO AGE,
BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1973

Age	Total	Men	Women
Less than 1 yr.	253	133	120
1 yr.	208	107	101
2 yrs.	282	145	137
3	302	144	158
4	295	136	159
5	262	140	122
6	273	136	137
7	292	155	137
8	294	144	150
9	318	140	178
10	263	138	125
11	277	132	145
12	263	140	123
13	219	112	107
14	202	102	100
15-19	939	438	501
20-24	729	357	372
25-29	517	244	273
30-34	458	202	256
35-39	478	231	247
40-44	381	185	196
45-49	287	147	140
50-54	225	96	129
55-59	141	65	76
60-64	137	74	63
65-69	62	31	31
70-74	52	21	31
75-79	24	9	15
80-84	14	8	6
85 and over	14	6	8
Total	8461	4118	4343

Source: DANE, XIV Censo Nacional de Población: Cali, 1973, Sector 5-1, Barrio #5107 (Bogotá: DANE, 1973 b), Cuadro 18.

¹⁵Since women were granted suffrage in 1957, they have represented a sizeable percentage of the nation's potential

age groups above the fourteen-year old age group. Calculations based on the data in the table indicate that in 1973 39.9% of the barrio's population was eligible to vote (i.e. 3,373 of the total of 8,461.) That is, 60.1% (or 5,088) of the population was under the age of twenty-one and was thus ineligible to vote. For the entire city of Cali in 1973, 53.4% of the population was ineligible to vote (see Table 5.) Thus the population of San Judas

TABLE 5

POPULATION UNDER TWENTY-ONE, ACCORDING
TO SEX AND AGE GROUP, CALI 1973

Age Groups	Total Population	Men		Women	
		Number	%	Number	%
0 - 4 yrs.	110,635	55,775	6.15 ^b	54,860	6.05 ^b
5 - 9	120,222	60,194	6.64	60,028	6.62
10-14	121,573	59,813	6.59	61,760	6.81
15-19	113,444	48,991	5.40	64,453	7.11
20 yrs. ^a	18,389	7,883	0.87	10,506	1.16
Total	484,263	232,656	25.65	251,607	27.74

^aInterpolation was used to estimate the amount of 20-year olds within the 20-24 year age group.

^bPercentages based on total 1973 population of 907,090.

Source: DANE, XIV Censo Nacional de Población, reprinted in DANE, Pérfil, p. 13.

electorate and by 1980 represented 47.1% of the potential electorate of Cali. However, they have been affected more by high abstention rates than the men. During the first decade of the National Front coalition, voter turnout among men dropped from 67.3% to 34.5%; among women it dropped from 44.5% to 20.4%. See DANE, "Tendencias Electorales," Colombia Política (Bogotá: DANE, 1972 a), p. 151. The decline among the men and women voters of Valle del Cauca during the same ten-year period was even more drastic. Voter turnout among all men over twenty-one in the department declined from 83.0% to 31.3%; among women it declined from 70.4% to

had a heavier concentration at the lower age levels than that of Cali. This finding is not unexpected since most of the pobladores of San Judas were from less-urbanized areas where birth rates are traditionally higher than in the major cities.

The rural-to-urban migration process has also had other implications for the nation's political system. On the national scale, the effect of Colombia's rugged topography on the nation's population distribution pattern has been the growth of several distinct urban centers within the country. This multi-nucleated urbanization pattern (Daland, 1969:253; Lloyd, 1972:179) is contrary to the more common pattern of urban hypercephalism existing in most Latin American countries in which one or two primate cities contain a highly disproportionate amount of the nation's population.¹⁶ Examined from the political perspective, the consequences of a multi-nucleated urbanization pattern for Colombia have been significant. Rather than concentrating a major percentage of its development efforts and resources

19.5%. Ibid., pp. 163-165, Table 8.2.3. For more information on the role of Colombian women in the nation's political system, see Shirley Harkness and Patricia Pinzón de Lewin, "Women, the Vote and the Party in the Politics of the Colombian National Front," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, XVII (November, 1975), 439-464. For a commentary on the "lack of interest" among women voters for the 1980 elections, see El País (Cali), January 7, 1980.

¹⁶By 1978, Colombia had sixty nine towns with populations greater than 30,000. See Rafael Mora-Rubio, "Colombian Experiment," Mazingira, XII (1979), 18.

on the capital city, as do other Latin American governments, the Colombian government has been forced to contend with other centers of economic and political influence. This distribution of power throughout the country has caused increased interest aggregation, bargaining, and shifting of alignments among political factions, all of which have had a direct effect on the three administrative levels of the national government (Daland, 1969:253).

Furthermore, it has been claimed that the urbanization process in Colombia has had an impact on the country's political system in two additional areas - voting behavior and partisan affiliation. Ronald H. McDonald's 1969 cross-national comparative study of "urban core dissent" in Latin America suggests that voters in the central urban areas of all Latin American nations, including Colombia, have a greater tendency than their rural counterparts to vote against the existing dominant political party and regime.

Also, studies in Colombia indicate that abstention rates among urban residents, especially those of the inhabitants of marginal barrios, are much higher than those in rural areas (DANE, 1972 b: 105). And finally, other investigations carried out in Colombia have shown a progressive decrease in the party identification of

urban residents during the 1970's.¹⁷

In short, these three trends (urban core dissent, rising abstention rates, and growing political non-affiliation) suggest that the on-going urbanization of Colombian society, with its concomitant proliferation of marginal barrios, will continue to exert an influence upon the nation's political system throughout the 1980's.

In the specific case of Cali, the rural migrants arriving in the city have been the primary factor in the proliferation of illegal barrios such as invasions, pirate settlements, and controlled clandestine settlements. These illegal settlements have drastically increased the total area and population of the city since 1950.

¹⁷In 1970 party identification in the case of the electorate of Bogotá was 89%. By 1974 it had decreased to 73%. See Gabriel Murillo and Miles Williams, Análisis de las Elecciones de 1974 en Bogotá (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1975), p. 25. Also see Rodrigo Losada and Gabriel Murillo, Análisis de las Elecciones de 1972 en Bogotá (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1973) and J. Mark Ruhl, "Party System in Crisis? An Analysis of Colombia's 1978 Elections," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXXII (1978), 43. Losada offers possible reasons for this apparent decline in partisan affiliation among the urban dwellers of Colombia. He cites a lack of interest in politics, the inability to understand politics, and a general feeling of "disaffection toward the parties" as the three major factors in the decline of partisan identification. Moreover, he found that the only socio-demographic dimension that demonstrated a significant relationship with political non-affiliation was age; that is, non-affiliation was generally inversely related to age among both sexes. See Rodrigo Losada L., "Quiénes Son y Que Piensan Los Que No Tienen Partido Político," Coyuntura Económica, VII (1977 b), 30.

The growth in area of the illegal barrios is verified by the data presented in Table 6:

TABLE 6
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ILLEGAL
BARRIOS OF CALI (IN HECTARES)

	Before 1950	1950- 1959	1960- 1969	1970- 1979
Invasion barrios	139.7	157.2	84.2	141.9
Pirate settlements	13.9	118.3	411.2	47.9
Controlled clandestine settlements	<u>15.2</u>	<u>62.0</u>	<u>183.0</u>	<u>37.7</u>
Total	168.8	337.5	678.4	227.5
	In 1949	In 1959	In 1969	In 1979
Urban surface area of city (urbanized area within and outside of perimeter)	800	2,000	3,600	7,000
Percentage of urban sur- face area illegally developed <u>until this</u> <u>period.</u>	21%	25%	33%	20%

Source: Rodrigo Losada, "Problemas Legales e Institucionales de la Vivienda Popular en Cali," Documento FIDECA-25 (Cali: Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Municipal, Banco de Datos, 1979 a), p. 11, Cuadro 1.

Note that the largest increase in overall development of these illegal barrios occurred during the 1960's (when San Judas was founded) and subsequently decreased.

Nevertheless, the number of invasion settlements¹⁸ actually increased during the 1970's and, as of 1980, still represented a serious problem for the municipal government.¹⁹ The principal consequences of this huge migration into Cali have been the extension of the urban limits, especially to the east and south, and the growth of barrios populares on, within, and outside the urban periphery.

What factors are responsible for the creation of illegal barrios, such as San Judas, in Cali? According to one Colombian political scientist, a major factor in this growth is the lack of opportunities available to the newly-arrived migrant to legally acquire housing (Losada, 1979 a:4). The scholar claims that since most of the migrants to Cali have very limited economic resources, and since private construction firms and the Colombian government have failed to offer apartments or houses that these migrants could afford, the only alternative is for the migrant to seek land in invasion and pirate settlements where he can build his own house. According to Rodrigo Losada:

The low-income families of Cali don't only suffer the greatest impact of the housing shortage, but they also lack sufficient opportunities to buy a house

¹⁸A 1965 report to the Agency for International Development claims that in 1962 30% of Cali's population was living in invasion settlements. See Charles Abrams, "Squatter Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity," Report to A.I.D., Washington, D.C., Department of H.U.D., 1965.

¹⁹See El Occidente (Cali), March 13, 1980.

legally. First, because practically no private urban-construction firm, which offers houses or apartments within reach of the poor families, exists in the city...Second, because the housing programs of the Instituto de Crédito Territorial and of INVICALI, despite their great successes, cannot satisfy the demand and for the most part only serve the middle class or the least poor of the poor..." (1979 a:4-5).²⁰

This lack of access to low-income housing for the migrant to the urban setting is one example of how the Colombian government impedes the socio-economic mobility of the urban poblador and perpetuates the growth of marginal barrios.

Furthermore, Losada views the illegal barrios of Cali as "escape valves" for the frustration of the masses (1979 a:71). Without these barrios, he claims, the political system of Colombia would be subject to violent attacks. He thus warns the leaders of that system against adopting an unrealistic posture vis-à-vis the existence of illegal barrios²¹ and proposes that the system enact legislation

²⁰Losada describes how the I.C.T. built two urbanizations, for families with a minimum monthly income of 6,000 and 6,300 pesos respectively. But according to DANE's 1978 Home Survey, 65% of all Cali's residents earn less than 6,000 pesos per month (Losada, 1979 a:5) and in fact the minimum monthly salary in Colombia was raised to 4,500 pesos per month in January, 1980.

²¹Losada cites Article 10 of Accord #8 of 1973 as an example of an unrealistic response by the municipal government of Cali to the existence of illegal barrios. In the article the government threatens that all illegal settlements (i.e. those not conforming to the municipal housing code) will be "suspended or demolished" (Losada, 1979 a, op. cit., pp. 67-68.)

that will provide the urban poor with other alternatives. Recent remarks by government officials in reference to the development of new invasions in Cali²² demonstrate that the municipal government, although attempting to act according to legal and juridical norms, is still dealing unrealistically with an ever-worsening problem.²³

Another aspect of the redistribution of the Colombian population that has had consequences for the political system of Cali, and for the participation of the pobladores of San Judas within that system, is the notion of the possible re-acculturation and -socialization of urban migrants

²²In early 1980, 17 invasions took place on the urban periphery of Cali. The municipal government, assessing the situation as "one of the most dangerous invasion fevers ever to be witnessed in Cali," threatened to prosecute the invasion organizers and to dislodge the pobladores. See El Occidente (Cali), March 13, 1980. For studies on the eradication of marginal barrios as a specific type of urban policy in Latin America, see E. Bugatti, "La Guerra Contra Las Villas Miserias," Primera Plana, 7 (August, 1969), 55-58; and Carlos Tobar, "The Argentine National Plan for Eradicating Villas de Emergencia," in Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood, eds., Latin American Urban Research, II (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), 221-228.

²³For additional studies on how the national and municipal governments are trying to resolve the housing shortage problem in Cali, and in Colombia as a whole, see INVICALI (Instituto de Vivienda de Cali), Cali: Criterio Sobre Renovación Urbana y la Vivienda Marginal (Cali: INVICALI, 1968); Pedro Morcillo, "Del Deterio de Cali a una Política Urbana," paper presented at the Inter-Regional Seminar on the Improvement of Uncontrolled Settlements and Shantytowns, Cali: United Nations, 1970; and Roberto Pineda, "The Colombian Instituto de Crédito Territorial Housing for Low-Income Families," in Rabinovitz and Trueblood, eds., 1972, op. cit., pp. 197-201.

as they migrate from the rural context to the urban environment. Their behavior in the political system will be influenced by the extent to which their political socialization processes are transformed during the migration period and the extent to which they are influenced by the new value system of the urban environment. For if it is true that political change occurs with "an alternation in the patterns of human interaction, that is, in the release of individuals from the restraints of traditional societies" (Schoultz, 1972 a:386), then political scientists must study whether, and how, the rural-to-urban migration processs of the Latin American peasants affects their political behavior by altering their attitudes and beliefs toward the political system.

"Political culture" has been defined as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of a nation" (Almond and Verba, 1963:13) and as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place" (Verba, 1974:224). Thus political culture refers to the beliefs, attitudes, and values acquired, and internalized, during the lifetime of the individual or group and which define the mode and intensity of political behavior (Czudnowski, 1968). The extent to which these beliefs, attitudes, and values are shared among the members of a community or nation defines

the political cohesiveness of that group (Verba, 1974) because "the likelihood that an individual will internalize a given preference, and act on the basis of such a preference, is related to the proportion of those around him who share that preference" (Berelson and Steiner, 1964:567).

But how does one acquire a political culture in the first place? This process of acquisition, whether conscious or unconscious, is known as "political socialization" and refers specifically to "those developmental processes through which persons acquire political orientations and patterns of behavior" (Easton, 1974:198). Obviously the political socialization of the individual then is a function of the various environments in which he or she has lived (Nelson, 1969). Since different environments affect the socialization pattern in different ways and ultimately shape the individual's political culture, the environment is an important variable in analyzing the political values and behavior of the individual (Cornelius, 1975:226; Hollingsworth, n.d.). And since it is generally believed that the urban environment has a very distinct value system and set of norms in comparison to the traditional values and norms of the rural environment (Leeds, 1968; Morse, 1971), an analysis of the effect of the rural-to-urban migration process on the Latin American campesino is essential if the political scientist is to understand

the role that this individual plays in the political system of the urban area and his motivations for assuming such a role.²⁴

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FEATURES

The influx of the rural poor to Cali has also affected the overall socio-economic composition of the city. Since the socio-economic status of the individual is claimed to be a factor in determining that individual's arena of political participation,²⁵ this alteration of the social structure of Cali may have definite implications for the participation of the city's residents within the municipal political system.

²⁴The "transference from the rural areas of institutions, values, and behavioral patterns and their persistence or adaptation to the specific requirements of the urban setting" is what Germani refers to as "residual ruralism." See Gino Germani, "The City as an Integrating Mechanism: The Concept of Social Integration," in *The Urban Explosion in Latin America*, edited by Glenn H. Beyer, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967, p. 179. For studies dealing with this concept in the Colombian context, see Havens and Flinn, 1970 a, *op. cit.*, and Harvey Kline, "Interest Groups in the Colombian Congress: Group Behavior in a Centralized, Patrimonial Political System," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, XVI (August, 1974), 277. The former examines the elements of the old hacienda system which were transferred to the marginal barrios of Bogotá as well as the traditional rural institutions of gamonalismo (the rural counterpart of urban caciquismo), debt peonage, and compadrazgo (godparenthood). The latter traces the transferral of patron-client relations from the rural to the urban context in Colombia.

²⁵Anderson claims that there is little participation among the masses of Latin America because "the majority of the population in most Latin American nations does not view the national political system as a relevant or comprehensible

Tables 7, 8, and 9 show the evolution of the socio-economic composition of Cali's barrios over an eleven-year period. Using statistics provided by DANE (the National Administrative Department of Statistics), Table 7

TABLE 7
SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF
POPULATION OF CALI, 1967

Socio-Economic Level	1967 Monthly Family Income (pesos)	1967 Population	% of Total Population
High-upper class Mid-upper class	10,000	44,681	5.1
High-middle class	6,000 - 10,000	174,342	19.9
Mid-middle class Lower-middle class	2,000 - 6,000		
High working class Middle working class	800 - 2,000	381,100	43.5
Upper-lower class Lower-lower class	500-800 less than 500	275,969	31.5
Total		876,092	100.0

Source: Pedro Morcillo et al., "Estudio Sobre Abstención Electoral en las Elecciones de Marzo de 1968 en Cali," in DANE, Colombia Política (Bogotá, 1972), p. 62.

arena of personal involvement." See Charles W. Anderson, Political and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), pp. 118-131. Booth claims that although "communal activism is higher among those with lower socio-economic status, those with higher socio-economic status are more active on the national level." See John A. Booth, "Political Participation in Latin America: Levels, Structure, Context, Concentration and Rationality," Latin American Research Review, XIV (1979), 41. Both studies

indicates that the upper classes represented 5.1% of the 1967 population of Cali, the middle classes 19.9% and the working and lower classes 75.0%.

Table 8 points out that by 1970 two trends were evident: the percentages of the municipal population represented by the upper class and the lower classes had decreased and a large increase in the percentage represented by the middle classes had taken place. Moreover,

TABLE 8
SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF
POPULATION OF CALI, 1970

Socio-Economic Level	% of Total Population	Absolute Number
Upper class	4.2	37,489
Upper-middle class Middle Class	14.2	126,749
Lower-middle class	20.7	184,768
Lower class and tugurio	60.9	543,594
Total	100.0	892,600

Source: DANE, "Encuesta de Hogares," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, No. 229 (Bogotá: DANE, 1970).

suggest that the political participation of the masses of Latin America is strictly limited because of their lack of access to resources and socio-economic mobility. As a result, whatever political participation they do exhibit is exhibited at the local level. This hypothesis that the arena of political participation is a function of the individual's socio-economic status in the Colombian context must be verified by further research. The findings of the present study (see Chapter IV) lend support to the hypothesis.

most of the relative increase of the middle classes had been confined to the lower middle class which comprised 20.7% of the city's population in 1970.

By 1978 the figures had again changed (see Table 9). The lower and upper classes had continued to decrease as a percentage of the total population while the percentages of the middle classes had grown. The lower middle class had especially increased and represented 36.21% of the total population of Cali in that year.

TABLE 9
SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF
POPULATION OF CALI, 1978

Socio-Economic Level	% of Total Population
Upper class	1.57
Upper-middle class	8.76
Middle class	7.69
<u>Lower-middle class</u>	<u>36.21</u>
Sub-total	<u>52.66</u>
Lower class	38.08
<u>Lower-lower class</u>	<u>7.69</u>
Sub-total	<u>45.77</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: Based on data provided by Ricardo Marín, DANE, Banco de Datos, Cali, Colombia, December, 1979.

The general trend over the eleven-year period is summed up, in Table 10:

TABLE 10

EVOLUTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF POPULATION OF CALI, 1967-1978
(% of total population)

Socio-Economic Level	1967	1970	1978	% of Change (1967-1978)
Upper classes	5.1	4.2	1.57	-68.6
Upper-middle and middle classes	19.9	14.2	16.45	
Lower-middle classes		20.7	36.21	
Sub total	19.9	34.9	52.66	+164.8
Lower classes ^a	75.0	60.9	45.77	-38.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	

^aIncludes working classes.

Source: See Tables 7, 8, and 9.

Assuming no major methodological changes were made in the retrieval of the data from 1967 to 1978, and also assuming that DANE's socio-economic class definitions were unchanged during that time, Table 10 distinguishes some interesting processes at work as Cali's population grew from 876,092 to about one million during the eleven-year period. By 1978 less than 2% of the population was comprised of members of the upper classes. The lower classes

had also shown a relative decrease since 1967. However, the biggest change over the eleven-year period was the sharp growth of the middle classes (164.8%), and especially of the lower middle class, as a proportion of the total population. Adding this latter group to the lower class provides the following results: almost 82% of the population of Cali was classified as belonging to the lower and lower-middle classes while the rest belonged to the middle and upper classes. To what extent this 82% of Caleño society participated in the municipal political system and that of their respective barrios are questions with important implications for the future of Cali's political system as well as that of the entire Colombian nation.

Despite the apparent growth of the lower-middle class in Cali, the socio-economic stratification of Caleño society is basically a reflection of the larger Colombian society and, to a great degree, of Latin American society in general. That is, it is dual in nature. A widely accepted view among students of Latin American social systems is that of the dual society,²⁶ the masses and the

²⁶The division of the majority of Latin American society into two distinct social strata has been documented by studies done in Argentina (Germani, 1970), Brazil (Hutchinson, 1960), Mexico (Eckstein, 1977), Chile (Petras, 1969), and Peru (Robles Rivas, 1972). Although in some cases this division has resulted in class conflict, this has not generally been the case in Colombia. Despite the existence of a well-defined social stratification system in Colombia, class conflict has traditionally been controlled by the multi-class political parties which dominate the nation's political system through their cooptative

elites, the "sub-culture" and the "dominant culture" (Pike, 1973). One scholar rather over-simply characterizes this social dichotomy as consisting of "a small, highly intellectual white aristocratic elite...and a great mass of humble, poverty-stricken, disease-ridden, uneducated colored or mixed-blood campesinos..." (Smith, 1951). While this characterization is overstated, an elite class is said to dominate the social, economic, and political spheres of Colombian life while at the bottom of the social ladder the masses "remain enveloped in an economic struggle for survival" (Horowitz, 1970:24) and are effectively restrained from participating to a large degree in the political system. By dominating this rigid social caste system inherited from the Spaniards,²⁷ the elite class has been able to mollify class conflict and

structures and policies. Thus social conflict in Colombia has been aligned along partisan lines more so than along social class lines. See Vernon Lee Fluharty, "The Conquest of Power: Nature of the Party Struggle," in Francisco José Moreno and Barbara Mitrani, eds., Conflict and Violence in Latin American Politics (New York: Thomas Cromwell Co., Inc., 1971); and Alan Angell, "Cooperation and Conflict in Colombia," Political Studies, XIV (1966), 53-71.

²⁷For studies on the effects of Spain's legacy on the socio-political order of Latin America, including Colombia, see Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," in World Politics, XV (January, 1973); Fredrick B. Pike, Spanish America, 1900-1970: Tradition and Social Innovation (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1973); and Richard Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in Louis Hartz et al., The Founding of New Societies (New York, 1964).

maintain the traditional patrimonial society (Silvert, 1964).²⁸

Although some scholars assert, and the data from Cali indicate, that there is an emerging middle class in Latin America, in many cases this middle class is "only an extension of the traditional upper class, both in terms of economic position and of basic values" (R. Adams, 1967: 16). Those who hold this view agree with the prevalent notion that "the dominant motive of social behavior is assumed (whether rightly or wrongly) to be the increased mobility toward the higher end of the stratification hierarchy" (Apter, 1958:221). My study in Colombia lends support to this apparent aspiration for upward social mobility, especially among those of the middle class.

Much has been written on the inegalitarian power structure of the Colombian socio-political system. It has been described as oligarchic (Hoskin and Swanson, 1974; Leal Buitrago, 1973; García, 1951; Cepeda, 1966)²⁹ and

²⁸In recent years Latin America has witnessed, in the cases of the 1979 Sandinista-led revolution in Nicaragua and the social class struggle and political violence in neighboring El Salvador, the erosion of elite hegemony which for so long has been the dominant characteristic of the socio-political system of those two Latin American nations.

²⁹James Payne disagrees with this oligarchic concept of the Colombian power structure and claims that political conflict is not based on social forces and processes but on the personal goals and incentives of the participants in the Colombian political system. See James L. Payne, "The Oligarchy Muddle," World Politics, XX (1968 b), 439-453. Also see Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968 a) by the same author.

elitist (Dix, 1967). It has been blamed for creating a situation of "internal colonialism" (Havens and Flinn, eds., 1970) within the country and its tendency to maintain a bifurcated social order has been cited as one of the causes of Colombia's slow socio-economic development (Lleras Restrepo, 1964:85 and 1965). An examination of some of the nation's socio-economic indicators supports these claims.

A common feature of the social structure of many Latin American countries, Colombia included, is the tendency for a small percentage of the population to control an overwhelmingly large percentage of the nation's resources (Lebret, 1958:7). Although Colombia is by no means the most extreme example of this tendency in Latin America, there exists, nevertheless, much inequality in the national resource distribution pattern.

In 1970 the upper 20% of the Colombian population³⁰ received 61% of the national income while the bottom 40% earned only 9% of that income (Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1976:240).

Although these figures exhibit an improvement over the 1953 statistics which showed that only 5% of the population

³⁰This upper 20% in 1970 included the upper class (5%), consisting of the traditional landed elite and the new rich, and the middle class (15%), comprised of professionals, technicians, white-collar workers, and the owners of medium-sized businesses. See Blutstein, op. cit., p. 109.

received 56.2% of the national income (Sojo Zambrano, 1967:8), they still illustrate the highly skewed income distribution of the country.³¹

Related to the country's unequal income distribution pattern is its securities distribution pattern which is also highly skewed. According to the Ministry of Labor, in 1971 0.2% of all securities holders held 61% of all the shares in the country (Blutstein, 1977:209).

The per capita gross national product (GNP) of Colombia grew from U.S. \$285 in 1953, to U.S. \$340 in 1962, and U.S. \$358 in 1970 (Sojo Zambrano, 1968:10; Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1976:240). While the amount of increase during the first nine-year period was 19.3%, it dropped to 5.3% during the latter eight-year period. One of the probable factors in this decline was the high rate of population increase during the 1960's when the annual growth rate of the national population exceeded 3.4% (Blutstein, 1977:40).

The annual per-capita income statistics are another indication of the poverty which exists in Colombia. Per-capita income grew from U.S. \$251 in 1953, to U.S. \$286

³¹ These figures however can be misleading. Focusing solely on the upper 5%, other figures show that from 1960 to 1970 this segment of the Colombian population actually experienced an increase in its percentage of the national income from 36% to 40% (Blutstein, 1977: 334). Another source indicates that in 1974 "3.6% of the population controlled 27.2% of the nation's total income and 45% of all households had annual per capita incomes below \$150". See Jonathan Hartlyn, "Colombia: Troubled Past, Troubling Future," Newsday (Garden City, New York), March 20, 1980.

in 1962, to U.S. \$325 in 1970, and to U.S. \$473 in 1975 (Sojo Zambrano, 1967:10; Blutstein, 1977:334).

Even though this represents an increase of 88.4% over the 22-year period, many Colombians still must struggle to survive in an economy beset with high levels of inflation and unemployment.³²

Although by 1979 70% of the Colombian populace was residing in urban areas, a review of the rural land use pattern in Colombia points out another inequality in the socio-economic system of the nation.³³ Lloyd (1972) estimates that as of 1972, 4% of the Colombian farms contained 67% of the country's cultivable land. This estimate is in general agreement with the government estimate of the previous year that 3% of the landowners owned 55% of the land (Blutstein, 1977:209). When one considers that only 4.9% of the total land area of the country is used for cropland,³⁴ it becomes very clear that only a small amount of cultivable land is available to the rural poor.

³²The Colombian government cited the official 1979 inflation rate as 28%. According to DANE, the unemployment rate in Cali at the end of September, 1979, was 11% (El País, (Cali), January 23, 1980). But unemployment rates in the marginal barrios of Cali were undoubtedly much greater. See the case of San Judas below.

³³For an historical perspective on Colombia's land tenure system, see Dale Adams, "Land Tenure System: Antecedents and Problems," in Havens and Flinn, eds., 1970, op. cit.

³⁴As of 1974, according to information from the United States Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia Annual Situation Report (January 31, 1975) as cited in Blutstein, op. cit., p. 349 (Table 13).

This situation of unequal land distribution has acted as a "push" factor in stimulating rural-to-urban migration.

In sum, these socio-economic indicators lend validity to the claim of the "dual society" in Colombia and demonstrate the stark contrasts extant in the social stratification system of that nation. Consequently the urban marginal barrio has become a refuge for the urban and rural poor and has been a factor in the growing awareness, among the pobladores, of a class consciousness which may be manifesting itself in an increasing repudiation of the paternalistic, elitist political system controlled by the two traditional political parties.³⁵

BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO

San Judas is the refuge of a segment of Cali's poor. Established illegally in 1962, the barrio is populated largely by migrants from outside of Cali who arrived in the city seeking a better life for themselves and their families. But after eighteen years of existence the

³⁵The strong support among the Colombian poor for the ANAPO presidential candidate in 1970 (Schoultz, 1972 b) and the wide support among all sectors of the Caleño electorate for the Movimiento Cívico in the 1978 and 1980 elections (see Chapter III) are two probable indications of disillusionment with the Liberal and Conservative parties. Other studies suggest that class consciousness does not play an important role in the political behavior of the Colombian electorate. For a discussion of the noticeable lack of a social-class cleavage in the Colombian electorate during the presidential election of 1978, see Ruhl, op. cit.

residents of San Judas continue to face serious problems in their efforts to more fully integrate themselves into the social, economic and political spheres of Caleño society.

The barrio has well-defined limits (see Figure 2). Carrera 41A (K41A), the northern boundary of San Judas, separates the barrio from another barrio popular, Guabal. The southern and eastern boundaries are large open aqueducts built by the municipal government for the proposed purpose of controlling the municipal drainage of rainwater. The western boundary, 16th Street, separates San Judas from a government urbanization project on the southern end and from a large vacant field at the northern end. This field is the only available source of additional land should the barrio decide to expand. However, the chances of expansion in the near future seem very remote.

The two aqueducts, the Caño Canaveralejo to the south and the so-called Caño de la Muerte (Canal of Death)³⁶ to the east, have played a very important role in the political development of the barrio because of the repeated overflowing of the Caño de la Muerte and the efforts of the pobladores to seek government assistance to resolve the

³⁶The residents of San Judas have given the aqueduct this name because it is estimated that in the last sixteen years sixteen people have drowned in it for one reason or another (eg. small children and drunkards who have fallen in; people who have been mugged and then pushed in.)




FIGURE 2. Street Map of Barrio San Judas Tadeo, Cali, 1980.

problem. The Caño Canaveralejo carries rain water from the slopes of the western range of the Andes Mountains which forms the western boundary of the Cauca Valley. The Caño de la Muerte was also originally built for the purpose of carrying rain water. However, in practice it has become a huge open sewer transporting raw sewage from the barrios north of San Judas.³⁷ The problem of flooding in San Judas and the nearby barrios results from the juncture of the two aqueducts at the southeast corner of the barrio. In the rainy season (known as "winter" in Colombia) the current of the rainwater being carried down from the mountains by the Caño Canaveralejo is very strong. Consequently when the water reaches the juncture with the slower current of the Caño de la Muerte, the raw sewage of the latter backs up and overflows into the barrio. For this reason most of the furniture and belongings of the barrio residents are elevated several feet above the floor. Despite these efforts, the flooding has reached heights of

³⁷ Many of San Judas' residents claim that the government deceived them in its purpose for constructing the aqueduct. That is, they claim the government was well aware that the aqueduct would be used to transport raw sewage southward. A recent government attempt to widen the aqueduct, and thus increase its potential capacity, elicited a response from the barrio residents in the form of a confrontation between workmen and hundreds of barrio pobladores. The peaceful protest achieved its goals when the workmen withdrew from the barrio and the government subsequently cancelled the project.

five feet within San Judas, causing much hardship to the barrio's residents.

This annually-repeated overflow of raw sewage into the barrio is the major problem facing the pobladores of San Judas³⁸ and has motivated them to resolve the problem by means of interaction, via voluntary associations, with the officials and bureaucrats of the municipal government as well as with politicians at the municipal and department levels.

San Judas is divided into three sectors (etapas) which reflect the evolution of the barrio (see Figure 3). Sector I consists of that part of the barrio located to the north of Carrera 44. It is the largest and oldest (first settled by pobladores in 1962) of the three etapas and is a pirate settlement. Sector II, also a pirate settlement, stretches from Carrera 44 southward to, and including, Carrera 48. Sectors I and II, both settled in the 1960's, occupy 32.0 hectares of land.³⁹ Sector III, settled as an invasion during the 1970's, occupies the 8.2 hectares of land to the south of Carrera 48.⁴⁰

³⁸According to a survey taken of positional leaders within the barrio and informal discussions with many other barrio residents.

³⁹In the metric system, one hectare is equal to 10,000 square meters (or 2.47 acres).

⁴⁰With the growth of sector III during the 1970's, the population of San Judas was estimated at 10,000 in 1980.




FIGURE 3. Three Sectors of Barrio San Judas Tadeo.

As of 1977, San Judas, consisting of three sectors encompassing 40.2 hectares, had still not been officially approved as a legal barrio by the municipal authorities.⁴¹ The main reason for this lack of government approval was the question of who owned the land in sectors I and II.

The area comprised by sectors I and II was originally privately owned. A contract to buy the land was signed in the early 1960's between the original owners and a private urbanizing company, the Sociedad Urbanizadora El Bosque Ltda., which was directed by a member of the municipal council who also served on the board of Municipal Planning. El Bosque created a pirate settlement by selling lots to pobladores without following the guidelines of the municipal code which specify the physical and structural requirements for the occupation of uninhabited land within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Cali.⁴² When El Bosque went bankrupt, it declared that all those who had bought lots (some of which were reportedly sold three or four times to different families)

⁴¹At that time there were twenty unapproved barrios in Cali. They comprised a total of 445.2 hectares of land, or 14% of the total area of Cali. See Rodrigo Losada, Problemas Legales e Institucionales de la Vivienda Popular en Cali, Documento PIDECA-25 (Cali: Departamento Administrativo Planeación Municipal, 1979 a). The number of unapproved barrios has probably increased since 1977 because of the recent rash of invasions in 1979 and 1980.

⁴²For example, 8% of the land to be inhabited must be designated as "green zones". In sector II of San Judas no land was set aside for this purpose. Thus a direct violation of the municipal code was committed.

were invading private property. The company was subsequently brought to court by the original owners of the land who claimed that the terms of the contract had been violated by the company. This bankruptcy suit has still not been resolved. In the meantime, the municipal government has appointed an interim caretaker (síndico) to receive the monthly land payments of the barrio residents.

As of 1980, the large majority of the pobladores of San Judas still did not have any legal title to the land on which they lived. The effects of this contextual factor on the political participation of the inhabitants of San Judas and the political responses of the municipal government to the demand-making efforts of these inhabitants are examined in Chapter V.⁴³

It is difficult for the outside observer to notice any physical differences between sectors I and II of San Judas. Except for a small segment of paved road in Sector II, all the roads are made of dirt and are difficult to travel over, especially during the winter. The houses, mostly one-story, have, for the most part, electricity and water, but there is no sewage system available

⁴³For a study outside the Latin American context which demonstrates the apparent success of the individual negotiations of invasion pobladores with public officials to obtain land titles, see Joan M. Nelson, "Migration, Integration of Migrants, and the Problem of Squatter Settlements in Seoul, Korea: Report on a Field Study for the Smithsonian Institute," mimeo., Washington, D.C., July, 1972.

in the barrio. Most of the pobladores are industriously involved in improving their own houses with their own resources and houses in all stages of completion are a very common sight. Many of the homes of sector III on the other hand are poorly constructed and of a provisional nature. In many cases, hoses are used to transport potable water to the home, raw sewage from the home runs out into the street, and electricity is illegally syphoned off of municipal power lines.

DANE has divided San Judas into five zones (see Figure 4). Zones 1, 2, 3, and 5 are classified as "lower-class" socio-economic zones while zone 4, roughly equivalent to the invasion area of sector III, is designated as a "low-lower" zone (see Appendix A).

The residents of San Judas are fairly representative, in terms of education and employment, of Caleño society at large. In 1978, 10.6% of all Caleños five years of age and older were illiterate. This figure shows a small decline from 1973 when the illiteracy rate was 11.1%.⁴⁴ Table 11 presents the educational levels attained by the five-year old and over population of Cali. As can be

⁴⁴DANE, 1979, op. cit., p. 29, Cuadro 3.1. According to statistics from the 1973 national census, the illiteracy rate for the population of Cali, five years of age and older, was 13.95%. See DANE, La Población en Colombia, 1973, XIV Censo Nacional de Población y III de Viviendas, Muestra de Avance, (Bogotá: DANE, 1973 a), p. 361, Cuadro 3. This discrepancy in the illiteracy rate is a very common feature of much of the statistical data provided by the various government agencies within Colombia, data which is continually being revised.




FIGURE 4. Socio-Economic Zones of Barrio San Judas Tadeo.
Source: DANE, "Plano de Cali," Sector 5107 (1979) as received from Ricardo Marín, DANE, Banco de Datos, Cali, Colombia.

calculated from the data in the table, about 70% of this segment of Caleño society went no farther than primary school.

TABLE 11
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THOSE
PERSONS FIVE YEARS OR MORE
OF AGE, CALI, 1973

Level	Number
No education	102,475
Primary	470,650
Secondary	192,150
University and post-secondary	22,500
Other	3,825
No response	24,775

Source: DANE, La Población en Colombia, 1973
(Bogotá: DANE, 1973 a), p. 363, Cuadro 5.

In 1973, 7,121 residents of San Judas were five years of age or older. Of this amount only 1,944 (27.3%) were actively involved in some type of educational training (see Table 12).

From the perspective of employment, in 1978 there were 496,062 Caleños who were economically active out of a

total of 927,173 potential workers.⁴⁵ That is, 46.5% of the potential labor force was inactive in 1978. Of those who were active, the large majority was involved

TABLE 12

PERSONS UNDERGOING EDUCATIONAL TRAINING, BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1973^a

Level of Education	Number of Persons
Elementary	1,595
Secondary	250
Technical-vocational	12
Normal school	1
University, post-secondary	7
Other	12
No information	67
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,944</u>

^aIncludes those persons five years of age and older.
Source: DANE, XIV Censo Nacional de Población: Cali, 1973, Sector 5-1, Barrio #5107 (Bogotá: DANE, 1973 b), Cuadro 09.

⁴⁵This figure is based on that segment of the population 12 years of age and older. See DANE, 1979, op. cit., p. 22, Cuadro 2.1.

in three economic activities: the manufacturing industry; restaurants and hotels; and communal, social, and personal services⁴⁶ (see Table 13).

TABLE 13
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION ACCORDING
TO ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, CALI, 1978

Economic Activity	Number of Persons Involved in Activity
Agriculture and cattle	5,051
Mines and quarries	1,194
Manufacturing industry	129,977
Electric, gas, water	3,288
Construction	28,370
Commerce, restaurants and hotels	104,867
Transportation and communi- cations	30,751
Financial establishments	22,639
Communal, social and per- sonal services	124,575
No information	596

Source: DANE, "National Home Survey," Stage 20,
Boletín Mensual de Estadística, #327
(Bogotá: DANE, September, 1978).

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 25, Cuadro 2.4.B.

Table 14 shows the type of activity in which all the pobladores of San Judas, ten years of age or older, were involved. Only a small percentage (36.5%) was actively working outside the home. In this respect the unemployment rate in San Judas was greater than that of Cali as a whole.

TABLE 14

POPULATION, TEN YEARS OR OLDER, ACCORDING TO
TYPE OF ACTIVITY, BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1973

Type of Activity	Number of Persons
Employed	2,072
Unemployed	129
Seeking employment	258
Landlord	74
Retired or pensioned	9
Student	1,337
Housework	1,548
No activity	237
No information	18
<u>Total</u>	<u>5,682</u>

Source: DANE, XIV Censo Nacional de Población: Cali, 1973, Sector 5-1, Barrio #5107 (Bogotá: DANE, 1973 b), Cuadro 11.

As is the case in many of Cali's barrios populares, the young sector of the potential labor force represented a major portion of the economically inactive population of San Judas. In his study of the economic system of Cali from the perspective of the urban slum-barrio youth, John P. Walter claimed that these youngsters viewed their respective barrio as a "security pocket" and that they resigned themselves to a life of poverty (1970:159). These claims are similar to those of the "culture of poverty" thesis discussed in Chapter I. However my observations in San Judas suggest that a small percentage of these youths is beginning to challenge these claims by using education as the channel for upward socioeconomic mobility.

Table 15 identifies the area of economic activity of those pobladores of San Judas who defined themselves as "employed" in Table 14. The general pattern of employment among the residents of San Judas was similar to that for all the economically-active residents of Cali (see Table 13). As indicated in Table 15, most of the economically-active pobladores worked in either the manufacturing industry, construction, commerce, or in communal, personal, and social services.

TABLE 15
 POPULATION (TEN YEARS OR OLDER) EMPLOYED,
 ACCORDING TO TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT, BARRIO
 SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1973

Type of Activity	Number of Persons
1. Agriculture, hunting, fishing	14
2. Mining	9
3. Manufacturing industry	541
4. Electric, gas, water	29
5. Construction	333
6. Commerce, wholesale	8
Commerce, retail	401
Hotels and restaurants	55
No information	1
Sub-Total	465
7. Transportation and warehouses	122
Communications	5
Sub-Total	127
8. Financial establishments	13
Real estate	16
Sub-Total	29
9. Community, social and personal services	
Public administration and defense	40
Sanitation	3
Social and community services	71
Cultural and recreational services	19
Personal and domestic services	231
No information	3
Sub-Total	367
10. Activities not well specified	37
11. No information	121
Total	2,072

Source: DANE, XIV Censo Nacional de Población: Cali, 1973, Sector 5-1, Barrio #5107 (Bogotá: DANE, 1973 b), Cuadro 13.

III. POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND LINKAGES

Chapter III examines and analyzes the political structures of Cali and San Judas and the political linkages, both particularistic and communal, which exist within the barrio and between the barrio and the municipal political system. This examination and analysis is based directly on the data gathered by the empirical research carried out in Colombia during a three and one-half month period.

METHODOLOGY

Since I arrived in Cali with no idea of which barrio popular was to serve as the focus of the present study, I initially sought help from Dr. Judith de Campos, a political scientist at the Universidad del Valle, who had been residing and teaching in Cali for more than a decade. She introduced me to one of her graduate students, Hernán Vasco, who personally introduced me to several of the barrios populares of Cali. My search for the appropriate barrio in which to undertake the present investigation was immensely aided by Mr. Vasco and subsequently by the two parish priests at the San Juan Bautista parish center in the barrio of Guabal. I had contacted the priests

because I knew that other socio-political studies had been carried out in Guabal in the past (see Walter, 1970). The priests suggested San Judas Tadeo, a poor barrio within their parish, as a possible site for the study. A visual inspection of the barrio, as well as an informal conversation with a resident of San Judas who soon became a good friend and my principal informant within the barrio, convinced me that the barrio would be a feasible site in which to carry out the necessary research. The present study was thus the first socio-political study to be undertaken on a large scale in San Judas.

The data presented in this and the following chapter were collected in San Judas using a semi-structured interview technique (explained below) and a political survey. The latter was administered in February, 1980, to 301 residents of the barrio.

The first problem I encountered in preparing for the survey was to obtain volunteers who could serve as interviewers. After consulting with the principal of the nearby high school in Guabal and with friends in San Judas, I was able to find nine young people who were willing to work with me on the project. Of the seven males and two females, eight were in high school and one was a university student. They were all long-time residents of San Judas interested in the future of their barrio. Furthermore, they had all received some previous training, mostly from their high school experience, in survey techniques

and interviewing procedures. This training was supplemented by a pre-survey session that I organized in order to review those techniques and procedures and to tailor them to the particular circumstances of the barrio.

The survey was carried out during a four-hour period on a Sunday morning two weeks before the mitaca¹ elections. The morning hours were chosen because it was thought that most of the barrio residents were most likely to be at home at that time. The barrio was divided into five zones (see Figure 4 in Chapter II) and the interviewers worked in pairs in four of the zones while the remaining zone was handled by one interviewer. The survey was carried out without any major problems and with the cooperation of most of those residents. Some of the pobladores were interviewed on the street; but most were interviewed in their homes.

Once the data-gathering process was completed, the interviewers and I continued with the next two stages of the project, i.e. the tabulation of the data and the interpretation of those data. We met at two post-survey meetings in the house of one of the interviewers for those two purposes. In short, the nine interviewers participated in all phases of the sample survey and benefited from the learning experience. They participated

¹The "mitaca" elections are nationwide elections for departmental assemblies and municipal councils. They are held every two years.

in the preparation and carrying out of the survey and in the tabulation and interpretation of the data. Copies of the final tabulated data were left with one of the interviewers and with the parish priest. This was done to disspell the fears of those barrio residents who suspected that I intended to take the results of the survey out of the barrio without letting them share in those results.

The actual survey, presented in Appendix D, was purposely kept short so that each interview would take a minimal amount of time. Moreover, each question was carefully formulated in order to elicit the specific information required by the investigation. The rationale behind the formulation of those questions is explained below.

The data were analyzed along three dimensions - age, sex, and zone, only the first of which provided any significant findings. The breakdown of those interviewed, by sex and zone, is presented in Table 16:

TABLE 16
 SURVEY SAMPLE, ZONE BY SEX, BARRIO
 SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1980
 (N-301)

Zone	Total People Interviewed	Total Men	Men as % of Total	Total Women	Women as % of Total
1	60	29	48.3	31	51.7
2	98	42	42.9	56	57.1
3	61	28	45.9	33	54.1
4	50	24	48.0	26	52.0
5	32	10	31.2	22	68.8
	<u>301</u>	<u>133</u>	<u>44.4</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>55.6</u>

As can be seen from the table, the most skewed sample appears in Zone 5 where 68.8% of those interviewed were female. This was also the zone where the least amount of people, thirty two, had been interviewed. Nevertheless, these two factors exerted a very small influence on the representativeness of the sample.

Table 17 demonstrates how representative the total sample of barrio pobladores was of the true male-female breakdown in the barrio (the universe). The data for the barrio are based on information from the 1973 national census.

TABLE 17
 REPRESENTATIVENESS OF SAMPLE BY SEX,
 BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1980

	% Male	% Female	Total %
Population of San Judas ^a	47.5	52.5	100.0 (N=3895)
Survey Sample	44.4	55.6	100.0 (N=301)

^aEighteen years and over, according to DANE, XIV Censo Nacional de Población: Cali, 1973, Sector 5-1, Barrio #5107 (Bogotá, 1973 b).

The divergence between DANE's figures and those of the survey is only plus or minus 3.1%. Thus, according to sex, the sample is quite representative of the universe.

The representativeness of the survey sample according to age is presented in Table 18. Once again, the figures provided by DANE are from the 1973 census.

TABLE 18
 REPRESENTATIVENESS OF SAMPLE BY AGE,
 BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1980

Age Group	Number of Persons Interviewed	Number as % of Total (N=301)	% of Persons in San Judas ^a (N=3895)
1 (18-19)	33	11.0	9.6
2 (20-29)	83	27.6	32.0
3 (30-39)	55	18.3	24.0
4 (40-49)	54	17.9	17.2
5 (50-59)	47	15.6	9.4
6 (60+)	29	9.6	7.8

^aBased on DANE, XIV Censo Nacional de Población: Cali, 1973, Sector 5-1, Barrio #5107 (Bogotá, 1973 b).

The data in Table 18 indicate that the largest divergence from the universe is the sample of age group 5. That divergence is 6.2%. Overall, the sample is fairly representative of the 1973 age breakdown of San Judas.

In sum, there are slight divergences in age and sex between the sample (N=301) and the universe (N=3895) from which that sample was drawn. Adjustments for these divergences have not been made. Considering that the sample represents 7.7% of the universe, the small divergences cited above do not detract significantly from the validity of the conclusions drawn from the survey data.

RESULTS IN PERSPECTIVE

The findings of the field research to be presented below must not be divorced from the political universe of which San Judas is a part. That universe is the Colombian political system. Its diverse components have strongly influenced the formation and development of the structures and linkages to be investigated below. Thus the following discussion presents an analysis of the specific structural and linkage components of the political system of San Judas within the general context of the Colombian political system.

Contrary to those scholars who perceive the marginal barrios of the Third World as chaotic and socially

disorganized environments completely alienated from the political system of the country, San Judas was found to have a plethora of voluntary associations, all with linkages, direct or indirect, to the municipal political system.² The great majority of these associations, while claiming to be civic-minded in nature, were also partisan-affiliated and served as the grass-roots organizations, and "transmission entities" (González Camus, 1978:21) of the various political parties, factions, and movements of the larger political system. In this sense, they were the lowest links in the centralized, hierarchically-structured political system of the nation.

The political linkage system of Colombia, of which the voluntary associations of San Judas form an integral part, has evolved to its present state as the consequence of two distinct processes - the formation of national party organizations by the factions of the Liberal and Conservative parties; and the evolution of the nation's constitutional structures. The former created a partisan linkage system, based on personalism and patronage, which

²McDonald claims that in the case of the residents of Bogotá's "most wretched barrios...real and imagined fear of police and each other keep most neighbors immune from party organization or any kind of socio-political coordination." See Ronald H. McDonald, "Political Protest and Alienation in Voting: The Case of Colombia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXI (Autumn, 1967), 9. I did not find this fear to exist in San Judas or at least to be very obvious. Undoubtedly the memories of La Violencia were much fresher in the minds of the Colombian populace in 1967 than in 1980.

extends from the national level, through the departmental and municipal levels, to the voluntary associations of the local barrio. The latter established a strongly-centralized unitarian government which linked the executive branches at each administrative level of the political system for the purposes of dominating the popularly elected legislative bodies at those levels and controlling the communal organization and activism of local barrio residents. Both processes have acted as contextual factors within the nation's political system and must be well understood in order to properly analyze the role of the voluntary associations of San Judas within that system.

COLOMBIAN PARTY SYSTEM

The first process which has significantly affected the development of Colombia's political linkage system is the formation, on the part of the two traditional political parties, of national partisan structures which extend down to the level of the barrio popular in an effort to socialize, mobilize, and politicize the masses in an organized fashion along partisan lines. A brief overview of the origins, history, nature, and dynamics of the Colombian party system follows as a prelude to the subsequent discussion of the voluntary associations of San Judas and the role of those associations within the

context of the inter-party and intra-party struggles of 1980 Cali.

The history of Colombian politics is, to a large extent, the history of the nation's political parties. Since their emergence as formal political organizations in 1848, the Liberal and Conservative parties have dominated the political system and their evolution over the past one hundred and thirty two years has greatly affected the history and development of the Colombian nation.

The Liberal and Conservative parties are mass-based, elite-controlled, multi-class, clientelistic³ political organizations which began to develop in the 1830's and became more well-defined in 1848 when the two political forces took opposing stances vis-à-vis the government of President Tomás Cipriano Mosquera. The two parties originated in the sharp bifurcation of Colombian society caused by the elite struggle among 19th century rural

³The Liberal and Conservative parties are patron-client parties with characteristics similar in many ways to the nineteenth century and early twentieth century machine parties of the urban areas in the United States. In this respect, they act as brokers between the citizen and the state in much the same way as have the two traditional parties of Uruguay. See Robert E. Biles, "Political Participation in Urban Uruguay: Mixing Public and Private Ends," in Political Participation in Latin America, Volume I: Citizen and State, eds. John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978.) The patron-client feature of the Liberal and Conservative parties in Colombia has also been cited as a major factor in their ability to adapt to rapid socio-economic change. See Samuel Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 61.

caciques for control of the nation's economic and political resources. These caciques exchanged patronage, protection, and material resources for political support. However as the partisan cleavage was broadened and intensified because of a series of civil wars, mass loyalty shifted from the individual patrón to the political party with its personalistic leaders (R. Kaufman, 1977:118).

Thus throughout their history, the political parties have created a deep cleavage in Colombian society, a cleavage which has transcended class divisions and has been maintained by strong partisan loyalties. The hierarchical and confederated structure of the parties links national party leaders to local party bosses (gamonales) who control regional party organizations with links to the voluntary associations of local barrios. This linkage system allows the parties to wield strict control over the political socialization, mobilization, and participation of the masses.

The greatest achievement of the party leaders has been their success in mobilizing and controlling the masses. This success is largely the result of the political socialization pattern which has prevailed in the country throughout most of its history. The best way of explaining this socialization process is by using the Gemeinschaft concept of membership in a group (Tönnies, 1963).

In the case of Colombia, party affiliation has been primarily determined by factors such as the party identification of the individual's parents and the individual's place of birth. More specifically, party identification in Colombia has traditionally been "ascribed and sacred" (Fals Borda, 1962), has infrequently resulted from individual choice, and has been strengthened by a "mysticism generated by each party" (Hoskin and Swanson, 1974:398). During the past thirty years, especially with the onset of modernization in Colombia and the rapid evolution of the rural-to-urban migration process, the Gemeinschaft concept may have become less valid as a tool for explaining partisan affiliation and may be slowly yielding to the Gesellschaft concept of voluntary association based on individual motivation and choice. More research is needed to test this hypothesis. In the meantime it is safe to assume that the basis for the "hereditary hatreds" (Dix, 1967) between the two parties and their members has been more ascriptive than not.

The evolution of the Colombian political system has been directly affected by the inter-party struggles which have been so characteristic of the Colombian party system since its inception over one hundred and thirty

years ago⁴ and which are still very evident among the partisan-affiliated voluntary associations of San Judas today. The formation of factions within the two parties has been another significant factor in the evolution of the nation's political system. The fluctuating alliances among these factions have caused much intra-party conflict, have intensified inter-party conflict, and have subsequently led one student of Colombian politics to describe the party system as a "multi-party system with alliances" (McDonald, 1967:19).

⁴Payne cites instances of these inter-party struggles as examples of what he terms "defensive feuds". "A defensive feud is a struggle between two groups in which each side recognizes the existence of a mutually acceptable solution less costly than fighting, but that solution cannot be reached" (1968 a:161). That is, contextual factors make it impossible for a truce, which both sides find preferable to continued conflict, to be reached and maintained. Payne claims a defensive feud is most likely to occur in a political system where six specific conditions are met: "incentives for political participation are strong; only two parties exist; party identification with those parties is high; the parties are decentralized; partisan channels of communication (at least on strategic matters) exist; and the military is prevented from intervening" (1968 a:165). In the case of Colombia these conditions have existed for most of the duration of the nation's party system. See James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968 a). The concept of the defensive feud in Colombian politics should be analyzed in relation to the concept of consociationalism. It would appear that the two terms characterize contrary circumstances. For example, Payne cites the 1946-1953 period in Colombian history as a defensive feud whereas Dix cites the same period as an abortive attempt at consociationalism. See Robert H. Dix, "Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia," Comparative Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (April, 1980), pp. 303-321. The concept of consociationalism in the Colombian context is discussed below. For an overview of the inter-party struggle in Colombia, see Vernon Lee Fluharty, "The Conquest of Power: Nature of the Party Struggle," in Francisco José Moreno and Barbara Mitrani, editors, Conflict and Violence in Latin American Politics (New York: Thomas Cromwell Co., Inc., 1971).

Inter-party conflict during the 19th century was based on the struggle for control of the government and the partisan divisiveness caused by differing ideologies.⁵ The Liberals were the champions of federalism and secularism. They were seriously influenced by Anglo-Saxon liberal ideas and by the bourgeois ethic and clashed with the traditional values of Spanish Catholicism. The Conservatives denounced the Liberal Party's adherence to the tenets of Benthamite rationalism and positivist utilitarianism. They sought to establish a strong unitarian government and to preserve the role of the Catholic Church in politics and society. The Conservative Party espoused authority as a means of preserving order and social class distinctions and privileges and viewed the individual as subservient to the collectivity. In short, the ideological cleavage between the two political parties pitted the essential spirit of the Spanish soul, with its organic concept of society, against the liberal concepts of utilitarianism, individual liberty, and anti-clericalism which were so prevalent in Latin America when Colombia gained its independence in 1810. Although this wide ideological divergence between the two parties had greatly narrowed as of 1980, the struggle between the two parties for control of the nation's political system continued unabated.

⁵Much of the following discussion is based on the excellent work of Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, El Pensamiento Colombiano en el Siglo XIX (Bogotá: Editorial Temis, 1964).

From 1832 until 1861, the Liberal and Conservative parties fought for control of the national government. The struggle took the forms of a civil war (1840-1842), a military coup (1854), and another civil war in 1860. The period 1861-1880 was mostly characterized by Liberal rule. Nevertheless, party factionalism led to a coup against President Mosquera in 1867. And in 1876, inter-party conflict erupted into yet another civil war.

From 1880 to 1930 the Conservative Party maintained control of the national government. The Constitution of 1886 attempted to stabilize the delicate political situation by imposing a strong unitary form of government on the nation. Yet the growth of import-export interests, with partisan affiliations, during the last quarter of the 19th century led to much political violence and turmoil. In his excellent book Coffee and Conflict in Colombia (1978), Charles W. Bergquist traces how the rise of the Liberals, with their doctrines of laissez-faire economics and capitalism, paralleled the growth of the export economy. Bergquist describes and analyzes the conflict of interests among the political factions within both parties which resulted in the One Thousand Days War (1899-1902), the quinquenio (1904-1909) of President Rafael Reyes, and which finally culminated in the bipartisan government of Carlos E. Retsrepo (1910-1914).

President Restrepo's Republican Union was a Liberal-Conservative coalition of those party members opposed to

the military government of General Reyes. More importantly, it is an example of a very significant phenomenon in Colombian political dynamics - the temporary alliance of leaders of both political parties in order to maintain the social order and to keep control of the political system in elite hands.⁶ This "two-party coalition rule" (Hartlyn, 1980:85) guided by "consociational elites" (Blutstein, 1977:277) has contributed to the preservation of the social order of the nation and to the political marginality of the masses and has successfully opposed most serious challenges to the elite controlled political system.⁷

The Colombian political system has been cited as "a highly successful case of consociationalism from the Third World" (Dix, 1980-303). Consociational democracy

⁶For a series of articles on this strategy of elite accommodation, see R. A. Berry et al., eds., Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1979).

⁷The outstanding exception to this successful record was the 1953 military takeover of the national government after the consociational arrangement of the National Union coalition (1945-1949) failed to prevent the social disorder and chaos of La Violencia. For an excellent comparative analysis of the unsuccessful National Union and the more successful National Front (1958-1974), see Dix, 1980, op. cit.

refers to a type of democracy,⁸ in which "the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the population" (Lijphart, 1977:1). In the case of Colombia, consociationalism refers to the conscious efforts of party leaders to bind the wounds of a badly divided society by mutually agreeing on policies which proscribe interparty conflict. Through such elite accommodation, the political leaders hope to restore social order and political stability so as to ultimately maintain their control of the nation's political and social systems.

The first effort at coalition government between the Liberal and Conservative parties took place in 1854 (Kline, 1979). Another attempt at consociationalism in Colombia occurred in 1869. In that year the Liberal and Conservative parties attempted to share public offices equally in order to "assure peace and the consolidation of republican institutions and to achieve the reconciliation

⁸The term "democracy", when used in the context of the Colombian political system, can best be described by Dahl's concept of the polyarchy. Dahl says that polyarchies "may be thought of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes." He further adds that such regimes are generally "highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation." See Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 8. Although the Colombian Liberal and Conservative regimes have been substantially popularized throughout the nation's history, popular participation in the political system is quite limited. See Chapter IV for an examination of popular participation in the Colombian electoral system.

of Colombians" (Hernández R., 1962:162-163). Although that attempt failed, it did not diminish the feasibility nor practicality of consociational government in Colombia.

In 1904 coalitional rule ("Concordia Nacional") was attempted successfully to maintain political stability in the wake of the devastating three-year civil war and the subsequent secession of Panama. It was used again in 1910 ("Republican Union") to oust President Reyes who had replaced Congress with his own national assembly in order to more efficiently pursue his dictatorial policies. It was attempted again in 1930 ("Concentración Patriótica") during the administration of Liberal President Olaya Herrera when a Conservative split in the 1929 presidential election gave the Liberal Party the victory, its first in half a century. When President López Pumarejo resigned in 1945, Alberto Lleras Camargo, with the support of factions of both parties, created an interim government ("Unión Nacional") in an attempt at fostering national unity during a period of rising Liberal-Conservative tensions. And finally, in 1958, the Liberal and Conservative parties established the National Front of Transformation,⁹ an

⁹The rationale of the coalition government under the National Front is best explained by the Benidorm Agreement signed on July 4, 1956, by the Liberal Party leader, Alberto Lleras Camargo, and the Conservative Party leader, Laureano Gómez: "The consideration of events in a country imposes a logical order upon the conduct of the parties.

experiment in "controlled democracy" (Martz, 1962:11), and a "constitutional formula to minimize mass political mobilization" (Solaún et al., 1973:122), in order to replace the military dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla, stem the social disorder of La Violencia, and guide the nation back to constitutional rule and political tranquility. The National Front lasted for sixteen years and was institutionalized to a large degree by Article 120, No. 1, of the Constitution which authorizes the President, in the post-National Front period, to appoint government officials in such a way as to insure the "equitable and adequate participation" in the political system of the largest opposition party.¹⁰

No one doubts that this conduct should begin by reconquering the common civic heritage. It would be unwise to immediately reopen the struggle for power between the Conservatives and Liberals. It may be necessary and entirely possible to create a broad coalition government, or a succession of such governments, of the two parties until such time as the re-established institutions, legalized by the solid support of the citizens, are strong enough so that the civic struggle i.e. the inter-party struggle can be waged, without the fear of coups or the intervention of outside factors, by means of the incorruptible suffrage whose decisions are definitive and followed without question." Translated by the author from DANE, "Resultados Electorales Frente Nacional, 1958-1972: Asambleas Departamentales," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 250-251 (Bogotá: DANE, 1972 b), p. 33. For a study on the basis of formation of the National Front, see Harvey Kline, "The Origins of the National Front," in Berry et al., op. cit.

¹⁰There have been other examples of this effort to assure additional representation in the government. From 1905 to 1929 minority representation in the legislature was assured by the "incomplete vote" which guaranteed that "within any given electoral jurisdiction...the party winning the second largest number of votes was by law awarded

In short,

"during periods of relative political tranquility, the parties engage in intense inter-party rivalries; when instability threatens the political system, upper-level politicians curb their differences through the formation of political alliances" (Hoskin and Swanson, 1974:420-421).

Intra-party conflict is another characteristic of the Colombian two-party system.¹¹ The Liberal and Conservative parties have traditionally consisted of a moderate center with radical groups around that center (Angell, 1966). In many cases the dissident factions have allied themselves with factions of the opposing party in order to present a broad united front against an incumbent administration. One such alliance occurred in the nineteenth century during the period known as the Regeneration when moderate Liberals united with the moderate Historical

one-third of the seats at stake." See Dix, 1980, *op. cit.*, p. 320, fn. 12. President Turbay Ayala cited the constitutional provisions of Article 120, No. 1, as justification for his recent announcement of a restructuring of departmental governments and a rotation of the governors based on political affiliation. See El Tiempo (Bogotá), February 16, 1980.

¹¹In the 1970's the Liberal Party factions at the national level drafted the Consensus of San Carlos in an effort to avoid factionalism within the Liberal Party which would inevitably result in the increased possibility of Conservative electoral victories. This attempt at unity among the Liberal factions was not entirely successful however. In the 1978 presidential election, for example, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, who had lost his bid to be his party's candidate, chose not to support the party's official candidate, Julio César Turbay Ayala.

Conservatives to oppose the statist economic policies of the Nationalists (radical Conservatives) who ruled the government during the terms of Rafael Núñez and Miguel Antonio Caro (1885-1899). The failure of this alliance to achieve its goals peacefully gave impetus to the radical faction of the Liberal Party. It was this faction's policy of violence which was a primary cause of the Thousand Days War (1899-1902).

It is important to note that in almost all cases of party factionalism, dissident Liberal and Conservative factions have operated within the traditional Liberal-Conservative party system for they have realized that it would be impossible to achieve their aims outside of that system. Gaitán's radical Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria (UNIR) defected from the Liberal Party but was soon forced to return. The extremely rightist Laureanista faction of the Conservative Party and the radical, leftist-leaning Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL) faction, led by the Liberal López Michelsen, also operated within the established party system. And from 1958 to 1968, during the two-party rule of the National Front, other political parties were able to participate in the political system by presenting lists under the Liberal and Conservative banners. In these and other cases, the Liberal and Conservative factions have caused intra-party conflict as well as inter-party conflict. This intra-party

conflict was very evident in San Judas in 1980.

The National Front coalition government ended in 1974.¹² Although the consociational regime achieved its goal of restoring order to the country and of preventing inter-party competition, in so doing it also created the conditions for intra-party rivalry and the consequent proliferation of party factions.

During the National Front the Liberals were split into two national factions. The moderates (Oficialistas), supporters of the National Front alliance, were led by Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the cousin of former President Alberto Lleras Camargo. The leftist faction of the Liberal Party was specifically opposed to the alternation principle of the National Front agreement and to the agreement in general. It was subdivided into a reformist wing (the MRL) and a revolutionary wing. The latter consisted of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC), Camilo Torres' United Front of the People (FUP), and two Castroite groups--the United Front of Revolutionary Action (FUAR), led by

¹²Parity in the cabinet and in all administrative posts was extended until 1978 to soften the transition from the National Front agreement to full inter-party rivalry. Parity in departmental and municipal public corporations (i.e. assemblies and councils) was ended in 1972. These and other actions were stipulated in the 1968 constitutional reform. For an analysis of the content and consequences of the 1968 constitutional amendments, see Jaime Vidal Perdomo, Historia de la Reforma Constitucional de 1968 y Sus Alcances Jurídicos (Bogotá, 1970).

Gaitán's daughter, Gloria Gaitán de Valencia, and a worker-student-campesino movement. The Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL) was composed of a "soft" faction led by Alfonso López Michelsen,¹³ the son of former President López Pumarejo, and a "hard" faction under the leadership of Alvaro Uribe Rueda.

The Conservative Party was divided into four distinct factions. The Ospina-led moderate faction (Unionistas) was in office during the administration of President Guillermo León Valencia (1962-1966). It was directly opposed by the radical Laureanista faction (Doctrinarios) under the direction of Laureano Gómez and his son, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. The Alzatista faction, which later allied itself with the Ospinistas, was led by Gilberto Alzate Avendaño. The fourth faction, which became an independent movement in 1962 even though after that date it continued

¹³López Michelsen's MRL was originally founded in Mexico with the aim of safeguarding "the Liberal Party from the hazards of an institutionalized bipartisan government." It viewed the National Front as "a government without opposition which would stop representing the true political and social realities in Colombia." For these reasons the MRL opposed the pro-National Front Oficialista faction of the Liberal Party. See Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Semblanza Política de Alfonso López Michelsen (Bogotá: Canal Ramírez-Antares, 1973), pp. 8-13. Michelsen offers his own thoughts on his revolutionary Liberal ideology and the first four years of the National Front in Alfonso López Michelsen, Colombia en la Hora Cero (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1963). For an interesting history of intra-party struggle and violence in a small Colombian city which has resulted in twenty-two politically-motivated assassinations in the last year and a half, see New York Times, November 17, 1979.

to offer lists of candidates under the Conservative, and to a lesser extent, Liberal parties, was the Popular National Alliance (ANAPO). It was comprised of the followers of Rojas Pinilla and of his daughter, María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, who led the movement after her father's death in the mid-1970's.

In the post-National Front period, inter-party rivalry again increased and intra-party factionalism continued. However there were controls on the political system designed to prevent the inter-party conflict and social chaos of the past.¹⁴ The 1968 constitutional reforms strengthened the role of the president, gave him strong controls over the state and the nation, and guaranteed the representation of the Liberal and Conservative parties in the political system. Furthermore, new electoral laws limited the president's term to four years and prohibited his successive re-election.

In the post-1974 era, the Liberal Party was victorious over its Conservative opponent. It scored victories in the 1974 and 1978 congressional and presidential elections and in the mitaca elections of 1974 to 1980. It thus had a greater degree of control over the nation's

¹⁴For an analysis of the consolidation of bipartisan government in Colombia during the decade of the 1970's, see Pedro Acosta Borrero, "Consolidación del Bipartidismo," El Tiempo (Bogotá), December 30, 1979.

political system. However it faced a formidable challenge for the presidency in 1982 in the person of Belisario Betancur who, despite his defeat to the Liberal candidate, Julio César Turbay Ayala, in 1978, was quickly unifying the Conservative factions and was also receiving support from some Liberal sectors.

As of 1980 the Liberal and Conservative parties continued to dominate the party system at the national level and most regional levels. The Liberals were divided into three national factions. The Turbayistas, followers of President Turbay Ayala, were associated with the previous administration of President López Michelsen. The Lleristas, led by ex-President Lleras Restrepo, were critics of the López and Turbay administrations. A smaller group, slightly to the left of the Turbayistas and Lleristas, had the support of various Liberal sectors throughout the country. In Valle del Cauca this faction was led by Senator Carlos Holmes Trujillo.

The Conservatives were split into two major factions which descended from the supporters of the Conservative extremist, Laureano Gómez, and from the more moderate Ospina Pérez. The Alvaristas, supporters of the former, were led by Senator Gómez Hurtado. The Ospino-Pastranistas, descendants of the former Unionista faction, were led by former National Front President Pastrana Borrero (1970-1974) and by doña Berta de Ospina, the widow of former

President Ospina Pérez.

The Liberal and Conservative factions of 1980 differed from their earlier counterparts in that the basis of their formation was not so much ideological as personalistic. At the national party level, the 19th century ideological differences between the two parties over the issues of federalism vs. unitarianism, the powers of the president, and Church-state relations were subordinated to the more pragmatic issue of how to solve the serious social and economic problems brought on by the consequences of modernization and urbanization. High rates of inflation, unemployment, and underemployment were contributing to increased social tension and political alienation. To confront this situation, the two parties were seeking support from all segments of Colombian society and were actively involved in using distributive and particularistic policies designed to gain electoral support in exchange for communal material benefits such as the construction of public works projects and recreational facilities. This Chapter and the next explore how the two parties operate within a barrio popular of Cali.

How did the Liberal and Conservative parties perceive the socio-political reality of 1980 Colombia? Both parties called themselves the "party of the people" (partido del pueblo). Perhaps this was an indication of their recognition of the deteriorating socio-economic

conditions of the masses as the major problem facing the elite-controlled political system. The Alvarista faction of the Conservative Party, in a recent party congress, claimed it was seeking "just and adequate solutions" to remedy the nation's "afflictive conditions," to overcome misery, to decrease the gap between the upper and lower socio-economic strata, and to provide the nation with the social development it demands.¹⁵ Alvaro Gómez set forth a detailed plan of action to control the nation's economy and to effectively use the nation's available resources in an effort to overcome the "traditional poverty" which has characterized the large part of Colombian society. He denounced government intervention in the economic sphere and supported a "self-development" program which would include more investment in industry and agriculture to increase national production so that the country would have a greater capacity to withstand competition on the international market.¹⁶

The Ospino-Pastranista faction of the Conservative Party was also attempting to deal with the socio-economic reality of 1980 Colombia. But, as Alfonso Ocampo Londoño warned his fellow party members, the Conservative Party should not ignore its historical tradition in building for the future. Rather it should renew its vows to uphold

¹⁵El Occidente (Cali), February 7, 1980.

¹⁶El Tiempo (Bogotá), January 30, 1980.

its traditional doctrines of constitutional order and Christian morality.¹⁷

The leader of the Ospino-Pastranista faction, Misael Pastrana Borrero, asserted publicly that

40% of our cities are marginal zones without services, without recreation, with high rates of unemployment. The great worry of the country in the coming years is going to be how to confront the demands of urbanization... In the cities the immediate future¹⁸ of the country will be played out.

In the same interview he stated that development is "a social necessity and not simply...the increase of wealth... Human rights are not only political, but also social." In short, Pastrana's words are very appropriate to the present task of this study which deals with the political behavior of the marginal sector of Colombian urbanized society.

Thus the two principal factions of the Conservative Party both professed their intention to solve the socio-economic ills of the nation. This emphasis on social reconstruction as a prerequisite to national progress had been previously voiced by the preamble of the Liberal Party statutes drawn up at the national party convention of February, 1961, which declared that

The Colombian Liberal Party is an association of citizens united by

¹⁷El País (Cali), February 17, 1980.

¹⁸El País (Cali), December 19, 1979.

the respect they profess for human rights; by their common faith in political liberty and in the systems of representative democracy; and by its desire to establish exclusively through such systems, a social organization based on the recognition of human solidarity and motivated to achieve both an accelerated economic development and a progressive improvement in the distribution of wealth and income. The Colombian Liberal Party is the party of the people...

Although the Liberal and Conservative parties dominated the Colombian political system of 1980, there were other parties and political movements which participated in that system. However they played a limited role because, in varying degrees, their access to policy-making channels was limited by the two traditional parties' policies of clientelism, cooptation, and consociationalism.

POLITICAL PARTIES AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

The partisan struggles and factionalism within the municipal political system of Cali and that of the barrio popular San Judas reflect, to a great degree, those of the larger political system. There are three major political parties in Cali - the Liberal and Conservative parties and the Movimiento Cívico. The first two parties were described above in the context of the national political system and are briefly described below at the regional level. The Movimiento Cívico is an important newcomer

to the municipal political arena and as such necessitates more intensive scrutiny.

It was asserted at the beginning of this chapter that the voluntary associations of San Judas were an integral component of the hierarchical structure of the national party organizations. If this is so, they must be studied within the context of the national party organizations.

At the upper governmental levels, the Liberal and Conservative parties, as well as the national factions within each party, are run by national directorates, each of which is composed of a small cadre of party members. Each cadre (rosca) directs its respective party organisms through vertical linkages to the lower administrative levels of the unitary national government. In each department of Colombia the parties have a departmental directorate, directly responsible to the national directorate, which controls all party activities within that department. Furthermore, each municipality has a small cadre of party influentials. These individuals comprise the party leadership within the city's political system and are linked to the national party organization through the departmental directorate.

As one proceeds down the governmental structure from the national level to the municipal administrative level, two relationships become evident. First, the individual

ability of the party leaders to affect national party policy decreases. Second, the number of factions within each party generally increases. The consequences of these relationships are twofold. In the first place, the party leaders at the municipal level, although generally not very active at the national level, have much control over all party activity within the municipality and participate vigorously in the local political system. In the second place, the parties are able to absorb different types of factions into their organizations, factions which are permitted much freedom at the local level but which exert less influence on the party at higher levels. In short, the pyramidal structure of the two traditional parties permits those parties to coopt dissident groups into the party system, to grant those groups a relative amount of autonomy at the local level, and to solidify the entire party structure by subordinating the party directorate on one level to the party directorate at the immediately superior governmental level.

As discussed above, by 1980 the Conservative Party was divided into two national factions, the Ospino-Pastranistas and the Alvaristas. These two factions dominated the Conservative Party in Valle del Cauca and each considered itself the only true representative of the Conservative Party in the department. But each faction was itself divided into sub-factions which were at times hostile to each other.

At the departmental level, the Ospino-Pastranista faction of the Conservative Party was split between the followers of the Minister of Education, Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, and those of Senator Humberto González Narváez. The split was based more on a personality conflict between the two party leaders rather than on ideological differences. Through the intervention of the national leader of the Ospino-Pastranista faction, Misael Pastrana Borrero, the Lloreda-Humbertista rift was expediently mended during the party convention of January, 1980, so that the two groups would present united lists, at the departmental and municipal levels, for the mitaca elections of March of that year.¹⁹

Although the two Ospino-Pastranista sub-factions followed different leaders, both with direct contacts to the national government, in Valle del Cauca and Cali they were nonetheless under the direction of a unified directorate

¹⁹The Ospino-Pastranista list for the departmental assembly of Valle del Cauca was headed by González Narváez who, because of his position as Senator of the Republic until 1982, relinquished the councilman's seat he won to his suplente, Pablo Rubén Vernaza García. Second on the list was Aldemar Girón Romero, a member of the Lloredista sub-faction of the Ospino-Pastranista faction. This alternation of names on the assembly list between supporters of the two Ospino-Pastranista sub-factions was also used on the list for the municipal council of Cali. However in that case, the list was headed by a Lloredista, José Vicente Borrero Velasco, who was followed by an Humbertista, Alvaro Mejía López, etc.

at each level. Hugo Castro Borja was President of the Ospino-Pastranista Directorate of Valle del Cauca; and Carlos Muñoz Paz, the so-called "lawyer of the poor," presided over the municipal Ospino-Pastranista directorate. Thus the Lloredistas and Humbertistas, although loyal to different personalistic leaders within the party and in the names of whom they actively recruited voters during the electoral campaign of 1980, mended their differences in Cali and Valle del Cauca to present a unified front against the other national faction of the Conservative Party, the Alvaristas.

The leader of the Alvaristas in Cali and Valle del Cauca in 1979-1980 was unquestionably Senator Carlos Holguín Sardi. Although his leadership had been attacked by dissident groups within the Alvarista faction of Valle del Cauca, such as those led by Cornelio Reyes and Gerardo Bedoya Borrero, both of whom participated in the national government as members of Congress, these groups were not successful in their attempts to weaken Holguín's stronghold over the Alvarista faction.²⁰ In the 1980 elections, Holguín's name headed both the departmental and municipal Alvarista lists. His close associate,

²⁰ According to a report in a Liberal newspaper of Cali, Holguín completely dominated the Alvarista convention of February, 1980, and denied the followers of Bedoyismo and Cornelismo places on the Alvarista's departmental and municipal lists. See El Pueblo (Cali), February 7, 1980.

Germán Villegas Villegas, was the leader of the Alvarista faction in Cali by virtue of his position as the president of the Alvarista municipal directorate.

Although the intraparty struggle for Conservative Party supremacy between the Ospino-Pastranista and the Alvarista factions has been openly waged throughout most of Colombia, when faced by the threat of the Liberal Party in national, regional, and local politics, the two Conservative factions have tended to unite against the common enemy. For this reason, Senator Jaime Pava Navarro, a member of the Alvarista National Directorate, announced in early 1980 that the Alvarista faction would try to unify the Conservative Party by supporting the Ospino-Pastranista candidate, Belisario Betancur, for the presidency in the 1982 elections.²¹ It was felt that such unity was essential if the Conservative Party were to be victorious over the Liberal Party candidate in the presidential election.

During the 1970's, the Liberal Party was divided into three national factions - the followers of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (the Lleristas); the supporters of Alfonso López Michelsen and Julio César Turbay Ayala (Turbayistas); and a leftist faction without any clear national leader. By 1980 however, the gap between the first two factions narrowed when López announced his support of Lleras for the

²¹El País (Cali), February 3, 1980.

presidency in 1982. Lleras had been a vehement critic of López's 1974-1978 administration. His pledge of support from López may be interpreted as an attempt at national unity by the Liberals in the face of a mounting Conservative challenge for the next presidential election.

Although there were national factions within the Liberal Party in 1980, the National Liberal Directorate, presided over by Victor Mosquera Chaux, had the final word on party policy at the national level. The factions that proliferated at the departmental and municipal levels generally existed not because of major disagreements over policy but because of loyalties to personalistic leaders and parochial interests. In Valle del Cauca there have been four principal Liberal factions in recent years. In each case a political caudillo claimed to represent the true interests of the Liberal Party.

The first Liberal faction, the Holmistas, was led by Senator Carlos Holmes Trujillo, a former ambassador to the German Democratic Republic. The Holmistas represented the regional variant of the leftist faction of the three national factions described above. Holmes, a young, aggressive politician, was a top candidate for the presidency when the Liberal Party held its convention in 1978.

The Holmistas were opposed by the Balcarcistas, the followers of Gustavo Balcázar Monzón, the ambassador to Great Britain. Balcázar, considered by some as the

"irrefutable chief of regional liberalism,"²² had wider support among the diverse socio-economic levels of Valle del Cauca than Holmes had. But he was forced to command from afar because of his government assignment. Nevertheless, the Balcarcistas and the Holmistas were the two strongest Liberal factions in the department in 1980. Each faction had a departmental directorate, led by Libardo Lozano Guerrero and Alvaro Hernán Ibarra respectively, which linked the municipal organizations to those of the Liberal Party at the national level. At the municipal level, Ibarra was also the president of the Holmista directorate. In Cali, the Balcarcistas were led by Guillermo Isaza.

A third faction of the Liberal Party in Valle del Cauca, the Ramiristas, had, for all practical purposes, joined the ranks of the Balcarcistas as of 1980. The Ramiristas were led by Ramiro Andrade Terán, a former leader of the MRL and presently the ambassador to Belgium and a supporter, along with Balcázar, of President Turbay Ayala. The faction had one seat on the municipal council of Cali during the 1978-1980 period.

The most dissident of the four Liberal factions in Valle del Cauca as of 1980 was the Marinista faction led by Senator Marino Renjifo Salcedo, a former mayor of Cali and governor of Valle del Cauca. When the Holmistas

²²El Pueblo (Cali), February 10, 1980.

and Balcarcistas joined forces to present unified lists for the 1980 mitaca elections,²³ the renegade Marinista faction presented its own list headed by José Hugo Sandoval, for the departmental assembly under the name of the Movimiento Unión Liberal. However, the faction did not offer a list for the municipal council of Cali. Renjifo, a loyal Llerista, was strongly critical of the other two Liberal factions and warned the Liberal Party that it was courting disaster if it continued on its present course of factionalism²⁴ and that unification was essential to victory in 1982.²⁵

THE MOVIMIENTO CIVICO

In November, 1977, a new movement was founded in Cali—the Movimiento Cívico (the Civic Movement.) Claiming to be

²³Similar to the tactic used by the leaders of the Lloredista and Humbertista sub-factions of the Ospino-Pastranista faction of the Conservative Party, the Holmista and Balcarcista factions of the Liberal Party also presented a united list for the 1980 mitaca elections. In the case of the Liberals, the assembly list was headed by a Balcarcista, Lozano Guerrero, followed by an Holmista; and the municipal council list was headed by Holmes Trujillo himself, who, because of his position as Senator of the Republic, relinquished the councilor position to his suplente, Jorge Hernán Mejía. Trujillo's name on the list was followed by that of a Balcarcista, etc.

²⁴El País (Cali), February 7, 1980.

²⁵In a similar tone, Carlos Lleras Restrepo denounced the factionalism between the Holmista and Balcarcista "tribes" in Valle del Cauca and claimed that their divisiveness was a factor in the success of the Movimiento Cívico in the 1978 municipal election. See El Occidente (Cali), January 15, 1980.

an alternative to the two traditional parties and crusading against corruption and immorality in Cali's municipal government, the Movimiento Cívico challenged the well-established Liberal and Conservative machines in the municipal election of February, 1978, and received 55,196 of the 158,234 votes cast for the municipal council.²⁶ The movement was consequently awarded seven of the twenty curules (seats) on the council.

The founder and leader of the Movimiento Cívico was José Pardo Llada, a Cuban exile who arrived in Colombia in 1962 and became a Colombian citizen in August, 1975. Pardo had much political experience in his native land. The son of a school teacher, he was trained as a lawyer but never practiced his profession. Instead he devoted his post-university years to his two major interests - journalism and radio commentary. His work with the communications media, and especially his skill in handling sensitive interviews, earned him much popularity and acclaim among the Cuban people. He subsequently used this popularity as a springboard into politics to pursue his political ambitions.

In 1950 Pardo was elected to the Cuban congress where he soon became president of the Parliamentary Committee of the People's Party. In 1952, while he was a

²⁶See Judith de Campos and Francisco Martínez, Estudio de las Elecciones de Febrero y Junio, 1978 en la Ciudad de Cali (Cali: Universidad del Valle, forthcoming), Part 1-3.

candidate for the governorship of Habana Province, the Batista-led military coup overthrew the government. Pardo then became a leader of the Nationalist Party, the largest opposition party in the Cuban political system. In 1956 he founded the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) and was proposed by the National Assembly as a candidate for the presidency of the nation, an offer he refused because of his claim that the fraud and corruption of the Batista dictatorship would prevent honest elections.

In 1958 Pardo joined the Jose Martí brigade of the Castroite guerrilla forces in the Sierra Maestra where he played an active role in the eventual overthrow of the Batista regime. Under the incipient Castro government, he served as the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations and the Minister of Information. In this latter position he accompanied Che Guevara around the world in an attempt to explain and justify the Cuban revolution. However, in 1961, when Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist, thereby betraying the revolution, according to Pardo, "by placing it at the service of the Soviet Union and Communism,"²⁷ Pardo fled Cuba as a political refugee. After a brief stay in Argentina, he arrived in Cali, Colombia, in 1962.

In Cali, Pardo was given the opportunity to continue working as a journalist and radio commentator. He began

²⁷El Occidente (Cali), January 8, 1980.

to write a daily column in a Conservative Caleño newspaper, El Occidente, and also broadcast a daily one-hour radio program called "Mirador en el Aire." Because of his successful efforts as a civic activist on behalf of the Caleño community, Pardo gained the popularity he had formerly possessed in Cuba. His exposés on corruption in municipal government (above all his attack against the municipal electric company, EMCALI) and his investigations into alleged scandals within the city's political system increased this popularity, especially among the anti-status quo sectors of Caleño society. Finally, in 1977, Pardo founded the Movimiento Cívico with the collaboration of such influential Colombians as the well-known Colombian author, educator, and journalist, Gustavo Alvarez Gardeazábal.

The principal aim of the Movimiento Cívico has been to offer the people of Cali an alternative to the Liberal and Conservative parties. Not having the tradition, organizational structure, or financial resources of its two major opponents, the movement has embraced the notion of administrative honesty which Pardo claims has been lacking among the closed, exclusive, and sectarian factions of the Liberal and Conservative parties.²⁸ He has effectively used this administrative-honesty issue to attack the two traditional parties which he claims are replete with

²⁸El Occidente (Cali), January 14, 1980.

political clientelism, privilege, and corruption. In short, the Movimiento Cívico claims to represent the people of Cali in their struggle against the injustice, insensitivity, and exclusivist features of the Liberal-Conservative-dominated local government. Its program is summed up in its "Twenty Points" which includes moralizing the municipal administration; the direct popular election of the mayor; the fight against crime, inflation, and the unjust tariffs of municipal enterprises; better educational, employment, and housing opportunities for the poor; more sports complexes for the youth of Cali; the creation of an improved public transportation system; and a program of daily school breakfasts.

The Movimiento Cívico came under heavy criticism from the other parties of the municipal political system, especially after its unexpected showing in the 1978 municipal election. Holmes Trujillo, the most outspoken critic of the fledgling movement, called it a populist movement²⁹ led by a "foreign prophet" whose main goal was to destroy the democratic processes and two-party system which have evolved in Colombia over the last one hundred and fifty

²⁹In the case of twentieth-century Colombia, there have been two examples of national populist movements. Both have involved a charismatic leader and his lower-class followers. The movements are known as Gaitanismo and Rojismo. The former was a political movement of the 1940's led by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a dissident member of the Liberal Party; the latter was a political movement of the 1960's and 1970's organized and directed by General

years.³⁰ Liberal Senator Lozano Guerrero concurred with Holmes' criticism and characterized the movement as "an explosive which can cause our democratic organizations to crumble into pieces."³¹ An editorial in a Liberal newspaper criticized the Movimiento Cívico as being "fascism masquerading as civic-mindedness".³² Another Liberal, Germán Navarro Palau, was quoted as saying that the movement was composed of a group of puppeteers who would eventually wind up embracing Conservatism as did

Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the former military dictator. Gaitanismo has been classified as "progressive populism" because the movement was based on an ideology which advocated modernization and social justice. Rojismo was a form of "authoritarian populism" which had no well-defined ideology but depended instead on a strong sense of mass loyalty to an anti-elitist authoritarian figure. See Robert H. Dix, "The Varieties of Populism: The Case of Colombia," Western Political Quarterly, XXXI (September, 1978), 351. An important aspect of Colombian populism is its relationship to the demographic trends of the country. Although both Gaitán and Rojas had support from the rural areas, both movements, especially that of Rojas which occurred at a later time in Colombian history, received much support from the campesinos who migrated to the urban areas. These "disposable masses" (DiTella, 1965), alienated from the political system and unable to find employment in their new environment, provided much support for the personalistic mass mobilization movements of Gaitán and Rojas. It would appear that under such circumstances of mass rural-to-urban migration, during which a large demographic displacement occurs, the conditions for the emergence of populist leaders and movements are good. In this context the claims of the leaders of the two traditional political parties that the Movimiento Cívico of Cali is a populist movement are analyzed below.

³⁰El País (Cali), February 3, 1980.

³¹El Pueblo (Cali), February 6, 1980.

³²El Pueblo (Cali), February 9, 1980.

ANAPO.³³ An editorial in Cali's Ospino-Pastranista newspaper claimed that the Movimiento Cívico was not "a neutral and apolitical force of people of good will, but an aggressive instrument at the service of the erratic personal ambitions of its leader." It then went on to warn its Conservative readers that "to vote for the Movimiento Cívico is to vote against the Conservative Party."³⁴

Verbal attacks against the Movimiento Cívico were not confined solely to the Liberal and Conservative parties. The leftist-oriented Independent Federation of the Workers of Valle (FITVA) classified the movement as "popular demagogy."³⁵ The Student Workers' Movement for Colombia called the movement a fascist one led by a CIA agent serving

³³El Pueblo (Cali), February 10, 1980. A survey of the Movimiento Cívico's candidates for the mitaca elections of 1980, carried out by José Pardo Llada, showed that, before joining the movement, 26 of the candidates were Liberals, 12 were Conservatives, and 20 were apolitical. See El Occidente (Cali), March 1, 1980. Those who were Conservatives represented only 20.7% of the total number of candidates. It is unlikely that this small group would be able to sway the majority of the candidates toward the Conservative Party, especially since their membership in the Movimiento Cívico implied repudiation of the Conservative Party as well as of the Liberal Party. Furthermore, information on the previous political affiliations of the supporters of the Movimiento Cívico is provided by the 1979 Losada survey of 662 potential voters in Cali. Question 42 of the study found that before identifying themselves with the movement, 51% of the respondents were Liberals, 21% were Conservatives, and 24% had no political affiliation. See Rodrigo Losada, "Estudio de Opiniones en Cali, 1979" (Bogotá: FES, 1979 b).

³⁴El País (Cali), March 8, 1980.

³⁵El Pueblo (Cali), February 4, 1980.

the candidacy of Belisario Betancur.

These are but a few of the many verbal accusations and criticisms thrown at the young political movement. Many are simply political barbs whose validity is questionable. However the charges of populism must be analyzed more closely in order to ascertain their validity.

Torcuato DiTella suggests that four requisites must be fulfilled for a movement to be classified as populist:³⁶ - (1) it must be a political movement, (2) supported by the urban working class and/or peasantry, (3) which doesn't result from the autonomous organizational power of either of these two sectors, and (4) which is also supported by non-working-class sectors upholding an anti-status quo ideology. The first condition was fulfilled when the Movimiento Cívico ran candidates for political office in the 1978 municipal election and the 1980 municipal and departmental elections for the purpose of gaining

³⁶DiTella equates Dix's "progressive populism" with what he calls "Aprista populism," referring to the APRA movement inspired by the Peruvian political activist Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre. He equates "authoritarian populism" with his classification of populism called "military reform parties." In "Aprista populism" the social order is vehemently attacked, but the movement nevertheless follows legal norms. "Military reform parties" on the other hand are more receptive toward the existing social order but are inclined to use more violent methods to achieve their goals. See Torcuato Di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Claudio Véliz, ed., Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

some control over the policy-making arena of the local government in order to influence the distribution of public goods within the municipality of Cali. Conditions 2 and 4 refer to the sources of popular support for the movement; and condition 3 implies that the leadership structure of the Movimiento Cívico is composed of individuals whose socio-economic levels are above those of the peasant and working classes.

Condition 3 can be shown to be applicable in the case of the Movimiento Cívico when the leadership structure of the movement is analyzed. Who are the leaders and financial backers of the movement and what are their socio-economic backgrounds? Pardo and Alvarez most surely do not belong to the lower socio-economic levels. Furthermore, examination of the lists presented by the Movimiento Cívico for the 1980 mitaca elections indicates that they are dominated by the names of professionals with extensive financial resources. Included on the lists are lawyers, former municipal government officials, ex-mayors of Cali, and commercial and industrial entrepreneurs. It is safe to say, then, that the leadership structure of the Movimiento Cívico is composed of middle and upper class Caleños. These are the people responsible for the

direction, organization, political strategies, and tactics of the movement.

Who are the supporters of the Movimiento Cívico? An examination of the voting behavior of the Caleño electorate during the 1978 municipal election will clarify this point.³⁷

The Campos-Martínez post-electoral survey of 720 potential Caleño voters in 51 of the city's barrios offers data which show that although the Movimiento Cívico received electoral support in all of DANE's six socio-economic categories, the support was largely concentrated in two of those categories - the upper class and the lower-middle class (comprised of members of the working class).³⁸

³⁷The following discussion on the February, 1978, election is based on information kindly provided by Dr. Judith de Campos of the Department of Social Science of the Universidad del Valle, Cali. The study, done in collaboration with Francisco Martínez of the same department, is the most exhaustive study done to date on the voting behavior and attitudes among the electorate of Cali during the mitaca and presidential elections of 1978. It was to be published in early 1980.³⁸

³⁸The Campos-Martínez survey also found that the movement received 41.6% of its vote from those who claimed to be Liberals and 31.2% from those who claimed to be Conservatives; that 42.3% of its vote came from the 36-55 year age group (p. 151); that 47.4% of its support came from those who had only lived in Cali from two to five years (p. 155); and that 53.8% of those who voted for the Movimiento Cívico were men (p. 153). See Campos and Martínez, op. cit.

Table 19 presents the data:

TABLE 19
 VOTES FOR MOVIMIENTO CIVICO BY SOCIO-
 ECONOMIC CATEGORY, CALI, FEBRUARY, 1978
 (N=720)

	Low- lower	Lower	Lower- middle	Middle	Upper- middle	Upper	Row Total
Votes for Movimiento Cívico	8	21	33	4	6	6	78
Votes for All Lists	135	274	164	50	58	39	720
Column %	5.9	7.7	20.1	8.0	10.3	15.4	
Row %	10.3	26.9	42.3	5.1	7.7	7.7	

Source: Judith de Campos and Francisco Martínez, Estudio de las Elecciones de Febrero y Junio, 1978, en la Ciudad de Cali (Cali: Universidad del Valle, forthcoming).

The data show that of the 720 Caleños interviewed, 78 voted for the Movimiento Cívico.³⁹ Of those 78, 62 (79.5%) belonged to the three lowest socio-economic categories.

³⁹Of the 720 respondents, 491 abstained and 229 voted. The abstention rate for the sample was 68.2% (491/720). Thus 34.1% of the voters in the survey voted for the Movimiento Cívico (78/229).

But in relation to overall voting patterns within each socio-economic category, the data indicate that 20.1% of the lower-middle class voters and 15.4% of the upper class voters questioned by the survey voted for the Movimiento Cívico. The percentages of the other socio-economic categories in support of the movement were less.

These data suggest that much of the electoral support for the Movimiento Cívico during the 1978 municipal election came from the lower-middle class segment of the sample while upper class support was also relatively strong. Assuming that the sample of 720 used in the survey was fairly representative of the potential Cali electorate,⁴⁰ then condition 2 of the definition of populism offered above is fulfilled and condition 4 is partially fulfilled. That is, there was support among the non-working-class sectors. But was that support based on an anti-status quo ideology? My personal experience in Cali, based on interviews and informal discussions with middle and upper class Caleños before and after the 1980 mitaca elections, suggests that the answer to that question is yes. Most of the movement's supporters from

⁴⁰ Much effort was expended to make the sample as representative of the potential Cali electorate as possible. Of the 51 barrios in which the survey was carried out, 8 were in the low-lower socio-economic category, 15 were in the lower category, 11 were in the lower-middle category, 6 were in the middle category, 7 were in the upper-middle category, and 4 were in the upper class category.

the higher socio-economic categories voted for the movement apparently because it represented a change in the local political system, an alternative to the traditional two-party system which has dominated Caleño politics for so long. Moreover, my personal interviews and discussions in San Judas suggest that this feeling transcended socio-economic status because the same feeling existed among the residents of that barrio popular. The data in Table 20 indicate why Caleños in general voted for the Movimiento Cívico and further strengthen the claim stated above:

TABLE 20

REASONS OFFERED FOR VOTING FOR THE MOVIMIENTO CIVICO, CALI, FEBRUARY, 1978 (%)

(N=229)

1. It represented a change.	22.2
2. It helps the poor.	18.5
3. It works for Cali.	18.5
4. It is anti-corruption.	13.6
5. The ideas of the M.C.	11.1
6. Because it is apolitical.	6.2
7. Other reasons.	6.2
8. The leadership of the M.C.	3.7
	<u>100.0%</u>

Source: Campos and Martínez, op. cit., Part 5.2.4

In short, the Movimiento Cívico has fulfilled the four conditions of populism as cited above and thus may be classified as a populist movement on a regional level.⁴¹ However, this populist classification must be used with care when comparing the movement to other populist movements of twentieth-century Colombia. As Campos and Martínez point out in their conclusion, the Movimiento Cívico

did not succeed in achieving a concentrated mobilization in the lowest strata, among people who desired a radical change of political programs and participation in the public power structure, as did the campaigns of Gaitán and Rojas Pinilla. It is a sector of independent voters, confined to local problems, which does not break with the general ideology of the political system...it is a more heterogeneous sector in its socio-economic base than the Anapista blocks of 1970 and 1974 and is less radical in its evaluation of the general political system than the Anapista block of 1970 or those who voted for other non-traditional parties in 1978...⁴²

In sum, the Movimiento Cívico is a populist movement operating within a specific time and space and cannot be easily equated with the earlier populist movements of Gaitán and Rojas Pinilla. Yet within its own context,

⁴¹A surprising finding indicated in Table 20 is the low percentage of those who cited the leadership of the Movimiento Cívico as their reason for voting for the movement. This low percentage is contrary to the popularity of José Pardo Llada among the general populace of Cali as measured in various surveys undertaken in the city and in San Judas and examined in Chapter IV.

⁴²Campos and Martínez, *op. cit.*, part 5.2.4.

the movement is attacking national institutions which have dominated the nation's political system for one and a half centuries. In this sense the movement transcends the political sphere of Cali and has important implications for students of Colombian politics.

COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

The second process which has affected the development of Colombia's political linkage system is the evolution of the nation's constitutional structures. The major feature of Colombia's governmental system is the predominance of the executive branches over the legislative branches at the system's three administrative levels--the national, departmental, and municipal levels. This asymmetry which exists between the two branches defines the relationship between the official representatives of the elite-dominated regime and the popularly-elected representatives of the nation.

The Bolivarian-inspired Constitution of 1821 created a presidency with strong powers. One of the president's powers authorized him to appoint all government officials at the three administrative levels. In 1830 a new constitution extended the president's powers to include much control over the judicial branch of the government. The 1832 and 1840 constitutions also expanded the powers of

the president by granting him extraordinary powers during national emergencies. His role as chief executive was further enhanced by the constitution of 1843. However, during the era of Liberal control from 1849 to 1880 (except for the Conservative presidencies of Manuel María Mallarino, 1855-57, and Mariano Ospina Rodríguez, 1857-61) the powers of the presidency were reduced in scope and intensity as the departmental governments were granted increased political autonomy under a series of federalist governments.

The 1886 constitution reestablished the political dominance of the president. His power was further strengthened by the so-called "Law of the Horses" (Law 61 of 1888) which authorized the president to "administratively prevent and repress transgressions against the State affecting the public order" (Bergquist, 1978:37). The law was short-lived however and was repealed in September, 1898.

Under the presently-revised constitution, the president is clearly the most dominant authority in the political system. Much of his power emanates from three specific constitutional articles-articles 120, 121, and 122. These three articles evolved into their present form when the Congress, under the administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, enacted Legislative Act #1 in 1968.

Article 120 designates the president as "Chief of State" and "supreme administrative authority."⁴³ The article enumerates the following responsibilities, among others, of the president: the power to appoint and remove all cabinet ministers, administrative department chiefs, and the directors or managers of national public agencies; to promulgate the laws; to appoint the department governors; to maintain, and reestablish, if necessary, public order; to direct the armed forces; to provide for the security of the nation; to declare war and to ratify treaties (with the approval of Congress); to oversee the collection and administration of public revenues and funds and the subsequent disbursement of the same; to rule and direct national public education;⁴⁴ to make contracts for the creation and implementation of public services,

⁴³In 1936, during the Liberal administration of President Alfonso López Pumarejo, the state, through legislative acts which amended the constitution, assumed a much more active role in controlling and guiding the economy of the country. Since this control is largely carried out through decentralized agencies of the national government, administrative departments, and an ever-growing national bureaucracy, the implications for the power of the president in his role as "supreme administrative authority" are great. For a good description and analysis of the evolution of state interventionism during the López administration, see Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957).

⁴⁴In February, 1980, the Minister of Education of the national government fixed the price of notebooks for students and announced a plan to monitor prices and levy fines in the case of overcharges by vendors (El Pueblo (Cali), February 8, 1980). This action is an extreme example of the far-reaching

in accordance with the laws; to intervene in the activities of those entities, natural or judicial, and institutions whose object is to control, benefit from, or invest private funds; to expedite letters of naturalization; to authorize patents; to direct diplomatic and commercial relations with international entities; and to allocate public credit, finance the public debt, regulate the international monetary exchange, and modify tariffs and customs charges.

Article 121 clearly affirms the president's domination of political power. It authorizes him to declare a state of siege within a part, or all, of the country whenever the public order is disturbed either by international or domestic conflict. The only condition specified in the article is that such action on the part of the president to restore public order requires the signature of all the cabinet ministers. This requirement is not difficult to fulfill since the president appoints and removes all cabinet ministers at his discretion. During a state of siege the president may suspend civil liberties and any laws "not compatible" with the siege. Equally important, his decrees during the state of siege become law. In effect,

control the central government possesses throughout all the administrative units of the state as well as all the spheres of Colombian society. Such involvement by the national government in small matters which might be better handled at the regional level inevitably leads to the growth of a large and, in many cases, immobile bureaucratic structure.

Article 121 gives the executive branch the legal power to assume a legislative function. Furthermore he can exercise this power without the approval of Congress.

Article 121 has been widely used by Colombian presidents.⁴⁵ A partial or total state of siege has been in effect in the country for most of the past three decades. Upon taking office in 1978, President Turbay Ayala took advantage of the provisions of Article 121 to enact, with bipartisan support, a tough Statute on Security. Article 4 of the statute created the crime of "disturbing the public order," punishable with sentences of from twenty to twenty-four years. Article 13 of the statute "increased the types of crimes to be tried in court martials, substantially increased the powers of arrest of the armed forces, lengthened sentences for such crimes as kidnapping and extortion, and prohibited news reports on public disturbances while they were occurring" (Hartlyn, 1980). In short, the armed forces assumed more of the

⁴⁵President López Michelsen imposed a state of siege on the Colombian nation from June, 1975, until June, 1976. The state of siege "suspended the right of habeus corpus; banned strikes, public meetings of more than three people, and demonstrations; and gave authorities the right to declare a curfew, to prohibit the sale of alcohol, and to make searches and seizures without a warrant. In addition, no citizen was allowed to carry firearms without official permission; many crimes, including kidnapping, assault, and any armed action, were made subject to military trial." See Howard I. Blutstein, Area Handbook for Colombia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977) p. 409.

responsibilities of the civilian judicial system and the national government further strengthened its control over censorship of the mass media. That control was strictly enforced by means of a national news blackout during the 62-day siege, by the M-19 guerilla group of the Dominican embassy in Bogotá in early 1980.

Article 122 supplies the president with another armament in his executive arsenal - the power to declare a state of emergency under circumstances during which the social or economic order of the nation is threatened. Again, all the president requires to make such a declaration is the signature of his cabinet members. However, unlike the declaration of a state of siege, the declaration of a state of emergency must have a date of expiration and the state of emergency may not exceed ninety days. Furthermore, even though the president is granted legislative powers to deal directly with the crisis, Congress does have the right to convene during the state of emergency and may, on its own initiative, repeal or modify any presidential decree. The chances of this congressional opposition occurring however are not very likely since the party loyalty of congressmen to the president usually prevents such action from taking place.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Besides strict party discipline, there are other factors which generally preclude Congress from overruling presidential policy. These include constitutional checks on Congress, changes in congressional voting rules in 1958 and again in 1968, etc. For a discussion of these factors, see Blutstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-268.

Besides the powers granted the president by these three articles, the chief executive may also be granted extraordinary powers by Congress during periods of normality (Article 76, No. 12), and he has the powers necessary to exercise much control over the budget (Article 41 of Legislative Act. No. 1 of 1968). These powers, as well as those contained in articles 120, 121, and 122, are all subject to very few constitutional checks. Blutstein explains:

To the extent checks existed to limit the possible abuse of the president's extensive powers, they were more or less broad, general societal pressures rather than specific constitutional limitations. The need to deal with and maintain the support of the nation's politically conscious elites was probably the major restraint on presidential authority. The president lacked a single autonomous power base, such as a mass party or military control, and consequently had to be responsive to an array of competitive economic, social, religious, and political elites (1977: 263).

Thus the President of Colombia is the most powerful political figure in the nation's political system and, like the President of Mexico, is the de facto leader of his political party. However, unlike the case of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, two major parties exist in the Colombian political system. Consequently the pressures exerted by the opposition party tend to influence the Colombian president's activities relative to those of his Mexican counterpart. Nevertheless

the Colombian chief executive exercises a disproportionate amount of political power and therefore plays a commanding role in the Colombian political arena.

The existence of a strong executive branch at the national level is imitated to a large extent at the departmental and municipal levels where the governors and mayors act as direct and indirect agents, respectively, of the president. In this respect the linkage system of the hierarchically-structured governmental system is perpetuated and strengthened throughout the system's three administrative levels.

The governors are appointed by the president for an indefinite term. They in turn appoint the mayors. This control of the chain of command from the national to the local arena has created a governmental linkage system which is an ideal structure for perpetuating the centralization policies of the national government and controlling popular participation in the political system. Further strengthening this linkage system is the Minister of Government who acts as the liaison between the president and his governors (Blutstein 1977:264). Additional control over the regional levels of government is granted to the national government by Article 186 of the Constitution which gives Senators and Representatives legal "voice" in the departmental planning process.

Furthermore, the governor's domination of the departmental assembly (duma) and the mayor's domination of the municipal council (concejo) ensure that the centralizing policies of the national government are carried out and limit the role of the masses in the formulation and implementation of those policies. In other words, "the locus of power in the departments and municipios is mainly centered in the non-elective, appointed executive branches, while the popularly elected assemblies and councils lack significant strength" (Rozman, 1968:27). Thus at all 3 administrative levels the legislative branch is subordinate to the executive branch.

This penetration of the local political system by the national government through a centralized, hierarchial set of structures and linkages (including bureaucratic agencies, national administrative departments, and decentralized agencies, the heads of which are appointed directly by the president) may have an effect on the individual's perceptions of the salience of local government. In traditional Colombian society, the individual depended greatly upon the local, multi-purpose patrón whose ties and power base were limited to a specific region. However, since the advent of modernization, with its accompanying processes of urbanization and rural-to-urban migration, dependence on the rural patrón has been replaced by dependence on the local politician or bureaucrat, who, while perhaps more limited

in function than his predecessor, nevertheless maintains links to the larger political system. This shift from "patron dependency upon a single local landlord to patron-clientship with plural national institutions" has been documented in other countries as well (Forman, 1975). More studies on how these contextual factors have influenced the individual's perception of the role of local government as a link to higher political levels are definitely warranted.

This new patron-client linkage in the urban context does not imply, however, that local political leaders exert a great deal of influence on national party politics. On the contrary, such influence has been shown to be of questionable significance.⁴⁷ Yet the local patrón does have limited access to scarce resources and is perceived by many local residents to be an important source of material benefits.

In short, what the centralization process has succeeded in doing is to coopt the masses into a rigidly structured unitarian system with hierarchical linkages, in which their individual or collective abilities to oppose government policies have, to the present, been effectively checked.

⁴⁷For the specific case of Cali's political leaders, see Stephen L. Rozman, "A Comparison of Liberal and Conservative Party Leadership in Cali, Colombia," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1968.

What role do the twenty two departmental governments play in Colombia's unitary system? Article 83 of the Legislative Act of 1945 granted the departmental assemblies effective powers vis-à-vis those of the governor. However, the power of these assemblies, or administrative corporations was severely eroded by Legislative Act #1 of 1968 (see article 187 of the Constitution). This erosion of powers was especially noticeable in four major areas -- in the control over local industry and commerce (article 187, no. 6); in the acquisition of inter-departmental capital and investments via contracts, loans, etc. (article 187, no. 10); in fomenting social and economic development (article 187, no. 2); and in the control of the departmental budget (article 187, no. 7).⁴⁸ In short, by 1968 the powers of the governor, the direct agent of the president, had increased considerably. He became responsible for overall departmental planning, gained control over the creation and implementation of the budget, became the official agent of the department responsible only to the national government, and acquired effective control over the department's trade and commerce.⁴⁹

⁴⁸See DANE, "Resultados Electorales Frente Nacional, 1958-1972: Asambleas Departamentales," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 250-251 (Bogotá: DANE, 1972 b), pp. 29-32, for a more detailed description of the changes in assembly autonomy brought about by the constitutional reforms of 1968.

⁴⁹All the powers of the governor are enumerated in Article 194 of the national constitution.

The department governor also exercises constitutional control over the municipal councils within his department. Since the mayor is the governor's official agent as well as the chief of municipal administration, very few important decisions are made by the municipal concejo without the tacit approval of the governor to "review the acts of the municipal councils and those of the mayors, for reasons of unconstitutionality or illegality, to repeal the latter and send the former to the appropriate court which will determine their validity" (article 194, no. 8). Furthermore, the governor wields much power over the allocation of departmental funds to municipalities.⁵⁰ and must approve any property and market taxes to be levied by the municipal council. This strong linkage between the department and the municipio has further strengthened the central authority of the national government.

At the municipal level, the mayor, the direct agent of the governor, has much control over the concejo in matters of industry and commerce (article 197, no. 4) and the municipal budget (article 197, no. 5). He may also be authorized by the concejo to temporarily assume its functions. Moreover, the composition of the municipal council and the pattern of the municipal power structure are other factors which influence the council's effectiveness vis-à-vis the

⁵⁰Law 2733 of 1959 states that the departmental governor controls and establishes the "fiscal sources of the municipality."

mayor and the national government (Núñez, 1963) and which influence its responsiveness to local pressures (Ebel, 1971). An examination of Cali's municipal council illustrates the validity of these assertions and demonstrates how the governmental linkage system extends to the municipal level in general.

CALI'S MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

Although Cali's three major political parties - the Liberals, Conservatives, and the Movimiento Cívico - controlled nineteen of the twenty municipal council seats from 1973 to 1980,⁵¹ the council has traditionally been weak because of the centralizing tendencies of the national political system (Blasier, 1966) which have limited the autonomy of the council vis-à-vis the powers of the mayor. This "crisis of authority" is a feature of the political reality of many Latin American municipalities (Whitehead, 1973). In the context of Colombian politics, each municipal council must act in accordance with a specific municipal code which regulates the interaction between the council and the mayor.⁵²

⁵¹The remaining seat went to the leftist political movement, UNO.

⁵²The departmental governor also exercises control over the municipal councils within his departmental jurisdiction. Some of these controls were discussed above. See footnote 49.

Article 196 of the Constitution of the Republic provides the legal basis for the creation of municipal councils as popularly elected administrative corporations. Among the eight functions of the council listed under article 197, three involve the mayor. Number 4 of article 197 permits the municipal council to create, upon the initiative of the mayor, public establishments, corporations, and industrial and commercial enterprises. Number 5 authorizes the municipal council to expedite the annual municipal budget based on the proposal submitted by the mayor. Number 7 gives the council the power to authorize the mayor to make contracts, negotiate loans, dispose of municipal resources, and to temporarily exercise all those functions which legally correspond to the council. In short, the national constitution subordinates the role of the council to that of the appointed mayor who serves as the direct agent of the governor and who is designated as the head of the municipal administration (article 201) and as the legal representative of the municipality (article 3 of Law 28 of 1974).

The powers of the mayor in relation to the municipal council have varied over time depending upon the political orientation of the national government. Law 4 of 1913, enacted during the reform-minded Republican Union administration of Carlos E. Restrepo, gave the mayor a voice, but not a vote, in concejo sessions (article 167) and also

authorized the mayor to send to the governor a copy of all municipal legislation approved by the mayor or considered by him to be unconstitutional or illegal (article 177). In all cases, the final decision on the fate of the legislation lay with the governor.

During the Liberal administration of President López Pumarejo, article 3 of Law 89 of 1936 curtailed the powers of the mayor by giving the president of the municipal council the power to sanction any legislation which the mayor may have refrained from approving. Furthermore, the council, if it found that the mayor's objections lacked legal basis, had the right to authorize the president of the council to approve the legislation and promulgate it.

By the 1970's the mayor was intervening actively in council affairs, but the council also had some legal recourses of its own. The current municipal code (reglamento) of Cali (Agreement 36 of 1976) specifies that the mayor occupy a non-voting seat on the directive committee (mesa directiva) of the municipal council (articles 23 and 51); that he submit projects, including the budget proposal, to the council for debate (article 42); and that he approve or reject all council agreements (article 79). However in the event that the mayor rejects a proposed piece of legislation, the president of the council has the authority to designate a committee to study and evaluate the objections

(article 81). If these objections are opposed by the council, the mayor is obligated to approve the legislation (article 83). If he fails to do so within the legally-designated period of time, the legislation is made law and promulgated by the president of the municipal council (article 85). The chances of a municipal council overriding the rejection of a mayor, however, depend on the partisan makeup of the individual council.

In a de jure sense, therefore, the municipal council does have the power to overrule the mayor for the purpose of enacting legislation. But what occurs de facto? In the first place, because of the vertically linked structure of the Colombian political system, the governor and national government have the means to intervene in municipal matters. These include the use of juridicial oversight procedures to have the legislation declared unconstitutional and the use of budgetary coercion in which case local legislation is prevented from being put into effect because funds are withheld or controlled by higher governmental authorities.⁵³

In the second place, the same factionalism which has traditionally characterized the Colombian political system at the national level also exists at the municipal level.

⁵³Taxes on real estate, commerce, and industry are the main sources of revenue for the municipality of Cali. But the authority to tax is controlled by the national legislature. See Cole Blasier, "Power and Social Change in Colombia: The Cauca Valley," Journal of Interamerican Studies, VIII (July, 1966), 400.

This factionalism impedes the complicated legislative process of the municipal council⁵⁴ and hinders attempts at harmonious behavior among the councilmen. An examination of the municipal council of Cali demonstrates the effects of factionalism on the council's operation.

The 1978-1980 municipal council of Cali consisted of eight Liberals, seven members of the Movimiento Cívico, four Conservatives, and one representative of the leftist organization UNO (National Union of Opposition.) Cleavages existed within the council along three different dimensions. First there were the internal cleavages within the parties themselves. Of the eight Liberals, two were Holmistas, four were Balcarcistas, one was a Marinista, and the remaining councilman was a Ramirista. Among the four Conservatives, two were Alvaristas and two were Ospino-Pastranistas. But of these last two, one was a Lloredista and the other

⁵⁴In the case of Cali's municipal council, the complicated legislative process begins when the mayor introduces a bill to the council for the first debate. If the unmodified text of that bill is approved, it is passed on to the appropriate council committee which studies the bill. If approved by the committee, the bill is sent to a plenary session of the council. In this second debate, the bill is discussed article by article and amendments may be introduced. If the bill is approved at the end of the second debate, it is sent to the secretary to await the third and final debate. In this final debate, the bill must receive approval from the necessary quorum of councilmen, in the exact form that it left the second debate. If it receives this approval, it is then sent to the mayor for his approval or rejection. See Municipality of Cali, Reglamento (Acuerdo No. 36 de 1976, Concejo Municipal de Santiago de Cali), chapters XII, XIII, and XIV.

an Humbertista. The natural rivalries among these intra-party factions were a source of division on the municipal council.

The second cleavage in the municipal council was based on the traditional rivalry between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The mayor, Rodrigo Escobar Navia, was a Liberal⁵⁵ appointed by the Liberal governor of Valle del Cauca, Jaime Arizabaleta Calderón, who himself was an appointee of the nation's Liberal administration. The Conservatives, relegated to a position of inferiority on the municipal council vis-à-vis their Liberal opponents, naturally opposed many of the proposals of the Liberal municipal administration. This opposition served to further embroil the municipal council in the problems inherent in divisionism.

Despite the presence of the first two cleavages, it was the third cleavage that was the deciding factor which influenced and shaped the major struggles which took place on the municipal council. This cleavage divided the Liberal and Conservative councilmen from the anti-status quo coalition of the Movimiento Cívico and UNO. The Liberal-Conservative consociational alliance is a prime example of the type of political strategy used by

⁵⁵Escobar Navia found it politically expedient to avoid taking a stance on the intra-party factional issue. By so doing, he was generally supported en masse by the eight Liberals on the municipal council.

the two traditional parties when faced by a major challenge (such as the Movimiento Cívico in Cali). The use of such a strategy was discussed above from a historical perspective.

When translated into numbers, the effects of the different cleavages on the operation of the municipal council of Cali assume more clarity. The Liberals and Conservatives held twelve curules while their opponents, the Movimiento Cívico and UNO, held eight. According to the municipal Reglamento, the municipal council needed a one-third quorum in order to convene and deliberate⁵⁶ and a quorum of one-half plus one of the total members of the council (i.e. an absolute majority) was required in order to vote on any matter (article 18). And for a bill to be passed by the council, a majority of the members that constituted the decisional quorum was necessary (article 64). In terms of Cali's municipal council, seven members were needed to convene a session, and eleven had to be present in order for the council to vote on any matter. In the rare case that only eleven were present, six votes in favor were needed for the passage of a bill; if, as was more common, all twenty were present, eleven votes in favor were required for passage. This meant that the Liberals

⁵⁶Previously an absolute majority of the concejo members was necessary for the concejo to meet and function. See article 163 of Law 4 of 1913.

and Conservatives were forced to unite in order to assure passage of a bill. That is, any Liberal-Conservative rift could be exploited by the unified MC-UNO coalition to block passage of a bill.⁵⁷ In effect, the inter-party factionalism between Liberal and Conservative councilmen acted as a potential obstacle to the passage of legislation.

But for the most part, the programs introduced by the mayor did indeed gain the final approval of the municipal council (the rubber stamp). Furthermore, the possibility of overruling a mayoral rejection was almost impossible because of party loyalty among the Liberal concejeros, the small number of Conservative concejeros, and the small likelihood of a Conservative-Movimiento Cívico alliance needed to reverse the executive decision.

In summary, the power of the popularly-elected municipal council of Cali was restricted by the legal and practical constraints placed on that legislative body by the municipal mayor and departmental governor who acted respectively as the non-elected direct and indirect agents of the president of nation. Second, the divisions among members of the local factions of the same national party, between

⁵⁷Some of the tactics used by the Movimiento Cívico-UNO coalition were to attend the council meetings but not answer when the roster was called; or the coalition would attend the meetings but walk out at a strategic time. Using both of these tactics, the alliance could, if Liberal and/or Conservative councilmen were divided or absent, hinder the operation of the council and thus forestall proceedings until the following council session.

political parties, and between partisan coalitions, resulted in shifting and temporary alignments which seriously dampened the effectiveness of the municipal council. And finally, the council did not generally initiate legislation but merely served the interests of the larger political system, filtered through the mayor, as well as those of Cali's influential economic elites.⁵⁸

In conclusion, the above discussion has examined and analyzed those aspects of the Colombian political system which serve as necessary prerequisites for the discussion which follows on the voluntary associations of San Judas. There are two major conclusions to be drawn from the discussion up to this point. First, the centralized Colombian government permeates all levels of the nation's political system through its linkage system in which the departmental governors and municipal mayors are the direct agents of, and solely responsible to, the President of the Republic

⁵⁸For studies on the "intersectorial conflict" (Walton, 1971) within Cali's power structure between the local politicians and the city's economic elites, see D. W. Dent, "Oligarchy and Power Structure in Urban Colombia: The Case of Cali," Journal of Latin American Studies, VI (1974), 113-133; Vincent L. Padgett, "The Power Structure of Cali," manuscript, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia, 1967; and John Walton, "Development Decision-Making: A Comparative Study in Latin America," American Journal of Sociology, LXXV (March, 1970), 828-851.

and the departmental governors respectively. Furthermore, within this linkage system the appointed executive branches at the subnational levels dominate the popularly elected assemblies and councils.

Second, the Liberal and Conservative parties have, through their inter- and intra-party struggles and their periodic efforts at coalitional unity, succeeded in completely dominating the political system of Colombia for the past 132 years. Although traditionally the parties' leadership has not been representative of the socio-economic composition of the Colombian nation, and even though the party leaders have, for the most part, used their power and influence to legitimate elite control of the government and to further their own interests, the national leadership has been flexible enough to the present to withstand challenges from all other social and political sectors. This flexibility is also reflected in the confederated nature of the party structures which infiltrate the political system down to the grass-roots level.⁵⁹

⁵⁹The confederated structure of the parties "permits dissidents to capture control of political office without having to challenge national party elites directly" (Solaún et al., 1973:121.) These successful dissidents are subsequently coopted into the mainstream of the party by the "informal rule of 'automatic inclusion'." In short, this structural arrangement of "loosely linked political forces which form a 'confederation' of politically successful local elites...contributes to the resilience of the national party elites in that it permits local level political competition to occur without compromising the prestige of the national leadership." See Mauricio Solaún et al., "Urban

Moreover, the clientelistic relationships which proliferate at the level of the barrio popular are extended through the municipal government to the departmental and national levels and pervade the entire Colombian political system. These extended patron-client networks are essential links within that system and permit bureaucratic officials, political authorities, and local politicians to act as brokers connecting the diverse hierarchical levels of the network. In effect, these linkages create an overall political structure which directs the political participation of the Colombian citizens through official channels and controls the effectiveness of their organized associations at the barrio level.

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS OF SAN JUDAS

The primary links between the municipal political system and that of the barrio popular in Cali were the party organizations which existed within the barrio and which were indirectly controlled by municipal party officials through barrio caciques. In the case of San Judas, most political parties organized these voluntary

Reform in Colombia: The Impact of the 'Politics of Games' on Public Policy," in Latin American Urban Research, III, eds. Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), 121.

associations within the barrio in an attempt to assure favorable voter participation in municipal, departmental, and national elections.⁶⁰

In San Judas the Holmista, Balcarcista, and Marinista factions of the Liberal Party had created barrio associations. Each association was led by a committee, the most important officials of which established close links with their respective municipal superiors in the party hierarchy.

The Holmista faction was the best organized of San Judas' Liberal associations. It had two principal committees, one in each of the two major etapas of the barrio.

⁶⁰The studies of voluntary associations in rural and urban Latin American marginal barrios are too numerous to list here. In general, many claim that positive government response to communal demands varies in direct proportion to the organizational strength of the poor. See D. Ronfeldt, Atecingo: The Politics of Agrarian Struggle in a Mexican Ejido (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1973); John Duncan Powell, Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Hernán Castillo, Chaquicocha: Community in Progress (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1964); and Henry F. Dobyns, The Social Matrix of Peruvian Indigenous Communities (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1964.) More recent studies assert that the effectiveness of the demand-making efforts of such associations is suspect because these associations are, in reality, cooptative mechanisms used by the ruling elite to control communal activism and participation within the local political system. See Susan Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Wayne A. Cornelius, "Urbanization and Political Demand-Making: Political Participation Among the Migrant Poor in Latin American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXVIII (September, 1974), 1125-1146; Sara Michl, "Urban Squatter Organization as a National Government Tool: The Case of Lima, Peru," Latin American Urban Research, III, op. cit., 155-178; and Ignacio González Camus, "¿Duermen las Juntas de Vecinos?" Hoy (Santiago de Chile), May 10-16, 1978.

The Holmista leader of sector I, besides serving as the representative of Carlos Holmes Trujillo in that sector of San Judas, also served in 1980 as the electoral campaign coordinator for eleven barrios in the southeast sector of Cali. In addition to the two principal committees, the Holmista faction had a youth organization, a community service-oriented comité social-jurídico, and a barrio school program which offered courses in math, literacy, first aid, etc. to any interested barrio residents. The school program was directed by a former member of the Colombian Communist Party who was serving in 1980 as president of the Holmista committee of sector II. Asked what their faction had done for the people of San Judas, an Holmista spokesman claimed responsibility for the initial construction of the still uncompleted community cultural center; for having an Holmista appointed as director of the local elementary school; for the construction of the barrio's first-aid center; and for the addition of seven classrooms to the elementary school.

The Balcarcista faction in San Judas was represented by the Brigada Social Liberal which claimed to have about one hundred and twenty local supporters among the inhabitants of the barrio. Its president was directly responsible to the Balcarcista faction at the municipal level which was led by Guillermo Isaza. The Brigada Social Liberal cited construction of the barrio's sidewalks as one of its major accomplishments.

The small Marinista group within San Judas was largely controlled by one man who specialized in particularistic exchanges as the basis of his support. His relationship to his peers is examined below.

The Alvarista and Ospino-Pastranista factions of the Conservative Party were also present in San Judas. Although not as strong in number in the barrio as the three Liberal factions, the Conservative factions were well organized and exerted much influence within the barrio.

The coordinator of the Alvarista organization and its various brigades in San Judas was a former Anapista and labor union leader. He was responsible for the activities of five barrio captains including the presidents of the Women's Brigade, the Youth Brigade and the Mixed (male/female) Brigade. The Alvarista faction also had a Social Service Committee which acted as a pressure group at the municipal level in the interests of the barrio pobladores. The Alvaristas claimed to be responsible for building the barrio library (no longer in use), for construction of the pedestrian bridges which spanned the large open sewer that formed the eastern border of the barrio, for acquiring implements for the community's first-aid center, for partial construction of the barrio's elementary school, and for a youth program which emphasized educational placement into high schools and colleges.

The Ospino-Pastranista group in San Judas was represented by the Comité de Union Conservador and the feminine Comando Ospino-Pastranista Belisarista. It hoped to supply the Ospino-Pastranista list with three hundred votes from the barrio for the 1980 mitaca elections. It also claimed to be responsible for obtaining funds used in the partial construction of both the community cultural center and the elementary school.

The Movimiento Cívico, despite its popularity at the municipal level, had no formal barrio organization in San Judas but instead was represented in the barrio by an official designee who was also the owner of the barrio's small movie theater. This representative of the movement was formerly a Conservative; but when he migrated from Antioquia to Cali he became a Liberal. Disillusionment with both parties was a major factor in his conversion to the Movimiento Cívico. He claimed to have provided the movement with fifty four votes during the 1978 municipal election.

ANAPO was represented in San Judas by members of the dissident splinter group Frente Por la Unidad del Pueblo. In the barrio the group was known as the Comando de ANAPO. Its president was born in the department of Mariño but had lived in San Judas for sixteen years and had been very active in barrio affairs. He was a former concejal of Cali and diputado in the departmental assembly and was

number two on the party's list for municipal council in the 1980 mitaca election.

Thus the Liberal and Conservative parties, the Movimiento Cívico, and ANAPO all had some form of organizational structure or representation within San Judas. Although there were pobladores in the barrio who voted for other political movements, these movements were mostly leftist in political orientation and did not have any type of overt organization in San Judas. They did, however, have well-defined organizational structures at the municipal level.

There were two other important voluntary associations in San Judas - the Comité Pro-Defensa and the Junta de Acción Comunal. Both associations claimed to be apolitical and oriented toward community service. While the latter claim was somewhat valid, the former most certainly was not.

The Comité Pro-Defensa was organized in 1979 ostensibly because the directorate of the barrio's Junta de Acción Comunal had ceased to function. In order to "defend" the interests of the pobladores of San Judas and to work for the continued improvement of the barrio,⁶¹ an election was organized by interested individuals in the

⁶¹The Comité Pro-Defensa had been in contact with the Municipal Department of Public Works (EMCALI) for the purpose of soliciting repairwork on the two principal roads of San Judas.

community. Approximately four hundred residents of San Judas are alleged to have participated in the election to select the directorate of the alternative organization. They chose the president of the Comando de ANAPO as the president of the new committee, the president of the Comité de Union Conservador as the vice president, the vice president of the Comando de ANAPO as the fiscal (financial officer), and a former Anapista, now a follower of the Ospino-Pastranista faction of the Conservative Party, as secretary. Although there were purportedly two Liberals among the ten elected officers of the directorate of the new organization, they played minor roles. Consequently, the directorate of the Comité Pro-Defensa was dominated by Anapistas, former Anapistas, and Ospino-Pastranista Conservatives in a barrio that was largely Liberal.

The directorate of the Junta de Acción Comunal of San Judas, on the other hand, was elected in June, 1977, and consisted at that time of three Liberals and two Conservatives. A restructuring of the Junta six months later, due to incompatibility among the officers, resulted in the replacement of the two Conservatives, who had resigned, with two Liberals. A subsequent readjustment left the vice-presidency vacant and the other four positions occupied by Liberals, including two Balcarcistas,

one Holmista, and one Marinista. This was the situation as of June, 1979, when the directorate's term in office expired.

Thus the two organizations, the Comité Pro-Defensa and the Junta de Acción Comunal, had aligned themselves along a cleavage which separated an ANAPO-Conservative alliance from the exclusively Liberal directorate of the Junta. This divisionism was the dominant characteristic of the barrio's political system and reflected the factionalism so characteristic of the larger political system of the nation. But of equal importance from the perspective of the present study, was the fact that the struggle between the two communal associations, besides being partisan oriented, also represented a struggle between an association that had been voluntarily created through the efforts of barrio residents (the Comité) and one which had been imposed upon those residents by the larger political system (the Junta).

ACCION COMUNAL

The Acción Comunal program was created by the national government during the Liberal administration of President Lleras Camargo.⁶² Law 19 of 1958, in seeking to reform

⁶²The following discussion on the origins and legal aspects of Acción Comunal is based on a conference given by Dr. Adolfo Alvarez of the Universidad del Valle.

the National Public Administration, provided the legal basis for the formation of Acción Comunal juntas throughout the country. Article 22 of Law 19 granted the national government, the departmental assemblies, and the municipal councils the authority to permit the juntas to serve as guardians of the public services (an oversight function) and to actively intervene in the administrative control of such services. Article 23 states the government's rationale in the creation of the juntas:

The Government will promote, through the channels it judges most advisable, and in accordance with municipal and departmental authorities, the cooperation of the inhabitants of each municipality for the purpose of promoting campaigns and activities of community improvement in public services, health, education, housing, the stimulation of agricultural production, creation of jobs...

In short, Acción Comunal was originally designed to be a government-sanctioned, government-controlled effort to foment community organization, backed by the financial and technical assistance of the public sector, for the purposes of bettering the economic, social, and cultural conditions of the community and of educating the people so that they could develop a social awareness and acquire the skills necessary to participate in the resolution of their common problems. In short, from the theoretical point of view, the Acción Comunal program was created in order to take advantage of the Colombian custom of communal

cooperation, as traditionally practiced in the minga, the mano prestada, and the convite, to give all community residents, regardless of socio-economic status, religion, or political affiliation, the opportunity to assume leadership roles within the local community and to participate in programs of communal activism.

The National Front implemented the Acción Comunal program as a means of dealing with the socio-economic problems of the nation caused by the country's rapid industrialization and urbanization and as a means of controlling the social chaos and political turmoil which characterized the period of La Violencia and the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla. The Lleras administration was heavily influenced in its decision to create the program by the 1954 Lebret report⁶³ which cited the lack of community involvement in the country's national development programs and the lack of human resources at the local level as two of the primary obstacles to the overall development of Colombia. The government was subsequently motivated to create and implement the Acción Comunal program by the Alliance for Progress which was created in 1961 as a pact between the United States and Latin America in an effort to promote social and economic reforms in Latin America so as to avoid another

⁶³ See Louis J. Lebret, Misión "Economía y Humanismo": Estudio Sobre las Condiciones de Desarrollo de Colombia (Bogotá: Aedita, Cromos, 1958).

political upheaval similar to that of Cuba.

The major factor which distinguished Acción Comunal from its communal predecessors was that not only was it concerned with achieving material goals such as the construction of roads, electrification systems, sewage systems, etc., but it was also interested in developing human resources at the local level. With this objective in mind, Decree 1761 of 1959 established the Division of Acción Comunal within the Ministry of Education. It formulated the educational objectives of Acción Comunal and implemented such programs as mandatory courses on community development within public schools. Decree 2059 of 1962 created the Social Services of Literacy and Acción Comunal to give all students at the middle school, high school, and university levels training and practical experience in literacy and communal action programs. Finally, Decree 454 of 1964 authorized the Acción Comunal program to create and promote cooperative educational programs and establishments. Both were subject, however, to the guidelines of the national Department of Education.

The national government also enacted decrees and statutes designed to insure the cooperation of public (Decree 2119 of 1964) and private (Decree 2263 of 1966) entities with Acción Comunal and to guarantee the integration of public and private resources to promote programs of health, employment, recreation, housing, etc.

And finally, Decrees 835 and 836 of 1969 established the possibility of creating federations of local juntas as well as a national junta federation whose implicit function would be to act as a pressure group within the national decision-making arena.

Although as of 1980 the number of Acción Comunal juntas had grown considerably throughout Colombia since the inception of the program,⁶⁴ whether or not Acción Comunal could be considered successful, in accordance with the legal bases described above, is debatable. There are those who praised the achievements of the program and asserted that "Acción Comunal is the most effective tool to stimulate civic spirit and foment solidarity among the people as well as to motivate the social and economic development of the community."⁶⁵ Many observers, however, took a different view of the overall intentions and accomplishments of the Acción Comunal program. They saw the program as an elite-organized structure, rather than as a voluntary communal organization organized by the spontaneous efforts of the residents themselves, which served to enhance elite control, through cooptative policies,

⁶⁴In 1960 there were 83 organized and legally-sanctioned juntas de Acción Comunal in Colombia. By 1980 the number had risen to more than 30,000 throughout the entire country. See El Tiempo (Bogotá), January 3, 1980.

⁶⁵These words were spoken by engineer Sigifredo Cruz Romero as he received a medal of recognition for his twenty years of continued service to the Acción Comunal program in Valle del Cauca. See El País (Cali), December 15, 1979.

over the actions of rural and urban community residents (Kline, 1974:282). In this respect Acción Comunal reflected Colombia's "centralist tradition in which public decisions are made largely at the higher levels of the authority pyramid" (Havens and Flinn, 1970 a:103) and are enforced through the "hollow voice of local political bosses" (Blasier, 1966:403) who dominate the juntas at the local levels, thereby reinforcing the status quo rather than granting the community access to political channels (Blutstein, 1977:276). In sum, many scholars considered the Acción Comunal program to be a method of controlling the masses by imposing on them an elite-directed structure which purportedly gave the community access to higher political levels but which, in practice, strongly and effectively shaped the behavior patterns of the residents of those communities and sharply restricted their participation in the policy-making arenas of the municipal, departmental, and national administrative levels of the government.⁶⁶

⁶⁶There are several studies on Colombian development programs and structures which deal, to varying degrees, with the Acción Comunal program in Colombia. For a study on the role of Acción Comunal in a rural peasant community, see Emil B. Haney and Wava G. Haney, "Social and Ecological Contradictions of Community Development and Rural Modernization in a Colombian Peasant Community," Human Organization, XXXVII (1978), 225-234. A brief description of Acción Comunal juntas in the context of community power structures is offered in Gustavo Jiménez, "The Institutionalized Church as a Supporter of Extant Structural Arrangements," in Eugene A. Havens and William L. Flinn, eds., Internal Colonialism:

To a large degree, the cooptative evaluation of Acción Comunal has much merit. Acción Comunal served as a vital link at the lower end of the government's hierarchical linkage system, for it was, as in the case of San Judas, the only formal government-sanctioned structure within the barrios populares that claimed to be open to membership for all barrio pobladores fifteen years of age and older.⁶⁷ But rather than provide access to higher political levels for those pobladores, the local junta provided access for government elites into the urban barrio. Nor did the Acción Comunal program allow local juntas to oversee the operation of municipal public utilities or to intervene in the administrative control of those public agencies. Despite these negative aspects of the Acción Comunal program, for many of the barrios of Cali the Acción Comunal juntas were the only means of acquiring material benefits from the municipal government for the purpose of improving the infrastructure of those barrios.

Structural Changes in Colombia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970). For an official description of the Acción Comunal program, see Benedicto Baquero C., Desarrollo de la Comunidad: Organización Comunitaria (Bogotá: Ministerio de Gobierno, Dirección General de Integración y Desarrollo de la Comunidad, 1977).

⁶⁷In order to organize an Acción Comunal junta in any barrio, a total of fifty barrio residents is needed.

Government control of Acción Comunal has been very strict. In the financial sense, the national government controlled the budget of the national Acción Comunal program. From 1976 until 1980 the budget allocation for that program was reduced by 63%⁶⁸ and in 1980 represented less than 1% of the country's total budget. In the legal sense, the national government and its regional administrative corporations controlled, by means of decrees and resolutions, the formation and operation of all local juntas. A regional "promoter," under the direct supervision of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Government, was used by the national government as its local representative in matters involving Acción Comunal. He was responsible for the initial screening of a barrio's request for the establishment of a legally-sanctioned junta. Once the junta was declared a legal entity by the national government, the promoter coordinated the electoral process used within the barrio to decide the composition of the junta's directorate. The national government also specified the statutes to be used by the local junta in its daily operations.⁶⁹ These statutes specified, among other things, the

⁶⁸El Tiempo (Bogotá), January 3, 1980.

⁶⁹Article 1 of the Ministry of Government's Resolution 0504 of 1970 states: "The juntas of Acción Comunal which exist in the national territory must adopt the following statutes..." It then goes on to enumerate those statutes, statutes which govern all aspects of the local junta's existence and operation. During the late 1970's, with the proliferation of barrios populares and Acción Comunal juntas,

structure of the junta, the powers of its officers, the procedures to be used, the quorums necessary to convene, deliberate, and vote, and the powers reserved to the national government to control the whole process.⁷⁰

Another common criticism of Acción Comunal was that it was not as apolitical as it professed to be. In 1960 the program was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education to that of the Ministry of Government and, in the process, lost much of its political neutrality as it became a pawn in the partisan struggle between the two traditional political parties. Decree 3159 of 1968 reorganized the Ministry of Government and created the Dirección General de Integración y Desarrollo de la Comunidad (DIGIDEC) which became the direct supervisory agency of the Acción Comunal program. By 1979 the

other statutory codes were put into use by local juntas with municipal approval. However, Decree-law 1930 of 1979, in an attempt to impose the same set of statutes on all the juntas throughout the country, established a uniform statute code which all juntas, created as of August, 1979, had to use.

⁷⁰Articles 42 and 43 of Decree-Law 1930 of 1979 permit the intervention of the national government in the affairs of local juntas. The former permits the Minister of Government to sanction or void the election of local junta officials, as well as the decisions which affect the material resources of the junta, if five affiliates of the junta present an appeal to the government authority. The latter specifies when new elections are to be held in the event that the initial election results are declared null and void by the Minister of Government. Moreover, the national government has the power to expel any member from any local junta, or any junta's board of directors, to freeze the funds designated for a particular junta, and to suspend for ninety days, or cancel, the legal basis of the junta (Article 53 of Decree-Law 1930 of 1979).

national government was being attacked for its proposal to create a new administrative department which would control and unite Acción Comunal with the Agency of Indian Affairs (Asuntos Indígenas).⁷¹ All these political maneuvers tended to embroil the Acción Comunal program in political clashes and subjected it to the paralyzing effects of bureaucratic immobilism.

In the case of Cali, the municipal Acción Comunal supervisory agency was officially designated an administrative department of the municipality in 1979. This move had different consequences for the Acción Comunal program which was under the direction of the Administrative Department of Social Promotion and Comunal Action at that time. It gave the city more administrative autonomy over the program although the municipal organization was still forced to adhere to the legal norms of the national Acción Comunal organization. Second, it increased the budgetary allocation for the municipality's Acción Comunal.⁷² Notwithstanding

⁷¹El Tiempo (Bogotá), December 14, 1979.

⁷²As an administrative department of Cali under the direction and authority of the mayor, the municipal Acción Comunal requested eighty million pesos (U.S. 1.00 was equal to 45 Colombian pesos as of March, 1980) for the 1980-1981 fiscal year. Subsequently the sum of thirteen million pesos was approved by the municipal council for its Acción Comunal program. Although this sum represented only a fraction of that requested by the municipal Acción Comunal director, it was a relatively large amount for Cali in comparison to the national Acción Comunal budget of thirty million pesos for the entire country.

these benefits and the fact that the Director of Acción Comunal in Cali, María del Pilar Uribe de Bernal, a Liberal, was guaranteed a voice in the committee meetings of the municipal government by article 51 of the municipal code, the national government still wielded much power over Cali's Acción Comunal program. Article 19 of the 1979 decree which created the program as an administrative department of the municipal government also gave the mayor the responsibility for determining the types of offices on the board of Acción Comunal and the qualifications and functions of those who occupied those offices. Furthermore the allocation pattern of the municipal Acción Comunal's budgetary resources to local barrio juntas was very selective and particularistic. The decision to allocate or withhold funds requested by local juntas depended on the evaluation of a group of eight or nine municipal promoters who analyzed the feasibility of the local juntas' requests. And last of all, the officers of the municipal Acción Comunal, by virtue of their role as intermediaries between barrio juntas and the agencies regulating municipal public services, could and did influence the realization of barrio projects by arranging for, or denying, technical assistance to the barrios.

In conclusion, although the junta de Acción Comunal was a very active and somewhat successful organization within many of Cali's barrios populares, it was essentially a

linkage structure organized and controlled from above in an attempt to control the communal activism of the barrio residents. Moreover, the success of each junta depended on the contextual factors present in each barrio. The Junta de Acción Comunal of San Judas was characterized by political divisionism and was looked unfavorably upon by the municipal Acción Comunal because of this factionalism⁷³ and because of the barrio's precarious land-tenure situation. Nevertheless, the officers of the junta of San Judas frequently played important roles in the barrio's power structure because, for the most part, they were barrio caciques with well-defined partisan affiliations.

CACIQUISMO AND CLIENTELISM

The most salient feature of the voluntary associations of San Judas was the role played by the leaders (caciques) of those communal organizations. In order to better

⁷³On February 11, 1979, the former secretary of the Junta de Acción Comunal of San Judas wrote a letter to the municipal Acción Comunal in which he condemned the treasurer and fiscal as "inept persons incapable of representing the community." He claimed they were using their positions to reap monetary rewards. Political bias was almost certainly a factor in the condemnation. The former secretary was a Conservative; the treasurer and fiscal were Liberals. In an interview with an official of the municipal Acción Comunal program, I was told that this divisiveness in San Judas was one of the principal reasons the barrio had been denied funds and material resources.

comprehend the function of these association leaders, they must be examined from the perspective of clientelism and caciquismo, two traditional components of Colombian culture.

One aspect of the "residual ruralism" concept which has been investigated by scholars in Latin America is that which Cornelius (1972) calls urban caciquismo. Cornelius views the urban cacique as the analogue of the traditional rural political leader. In his rural context the cacique traditionally controlled political patronage because of his position as "boss of the public offices" (Santa, 1964:77), a position he acquired and maintained because of his "derivative power based on his outside contacts with functionaries and professionals" (Toness, 1967: 68-70).⁷⁴

⁷⁴Angell points out that the real power of these rural bosses "lay in their control over the land the peasants worked." See Alan Angell, "Cooperation and Conflict in Colombia," Political Studies, XIV (Fall, 1966), 55. But there is no doubt that the cacique's power increased when he widened his power base to include contacts with outside políticos. For additional detailed studies on this phenomenon of the cacique, in both his rural and urban roles, see Wayne A. Cornelius, "A Structural Analysis of Urban Caciquismo in Mexico," Urban Anthropology, I (Fall, 1972), 234-261; Susan Kaufman Purcell and John F.H. Purcell, "Community Power and Benefits from the Nation: The Case of Mexico," in Francine Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood, editors, Latin American Urban Research, III, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 49-76; Paul Friedrich, "The Legitimacy of a Cacique," in Marc J. Swartz, editor, Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives (Chicago: Aldine, 1968); pp. 243-269 and "A Mexican Cacigazgo," Ethnology, IV (1965), 190-209; Odin A. Toness Jr., "Power Relations of a Central American Slum," unpublished M.A. thesis (Austin: University of Texas, 1967), and Robert Kern, ed., The Caciques: Oligarchical Politics and the System of Caciquismo in the Luso-Hispanic World (Albuquerque, New Mexico, University of New Mexico Press, 1973).

Having been the political broker between the rural peasant community and the larger political sphere, the urban caciques, as demonstrated in Talton Ray's study of political leadership in the low-income barrios of Venezuela, have become "the supreme, and almost absolute, authority in their barrios. They sanction, regulate or prohibit all group activities and exercise a strong influence over any decisions that might affect their communities" (1969:59).

Cornelius has found however that the phenomenon of urban caciquismo appears to be a transitory one (1972:250-251). As the residents of low-income barrios undergo the contextual effects of the political socialization process within the urban area, their perceptions of the necessity, value, and function of this "self-appointed autocratic strongman" (1972:248-249), who pursues his goals of personal gain and economic wealth in the name of the defense of the local community and the promotion of its developmental needs, undergo a gradual transformation. This assertion may apply in the case of the caciques of San Judas (see Chapter V). Nevertheless it was found that the caciques still occupied influential positions within the political system of the barrio. This influence was derived from their linkages to the municipal political system which provided them with access to limited material resources subsequently used as patronage in exchange for the loyalty of the barrio pobladores.

A very important institution which has traditionally linked individuals together in social, economic, and political interactions is the patronage system.⁷⁵ This concept, originally studied by anthropologists and sociologists, has, in recent years, been utilized by political scientists in their research into Latin American socio-political systems. Its application to the Colombian political system is necessary in order to gain deeper insight into the structures and dynamics of that system at all levels. On a larger scale, the patron-client concept aids the researchers in their studies of transitional societies, interest articulation, linkages between the individual and the state, political power, social conflict, and social cohesion (Kaufman, 1974).

⁷⁵In the Latin American context many scholars assert that the patron-client relationship is a direct descendant of the ancient Roman institution of clientela (Alternativa, 1980:4) which was subsequently introduced into Spain and the New World over the course of centuries. This Roman institution, combined with the elitist, hierarchical, two-class, patrimonial socio-political order inherited by Latin America from Spain (Wiarda, 1973:209) led to the creation of the encomienda system in Latin America in which society was organized into collective social groups usually under the direction of an oligarchic landowner (Guillén M., n.d.) In this paternalistic society, members of the upper strata controlled the scarce resources available to the entire society in a successful effort to foster the economic dependence of the lower classes upon the upper classes (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976). Thus, Latin American society became a hegemonic paternal system (Schmidt, 1977) in which the patron, with his many clients (the patron-client cluster) was able to maintain an unchanging social order for many decades.

The patronage system in its most basic form consists of two individuals linked together in a patron-client dyad. This patron-client relationship is

an exchange relationship between roles involving an individual of higher status (the patrón) and a person of lower status (the client). The former provides the latter with protection and benefits while the client reciprocates by giving the patron support and loyalty (J. Scott, 1972:92; Boissevain, 1966)

In other words, the patron-client dyadic contract is "an informal, particularistic exchange relationship between actors of unequal power and status..." (Kaufman, 1977: 112-113.)

Thus the three major components of the traditional patron-client relationship are proximity, reciprocity, and unequal status (J. Powell, 1970).⁷⁶ The patron and client interact on a personal basis. The exchange is mutually beneficial. And because of his superior position in the social hierarchy, the patron has access to, and the ability to distribute, those resources which are needed by the client in return for those resources (e.g. votes, moral support, etc.) needed by the patrón.

⁷⁶Besides asymmetrical dyads, there are also symmetrical dyads which bind people of the same status. See George M. Foster "The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village," American Anthropologist LXV (1963), 1280-1294. For the purposes of the present study, the asymmetrical dyad is the more relevant of the two types.

Thus in traditional societies the patronage system may be used to subjectively sanction objective inequalities within an inegalitarian moral order (Emerson, 1975; J. Scott, 1975.) But in the modern urban context, such as that of San Judas, the patronage system may serve to emphasize the non-subjectively-sanctioned inegalitarian distribution of resources within the society. In this respect the system undergoes an evolutionary modification as it enters the modern environment and may be used by political leaders to perpetuate marginality, i.e. integration without reciprocity (Perlman, 1976:244-245), among the urban masses.

In short, in traditional society the patronage system acts as a stabilizing factor which legitimates the existing socio-political order. But in modern society the system may act as a destabilizing factor in the sense that it fosters a repudiation of the existing socio-political order among the exploited and marginal masses.⁷⁷

⁷⁷As explained in Chapter I, the concept of marginality as used in the present study implies integration without reciprocity. In Emerson's study of traditional society in Indonesia, reciprocity is the basis of the sanctioned inegalitarian social-class structure. In Perlman's study of modern Brazilian society, reciprocity does not exist as such. Thus the favelados are less apt to sanction the exploitative and exclusionary policies of the ruling class. See Donald K. Emerson, Orders of Meaning: Understanding Political Change in a Fishing Community in Indonesia (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1975); and Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 244-245.

The role of the cacique within the patronage system also undergoes modification as it comes into contact with the modernizing influences of the urban milieu. In the city the cacique continues in his role as a personalistic patron within the local barrio; but more importantly he is transformed into a "political middleman between his community and the politicians and political parties in the urban electoral arena" (Toness, 1967:58-59). In this respect he acts as a political broker within an extended patron-client network.

In the urban context the functions of the broker are mainly political in nature. He becomes the politicizing agent of a political party or movement as well as its local mobilizer. Because of his contacts with official organizations and the government bureaucracy, he gains access to many resources. And because of his gatekeeper function he is able to limit the access of local individuals to the larger political system (Cornelius 1972:246) and therefore limit their participation in the decision-making process which determines the allocation of public goods (Bamberger, 1968). Eric Wolf sums up the function of brokers in the patron-broker-client relationship:

...they stand guard over the critical junctures and synapses of relationships which connect the local system to a larger whole. Their basic function is to relate community-oriented individuals who want to stabilize their life chances, but who lack economic security

and political connections, with nation-oriented individuals who operate primarily in terms of complex cultural forms standardized as national-institutions, but whose success in these operations depends on the size and strength of their personal following (1965: 97).⁷⁸

The linkages between the caciques of San Judas and their followers or clients were personalistic and were based to varying degrees on the three traditional features of patron-clientelism, i.e. proximity, reciprocity, and assymetry. Moreover, the caciques were the foci, the local mobilizers (Schmidt, 1977:315), through which municipal and departmental politicians channeled their distributive policies in an effort to coopt barrio residents and control dissent (Booth, 1979:43-44).

Many of the local caciques had their own limited resources. In the case of San Judas these included extending the use of their telephones to their neighbors, using rudimentary public address systems to make announcements of a civic and/or political nature, and, most important of all, taking advantage of their personal contacts with

⁷⁸The role of the urban cacique as a broker in a patron-broker-client triad and the system of clientelism in general in Colombia were criticized in a leftist publication: "In a country where not all of the inhabitants can obtain the basic services of education, health or sewers, clientelistic mechanisms intercede by means of intermediaries such as caciques and gamonales who distribute the goods and services of the state like personal gifts in exchange for political support." See Alternativa (Bogotá), No. 250 (February, 1980), p. 5.

higher party officials at the municipal and departmental levels to grant personal favors (such as educational and employment opportunities) to their clients. In turn, these clients voted for the appropriate list on election day, thereby verifying to the municipal party leaders the "delivery capability" of the barrio cacique.

Thus the client-broker-patron triad which linked the barrio residents, the barrio caciques, and the municipal party officials shaped the participation of the barrio residents who viewed the Liberal and Conservative parties as the primary channels for access to the larger political system. Although other parties and political groups did exist in San Judas, they had neither the resources nor the organizational capabilities sufficient to operate as efficiently as the two traditional parties. Therefore, in San Judas the Liberal and Conservative parties waged an effective politics of cooptation and dominated the local political system through their cacique representatives.

In short, the residents of San Judas used the traditional political parties as the main vehicle in seeking access to the institutional decision-making centers at the municipal level of government. This access however was severely limited and did not imply influence in the decision-making process. For the most part, my research in San Judas showed that the barrio caciques, although perceived by the barrio's pobladores as important links to the

politicians and party authorities at the municipal level, in reality wielded little influence with their superiors and had almost no significant impact upon the decisions made in the municipal political system. Nor did the local caciques receive inordinate amounts of tangible economic benefits in their role as political brokers. Prestige in the barrio seemed to be their most immediate compensation although several of the caciques had received employment through their patron-client relationship with municipal and departmental party officials.

SAN JUDAS: POWER STRUCTURE

Did the caciques of San Judas comprise a power structure within the barrio? To answer this question, I investigated the leadership pattern within the barrio from both the reputational and positional perspectives. Since there was no formal governmental system operating within San Judas (the Junta de Acción Comunal was, for all practical purposes, non-functioning), I was interested in finding out whether the local caciques, by virtue of their political influence within the barrio, and their positions of formal authority were considered the leaders or "influentials"⁷⁹ of San Judas by the barrio residents

⁷⁹The term "leader," or "influential," is used here in a very loose sense. Since as of 1980 San Judas had no barrio council nor formal decision-making process which

as well as by their fellow caciques.

If power is said to be exercised as "a necessary function in social relationships" (Hunter, 1953-7), then the existence of organized barrio associations implies a certain power structure within the urban barrio. This leadership pattern, or power structure, when discerned and analyzed, should aid the political scientist in his attempt to examine the political dynamics of the marginal barrio.

The four traditional analytical approaches used by students of community power structures are all derived from studies done in the United States. They are the reputational approach, the positional approach, the social participation approach, and the pluralist approach. Each of these four approaches has been applied to the Latin American context.

had evolved through the efforts of the residents themselves, there were no popular leaders in the barrio whose following transcended partisan loyalties. Nor were there any leaders whose influence and power in the barrio were based on economic status. Thus the methodology used in the present study focused on the positional relationship of local caciques among the voluntary associations of the barrio and then attempted to verify or reject the findings of this first approach by comparing them with those of the reputational approach. The term "leader" is hereafter used to describe any barrio resident who, by virtue of his political contacts or civic accomplishments, was perceived by a segment of the barrio population as having some control over the distribution of resources within San Judas and/or having access to resources which could be used to distribute patronage among the barrio pobladores.

The most commonly used approaches in the case of studies involving Colombian communities have been the positional and reputational approaches (Schmidt, 1977; Havens and Flinn, 1970 a). The former approach views leadership as a function of the authority deriving from a person's position within a formal organization or association. That is, the position is more important than the person who occupies it. The latter approach seeks those individuals who are considered to be influential members of the community by the members of that community.⁸⁰ These influentials may be the patrons of a patron-client dyad, the political brokers of the local barrio or community, professionals, economic elites, religious elites, or other residents who, through their accomplishments or contacts, are perceived as being

⁸⁰There are two major weaknesses inherent in the reputational approach. First of all, it only measures a person's reputation for power, not his actual power. Second, it is a subjective, not objective, measure based on the personal opinions of those informants chosen by the investigator. As such, the informants' personal biases, political affiliation, etc. may influence the names they provide the investigator. Nevertheless, the reputational approach still retains much analytical utility and has been used in research on Latin American communities with relative success. See Gary W. Hoskin, "Community Power and Political Modernization: A Study of a Venezuelan City," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1967; David E.W. Holden, "La Estructura del Liderazgo y Sus Características en una Comunidad de Costa Rica," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VIII (January, 1966), 129-141; and Harold T. Edwards, "Power Structure and Its Communication Behavior in San José, Costa Rica," Journal of Inter-American Studies, IX (1967), 236-247.

beneficial to the well-being of the community.⁸¹

In the present study, San Judas was the community under investigation. The first step in the analysis of the community's power structure was to define all the positional leaders. This was done by using several informants within the barrio. The most helpful and knowledgeable informant I was able to find was a seminarian who was introduced to me by the parish priest. This seminarian was in a unique position to help me. He knew the barrio and its residents well because he had grown up in San Judas and because of his work with the Church in the barrio. Moreover, his self-imposed apolitical stance was a major factor in his relatively objective perceptions and descriptions of the political dynamics and personalities within the barrio. He provided me with much insight into the political maneuverings in San Judas among the various cacique-led, partisan affiliated, voluntary associations. As he helped me identify those associations, I made initial and informal contacts with their leaders, introduced myself, and arranged for a more formal interview⁸² at a future date.

⁸¹As will be shown below, in the case of San Judas there were no professionals or economic elites residing in the barrio; and the specific case of the parish priest is also clarified below. Thus, almost all the positional and reputational leaders were found to derive their power from political bases.

⁸²See Appendix E for the text of the semi-structured interview used with the positional leaders.

The more I spoke with the barrio caciques and with other barrio residents, the more I was able to identify the salient associations and political relationships within the barrio. In most cases the caciques were very cooperative and provided me with valuable information concerning the political dynamics, development, structures, and linkages of the barrio. That information, however, was quite subjective and was usually slanted to give me a favorable impression of the political faction represented by the cacique being interviewed. Nevertheless, the interviews proved very productive and provided much insight into the internal struggles among the positional leaders of San Judas, into the voluntary associations of the barrio, and into the linkages, both particularistic and collective, within the barrio and between the barrio and the municipal political system.

The next step used the reputational approach to determine the community influentials from the point of view of the positional leaders. The third step also involved using the reputational approach. But, unlike step two, those interviewed were the pobladores of the barrio who did not occupy formal positions of authority within the barrio. The fourth and final step was to compare the results compiled in the first three steps.⁸³

⁸³Such a study of the local power structure from at least two methodological perspectives allows the researcher to determine the nature and degree of similarity between

The power structure of San Judas, as analyzed through the positional approach, was found to be pluralistic in nature, reflecting the wide number of associations which operated within the barrio.⁸⁴ The Liberal and Conservative parties and their factions had barrio associations, women's brigades, youth groups, etc. Thus the formal leader in each case could be considered as occupying a position of authority since that individual controlled the actions of others within the barrio and, through his contacts to the

the two lists of leaders or "influentials" and to better analyze the structural and dynamic components of local power (Schulze and Blumberg, 1970:220). This process of comparative methodologies and multiple analysis has been used in Mexico (Eckstein, 1977; Walton, 1971), Colombia (Havens and Flinn, 1970 a) and other areas of Latin America (Schulze and Blumberg, 1970). Whereas Havens and Flinn's study of the power structure of a shantytown in Bogotá using the positional, reputational, and decision-making approaches concluded that "all three methods produced essentially the same results" (1970 a:99), Schulze and Blumberg found that "the composition of the community's power elite, as defined by reputation, differs significantly from that defined on the basis of superordinate positions in either the local economic or the politico-civic institutions" (1970:220).

⁸⁴In this respect the findings of the present study agreed with those of Mangin who also found that the power structures of the invasion barriadas of Lima were pluralistic in nature rather than oligarchic. See William Mangin, "Poverty and Politics in Cities of Latin America," in Warren Bloomberg, Jr. and Henry J. Schmandt, eds., Power, Poverty, and Urban Policy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968). Thus the findings derived from the application of the positional approach to the power structure of San Judas did not reflect the oligarchic nature of Colombian society. The most probable reason for this was the lack of social class distinctions among the pobladores of San Judas. The absence of rigid socio-economic cleavages in the barrio created a situation in which socio-economic status, a major factor in the pattern of leadership at the national level, was subordinated to political status as a causal determinant of the barrio's leadership pattern.

larger political system, was able to influence, or attempt to influence, the distribution of resources within the barrio. Other organizations within the barrio represented anti-status quo political movements, such as ANAPO and the Movimiento Cívico, and still others claimed to be apolitical (Junta de Acción Comunal and the Comité Pro-Defensa). But in each case, the president of the voluntary association had strong political ties to the larger political system and in this respect acted as a leader within the barrio.

Table 21 lists the formal positions of authority that existed within the principal voluntary associations of San Judas in the 1979-1980 period and also gives the initials of the individual who occupied each position.

The table includes the most important officeholders of the three Liberal factions, the two Conservative factions, the Anapistas, the Movimiento Cívico, the Junta de Acción Comunal, and the Comité Pro-Defensa in San Judas. Also included is the parish priest, a position which has traditionally wielded formal authority in Latin American communities. Of the seventeen positions listed in the table, sixteen were held by men. The only woman was the president of the Women's Alvarista Brigade who was very active in the political dynamics of San Judas. It may also be noted that three people were simultaneously holding two positions of formal authority. Furthermore, there are

TABLE 21

OCCUPANTS OF FORMAL POSITIONS OF
AUTHORITY, BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1980

Office- holder ^a	Position(s) Presently Held ^b	Position(s) Previously Held
1. R.R.	President, Holmista faction of Liberal Party (Etapa I)	President, JAC ^c
2. E.L.	President, Holmista faction of Liberal Party (Etapa II)	President, JAC
3. A.L.	President, Liberal Marinista Brigade	Fiscal, JAC
4. M.P.	President, Social Liberal Brigade (Balcarcistas)	n.d. ^d
5. L.E.R.	President, Comité de Union Conservador (Ospino-Pastran- istas); Vicepresident, Comité Pro-Defensa	President, JAC; President, Social Action Committee of JAC
6. N.de R.	President, Women's Conserva- tive Brigade (Alvaristas)	President, Alvarista Social Service Committee
7. A.T.	Coordinator of 11 Alvarista brigades in San Judas	n.d.
8. R.M.	Captain of Alvarista Brigade	n.d.
9. S.S.	Captain of Alvarista Brigade	n.d.
10. G.Z.	Captain of Alvarista Brigade	n.d.
11. J.B.	President, JAC	n.d.
12. H.V.	Vicepresident, JAC	n.d.
13. M.T.H.	President, Comando de ANAPO; President, Comité Pro-Defensa	President, JAC
14. A.S.	Vicepresident, Comando de ANAPO: Fiscal, Comité Pro-Defensa	n.d.
15. A.G.	Secretary, Comité Pro-Defensa	Secretary, JAC
16. M.T.C.	Official Representative of Movimiento Civico in San Judas	n.d.
17. H.C.	Parish priest	none

^aInitials are used instead of names.

^bIncludes positions in non-functioning Junta de Acción Comunal.

^cJAC= Junta de Acción Comunal.

^dn.d.= no data available.

no economic elites on the list because the socioeconomic composition of the barrio residents was relatively uniform in comparison to that of the city as a whole.

In short, Table 21 presents a list of the leaders of San Judas as determined by the positional approach to the study of community power structures. How valid the findings of that approach are in comparison to those obtained using the reputational approach is examined below.

The second step was to interview the occupants of the formal positions of authority listed in Table 21 in order to determine, by use of the reputational approach, who the positional leaders in the power structure considered to be the community "influentials." Of the seventeen positional leaders, I was able to interview twelve.⁸⁵ The following leadership sociogram identifies the responses of the twelve interviewed positional leaders to the question, "Can you identify three leaders of the barrio San Judas Tadeo?"⁸⁶

Some interesting findings are presented by the sociogram in Figure 5. These findings are presented in Table 22:

⁸⁵Cf the remaining five, one refused to be interviewed, three were unavailable for interviewing, and the priest, while very helpful in many ways, declined to identify "influentials" within San Judas because of his self-imposed status of political neutrality in the barrio.

⁸⁶Three respondents nominated only two persons; one respondent nominated four. In all, the twelve respondents offered thirty four nominations, only one of which was not a positional leader as defined by Table 21.




Figure 5. Leadership Sociogram, Barrio San Judas Tadeo, 1979-1980.

TABLE 22

COMMUNITY INFLUENTIALS,^a
BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1980

Previously Identified Positional Leader	Political Affiliation ^b	Number of Nominations Received	Political Affiliation of Nominators ^b
1. M.T.H.	A	10	4 C-A; 2 L-H; 1 L-B; 1 A; 1 M.C.; 1 C-OP.
2. L.E.R.	C-OP	8	3 C-A; 2 A; 2 L-H; 1 C-OP.
3. R.R.	L-H	6	3 C-A; 1 M.C.; 1 L-H; 1 C-OP.
4. E.L.	L-H	4	1 L-B; 1 C-OP; 1 L-H; 1 A.
5. R.M.	C-A	1	1 C-A.
6. A.S.	A	1	1 A.
7. A.G.	C-OP	1	1 M.C.
8. M.P.	L-B	1	1 L-B.
9. H.V.	Conservative ^c	1	1 A.
10. G.Z.	C-A	0	
11. A.T.	C-A	0	
12. S.S.	C-A	0	
13. N de R	C-A	0	
14. M.T.C.	M.C.	0	
15. J.B.	L-B	0	
16. A.L.	L-M	0	
17. H.C.	n.d.	0	

^aThe "influentials" were determined through interviews with twelve of the seventeen positional leaders included in Table 21.

^bAbbreviations: A (ANAPO); C-OP (Conservative - Ospino-Pastranista); C-A (Conservative - Alvarista); L-H (Liberal - Holmista); L-B (Liberal - Balcarcista); L-M (Liberal - Marinista); M.C. (Movimiento Cívico); n.d. (no data).

^cFaction is unidentified.

Table 22 lists the barrio "influentials" according to the number of nominations received by each individual from the twelve interviewed positional leaders. Only four persons received more than one nomination and together these four persons received 82.5% of the total of 34 nominations. Thus a clear pattern of leadership, as perceived by the twelve positional leaders, is indicated by the table.

Another significant finding is the fact that the four principal influentials of Table 22 represent three different political parties. The total number of nominations for each political party is as follows: 12 for the Liberals, 11 for the Conservatives, and 11 for the Anapistas. This three-way division of the 34 nominations could be interpreted as a reflection of the relatively equal influence of the leaders of the three political parties in San Judas.

If the political affiliation of the nominators of the top four "influentials" is examined, it is found that each "influential" received at least 50% of his nominations from positional leaders with different political affiliations. For example, in the case of "influential" number 1, the Anapista received ten nominations. One was from a fellow Anapista, five were from Conservatives, three were from Liberals and one was from the representative

of the Movimiento Cívico.⁸⁷ "Influential" number 2, an Ospino-Pastranista Conservative, received one half of his votes from two Anapistas and two Liberals. In fact, three of the top four "influentials" received at least one nomination from each of the three major political movements (the Liberal and Conservative parties and ANAPO) within the barrio. This indicates a recognition, on the part of many of the positional leaders of San Judas, of barrio "influentials" of divergent political affiliations within the barrio. It also supports the theory that the leadership patterns of Colombian communities and the nation itself are characterized by small groups of elites of different political affiliations.⁸⁸

Comparing tables 21 and 22, it is found that of the 34 nominations cast in the latter, only one went to an individual not identified by the former as a positional leader of San Judas. Despite this apparent concordance between the two tables regarding the leaders of the barrio, there are some significant differences which must be pointed out and explained. Using the positional approach,

⁸⁷Of course the low number of nominations from members of M.T.H.'s own party is explained by the fact that only one other Anapista was interviewed (and he did cast his nomination for M.T.H.). This fact does not detract however from the importance of having received nine other nominations from the positional leaders of five other political groups in San Judas.

⁸⁸These small elite groups which control the Colombian political system are called "roscas." See Blutstein, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

seventeen leaders were identified in Table 21. But of those seventeen, only nine received nominations from the twelve interviewed positional leaders. Conspicuous because of their failure to receive nominations were the parish priest, four of the five Alvarista leaders, the Junta president, the representative of the Movimiento Cívico, and the leader of the Marinista faction of the Liberal Party in the barrio. Why did these individuals fail to receive any nominations?

There were two priests in San Juan Bautista, the parish to which the barrio San Judas belonged. One was an American; his assistant was a native Colombian born in the parish and very familiar with the socio-economic and political systems extant in the country. Neither resided in San Judas but lived in the neighboring barrio of Guabal. In 1979 these two priests were responsible for serving 45,193 parishioners in nine barrios.⁸⁹ Thus their involvement in any one barrio was severely limited because of time and space considerations. Moreover, the two priests were primarily involved in the spiritual betterment of their parishioners and as such were not perceived by the positional leaders of San Judas as having any direct influence upon the distribution of tangible resources

⁸⁹In terms of the number of parishioners, San Juan Bautista was the second largest of Cali's seventy parishes. See Arquidiócesis de Cali, Arquidiócesis de Cali (Cali: Departament de Sociología Religiosa, 1979), pp. 152 and 290.

within the barrio. For these reasons, the parish priest⁹⁰ did not receive any nomination from the twelve positional leaders interviewed in San Judas.

The coordination of the Alvarista faction of the Conservative Party in San Judas received no nominations primarily because he was a relative newcomer to the barrio (having lived there only five years), was assigned the position by party officials at the community municipal level, while having little contact with the pobladores of the barrio, and was much younger than the other positional leaders. In short, he was generally perceived as an outsider by the more established positional leaders of the barrio and didn't even receive any nominations from the three Alvarista captains interviewed in San Judas whom he directly supervised. In fact, the Alvarista leaders as a group received very few nominations. Of the four Alvarista captains in the barrio, only one received a nomination and that nomination was cast by the Alvarista coordinator. This finding may reflect the weakening position of the Alvaristas vis-à-vis the Ospino-Pastranista faction of the Conservative Party in Cali and also at the national level.

The president of the Junta de Acción Comunal, a Balcarcista Liberal, received no votes because he was

⁹⁰ During my stay in Cali, only one of the two priests was active in the parish. For this reason only one appears in Table 21.

generally regarded by the other positional leaders of San Judas as a maverick in barrio affairs, an individual with little political "pull" (palanca) at the municipal level, and a person with little desire for playing the political "game" within the barrio's political system. He tried to direct the Junta as an apolitical force within the barrio, a force dedicated to improving the conditions of the barrio. But with this attempt to separate lo cívico from lo político he alienated the other positional leaders of San Judas and thus received no nominations as a barrio "influential." His influence among the pobladores of the barrio is examined below.

In the case of the representative of the Movimiento Cívico, the positional leaders of San Judas refused to recognize the representative in much the same way as the leaders of the traditional parties at the municipal level united in a common effort to discredit and destroy the Movimiento Cívico and its leaders. This unity among leaders of the traditional parties in the face of a serious challenge from another political movement was discussed above in the larger political system and similarly applies to the case of the political system of San Judas.

Interviews with the positional leaders of San Judas indicated that the leader of the Marinista faction of the Liberal Party within the barrio was disliked by a large majority of the leaders. It seems that, unlike the

president of the Junta who didn't want to play the political game, the Marinista president played the game of political clientelism too well. Claims that he was involved in dirty politics, that he was an opportunist interested only in distributive and particularistic short-range benefits for his clients, and that he debased himself in front of municipal leaders while pleading for political favors were common among the positional leaders interviewed. However, A.L. had strong personal ties with many of the residents of San Judas and, although his tactics were criticized by his fellow positional leaders, he was able to achieve results and distribute much patronage among his clients. His popularity among the residents of San Judas, as indicated by the sample survey results provided below, may have been the source of resentment against him and the reason he received no nominations from the other positional leaders.

Who did the people of San Judas perceive as the leaders of their barrio popular? To answer that question a survey of a sample of barrio residents was carried out.⁹¹ The barrio was divided into five sectors⁹² in which nine high school and university students interviewed 301 barrio pobladores. Question #3 asked "Can you name three leaders of the barrio San Judas Tadeo?" The following

⁹¹See Appendix D for the text of the survey.

⁹²See Figure 4 in Chapter II.

data were gathered:

- a. Of the 301 interviewees, only 132 could name at least one leader. That is, 169 people named no leaders at all;
- b. The 132 respondents cast 309 nominations for 50 different individuals as leaders of San Judas;
- c. 11 different women received 24 nominations in all, while 39 different men received a total of 285 nominations;
- d. the woman receiving the most nominations (7) was N. de R., the president of the Alvarista Women's Brigade;
- e. 8 men received 10 or more nominations. In all, these men received 214 of the 309 nominations cast (i.e. 69.2% of the total). They are identified in Table 23:

TABLE 23
BARRIO "INFLUENTIALS" USING REPUTATIONAL APPROACH,
BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1980^a

Influential	Political Affiliation ^b	Number of Nominations Received
L.E.R.	C-OP	57
E.L.	L-H	37
A.L.	L-M	36
M.T.H.	A	24
R.R.	L-H	22
J.B.	L-B	15
S.S.	C-A	13
A.G.	C-OP	10

^aThose who received at least ten nominations in answer to the question "Can you name three leaders of the barrio San Judas Tadeo?" are included in the table.

^bAbbreviations: C-A (Conservative-Alvarista); C-OP (Conservative - Ospino-Pastranista); L-H (Liberal-Holmista); L-B (Liberal-Balcarcista); L-M (Liberal-Marinista); A (ANAPO).

What do these data gathered by the reputational approach suggest about the perceived power structure of San Judas? First of all, the fact that 56.1% of those interviewed did not identify any leaders within their barrio may be indicative of their non-involvement in the political system of the barrio or of their lack of knowledge regarding barrio "influentials." Or, some persons may not have answered because of suspicions concerning the reason for the question or fear of the survey itself since many of the pobladores had never before participated in any kind of survey.

Second, the fact that those who responded to the question nominated fifty different people as barrio leaders suggests that the term "leader" means different things to different people. To some a leader is a personal friend or patron within the barrio who can be relied upon for individual favors. To others an individual is a leader by virtue of his position in a voluntary association, whether political or apolitical. Others may perceive leaders as those who, while not occupying any formal position of authority in any barrio association, unselfishly devote their time and efforts to barrio improvement programs and projects. At any rate, the nomination of fifty different "leaders" may at first be interpreted as indicating a diffuse and fragmented leadership pattern within the barrio. But upon closer

examination, the fact that eight individuals received 69.2% of the nominations serves as a warning signal that the power structure of the barrio is composed of a small nucleus of barrio leaders.⁹³

Third, the power structure of San Judas, as indicated by the survey, is composed almost exclusively of men. The eleven women nominated in the survey received only 7.8% of the total number of nominations. This finding is not surprising considering the traditional status of women in Hispanic society.

Fourth, the eight individuals with the highest amount of nominations include four Liberals, three Conservatives, and one Anapista and represent all five factions of the two traditional parties as well as the dissident faction of ANAPO. In terms of the total number of nominations for each individual group, Table 23 indicates that the Holmistas received 59 nominations, the Marinistas 36, and the Balcarcistas 15 for a Liberal Party total of 110 nominations or 51.4% of the 214 nominations cast for the top eight influentials. The Ospino-Pastranistas received 67 nominations for individual leaders and the Alvaristas received 13 for a Conservative Party total of 80 nominations (37.4%). ANAPO received 24 nominations (11.2%). This distribution of the

⁹³ Further research is needed to determine what kinds of people think they can name leaders and what kinds cannot.

nominations in San Judas among the three parties which have dominated the nation's political system during the last fifteen years roughly reflects the relative support accorded the three parties at the national level.

Fifth, the fact that the Movimiento Cívico representative in San Judas received only 7 nominations may be indicative of the low support for the new movement among the pobladores of the barrio or may merely indicate the poor leadership capability of the representative himself.

Sixth, the eight influentials listed in Table 23 were all previously identified as positional leaders (see Table 21) and five of the eight were identified as barrio "influentials" by the twelve positional leaders interviewed in San Judas (see Table 22). The most surprising finding indicated by Table 23 is the large amount of nominations received by A.L. (36), the Marinista Liberal, who had not received any nominations from his positional peers. According to the survey, he was the third most popular leader in San Judas. This finding suggests that the perceptions of the positional leaders may at times differ from those of their followers regarding the true leaders or influentials of the community. Also noteworthy are the fifteen nominations received by the president of the Junta de Acción Comunal whose apolitical views toward community development apparently won some support from the pobladores of the barrio if not from the positional leaders of San Judas.

In summary, what is the composition of the power structure in San Judas as defined by the three measures described above? Table 24 attempts to answer this question by indicating the position, based on the number of nominations received, of all the individuals cited in Tables 22 and 23.

Table 24 shows that there were only four individuals among the top five positions on each of the two lists. These four leaders include a Conservative (Ospino-Pastranista), an Anapista, and two Liberals (Holmistas), in that order. They were defined as leaders using the positional approach and have been nominated as leaders, by both the positional leaders and the residents of San Judas, using the reputational approach. For these four individuals the two approaches have yielded similar results and have shown the power structure of San Judas to be dominated by a small group of caciques⁹⁴ representing the three largest national political parties. But for the secondary leaders, the divergence in findings of the two approaches is greater. This group of twelve secondary

⁹⁴In this respect, these findings are similar to those of Bamberger whose analysis of "the system" in the urban barrios of Venezuela found that each barrio was controlled by a small number of personalistic leaders whose basis of power was their control over resource procurement and allocation. See Michael Bamberger, "A Problem of Political Integration in Latin America: The Barrios of Venezuela," International Affairs, XLIV (October, 1968), 709-719.

TABLE 24

COMPARISON OF POSITIONS, IN TABLES 22 AND 23,
OF BARRIO LEADERS, BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1980

Leader ^a	Position in, Table 22 ^b	Position in Table 23 ^c
1. L.E.R.	2	1
2. M.T.H.	1	4
3. E.L.	4	2
4. R.R.	3	5
5. A.L.	6	3
6. J.B.	6	6
7. A.G.	5	8
8. S.S.	6	7
9. M.P.	5	seven nominations
10. R.M.	5	three "
11. A.S.	5	three "
12. H.V.	5	two "
13. N. de R.	6	seven "
14. M.T.C.	6	seven "
15. G.Z.	6	two "
16. A.T.	6	zero "
17. H.C.	6	zero "

^aIncluded in the table are the names of the 17 positional leaders as listed in Table 21.

^bThere are six positions in Table 22. The five individuals with one nomination each have all been placed in fifth position. The eight individuals without any nominations at all have been assigned to the sixth position.

^cIn the case of those positional leaders who do not appear in Table 23, the number of nominations received by each individual, according to the survey data, is indicated.

leaders⁹⁵ has a power base most likely not as extensive among the pobladores of San Judas as the four primary leaders. Furthermore, their contacts and influence at the municipal level are probably not as plentiful and strong as those of the primary leaders. The existence of a small group of primary leaders and a larger group of secondary leaders within San Judas suggests a fraction-
alized community with different political interests competing for the support of the residents of that community. This plurality of interests is reflected in the community's two-tiered power structure, a structure dominated by four "influentials" who do not necessarily cooperate in the best interests of the barrio.

Table 25 presents some personal data on the primary and secondary leaders in San Judas.

The leadership profile presented in Table 25 provides some interesting data. The four primary leaders of San Judas have all lived in the barrio for sixteen years. Since the barrio is only eighteen years old, these four leaders can be considered as being among the first settlers of the barrio. This characteristic (i.e. length of time in the barrio) was also found to be present among the barrio leaders of Barrio Tolima in Bogotá and

⁹⁵This second group is defined as any individual (except for the priest) whose name appears on either Table 21, 22, or 23.

TABLE 25

PERSONAL DATA ON PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
LEADERS OF BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, 1980

Leader	Current Political Affiliation ^a	Previous Political Affiliation ^a	Place of Birth	Years in San Judas
1. L.E.R.	C-OP	same	Antioquia	16
2. M.T.H.	ANAPO	MRL	Nariño	16
3. E.L.	L-H	PCC, MRL	n.d.	16
4. R.R.	L-H	same	Valle del Cauca	16
5. A.L.	L-M	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
6. J.B.	L-B	same	Cauca	11
7. A.G.	C-OP	ANAPO	Boyacá	18
8. S.S.	C-A	ANAPO	Pasto	16
9. R.M.	C-A	same	Cali	13
10. A.S.	ANAPO	n.d.	n.d.	18
11. M.P.	L-B	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
12. H.V.	C	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
13. G.Z.	C-A	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
14. A.T.	C-A	ANAPO	Valle del Cauca	5
15. N. de R.	C-A	same	n.d.	16
16. M.T.C.	M.C.	Cons., Lib.	Antioquia	n.d.

^aAbbreviations: C-OP (Conservative-Ospino-Pastranista); C-A (Conservative-Alvarista); L-H (Liberal-Holmista); L-B (Liberal-Balcarcista); L-M (Liberal-Marinista); MRL (Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal); PCC (Partido Comunista Colombiano); n.d. (no data).

was claimed to be a factor related to the leader's acquisition of power.⁹⁶ The average length of time spent in San Judas

⁹⁶Havens and Flinn found that "most of the influentials were the 'first settlers' of the Barrio Tolima. This early settlement of the barrio gave the influentials or their families choice business sites around the plaza in the barrio." See Havens and Flinn, 1970 a, op. cit., p. 99. They claim that a similar phenomenon was observed by Lisa Redfield Peattie,

by the eleven primary and secondary leaders for whom data was available was 14.6 years.

Second, of the nine leaders for whom information was available, only one was born in Cali and only three were born in Valle del Cauca. These figures indicate that a majority of the leaders in San Judas migrated to Cali from other departments.⁹⁷

Third, of the eleven leaders for whom the information was available, only five were affiliated in 1980 with the same political party as when they first arrived in San Judas. This phenomenon of changing political affiliations has implications for the political socialization patterns undergone by migrants as they enter the urban environment. If it is found that the migration process is a causal determinant of this transferral of allegiance from one political group to another, the entire party system of Colombia could be strongly affected as the rural-to-urban migration process continues into the future.

in her study The View from the Barrio (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 27. This economic basis as the source of the influentials' power in Barrio Tolima was not found in San Judas. In the latter case the power structure was found to be much more politically-based than economically-based. Furthermore, the leaders of San Judas, as determined by both the positional and reputational approaches, did not tend to cluster around the only plaza of the barrio (located in Sector I) but instead were dispersed throughout the barrio.

⁹⁷See the discussion on migration into Cali from the rural areas in Chapter II.

In sum, San Judas was found to possess a power structure in the sense that there were specific community "influentials" who, because of their brokerage function which linked the barrio pobladores to the larger political system, wielded more power than their neighbors. But there was no formal structure within the barrio which could be perceived as a barrio-sanctioned governing body. Rather, each "influential" directed a voluntary association which in itself was an appendage of one of the diverse municipal party structures.

In the final analysis, the voluntary associations of San Judas were used as cooptative structures by the political movements active at the municipal level in much the same way that the municipal party structures were coopted into the national party organization. This vertical linkage system has been used by the national party elites to engender

sufficient mass support to enable them to monopolize political decision-making on the basis of traditional socialization patterns and through hierarchic party structures that integrate the masses into the political system (Hoskin and Swanson, 1974:421).

The effect of this politics of cooptation has been such that

upper echelon politicians dominate party politics to such an extent that lower- and intermediate-level party bosses, not to mention the masses, enjoy only a marginal role in formulating party decisions. Those who

control the party system have thwarted... the expression of class conflict in the political system largely through the cooptation of dissidents into party structures and the manipulation of the masses by means of traditional inter-party competition... Consequently the dynamics of interparty competition serve as a means of mobilizing the population, but in a manner closely defined by upper-rung políticos (Hoskin and Swanson, 1974: 420-421).

IV. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The previous chapter presented those findings of the present study related to Objectives B and C of Chapter I. The aim of Chapter IV is to describe and analyze those findings related to Objective A. That is, this chapter examines the extent of the political participation of the pobladores of San Judas in terms of voting behavior and membership in voluntary associations. The former is analyzed within the contexts of the specific electoral behavior of the Caleño electorate in the 1980 mitaca elections and the general voting patterns of the Colombian electorate in the past.¹ The latter is a measure of participation in those partisan-oriented voluntary associations of San Judas described in Chapter III.

¹There are several studies and analyses of specific elections and general electoral tendencies in Colombia. For a study of the 1962 and 1964 presidential and congressional elections, see Kenneth W. Johnson, "Political Radicalism in Colombia, 1962-1964," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VII (January, 1965), 15-26. The 1966 congressional and presidential elections are analyzed in Ronald H. McDonald, "Political Protest and Alienation in Voting: The Case of Colombia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXI (Autumn, 1967), 3-22. Two studies examine the 1968 elections in Cali: John McCamant et al., Las Elecciones del 16 de Marzo de 1968 en la Ciudad de Cali (Cali: Universidad del Valle, División de Ciencias Sociales y Económicas, 1968); and Pedro Morcillo et al., "Estudio Sobre Abstención Electoral en las Elecciones de Marzo de 1968 en Cali," Colombia Política (Bogotá: DANE, ed., 1972), pp. 57-80. Three studies of the 1970 elections in Colombia include Judith de Campos and John J. McCamant, "Cleavage Shift in Colombia: Analysis of the 1970 Election," Sage Professional Papers, III, Series 01-032 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970); Rodrigo

This chapter also provides data on the political attitudes and awareness of the residents of San Judas and those of Cali in general in order to provide preliminary evidence in support of the claim that there is a direct correlation between these two variables and the individual's extent of participation in the local political system.

POLITICIZATION

Objective A is implicitly concerned with the concept of the politicization of the urban poor in Colombia. Daniel Goldrich (1970:49) cites four distinct components of politicization, the first of which is direct participation in politics. The other three are salience, "the individual's

Losada and Miles W. Williams, "Análisis de la Votación Presidencial en Bogotá, 1970," Colombia Política, op. cit., pp. 1-55; and DANE, "Buscando las Causas del 19 de Abril de 1970: El Fenómeno Electoral en Bogotá," ibid., pp. 207-398. Two studies of the 1974 election are Gabriel Murillo and Miles Williams, Análisis de las Elecciones de 1974 en Bogotá (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1975); and DANE, "Elecciones Presidenciales, 1974," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, No. 283 (Bogotá: DANE, February, 1975), pp. 41-72. A detailed study of the 1978 elections in Cali is found in Francisco Martínez and Judith de Campos, Estudio de las Elecciones de Febrero y Junio, 1978, en la Ciudad de Cali (Cali: Universidad del Valle, forthcoming). For an analysis of departmental electoral results during most of the National Front, see DANE, "Resultados Electorales Frente Nacional, 1958-1972: Asambleas Departamentales," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 250-251 (Bogotá: DANE, May-June, 1972 b) pp. 29-130. An analysis of the 1980 mitaca elections in Colombia is provided in Rodrigo Losada L., "Reflexiones Sobre Las Elecciones de 1980," Javeriana, XCIII (April, 1980), 205-210.

awareness and psychological involvement in politics"; sense of efficacy, "his image of himself as an active or passive agent in the political system";² and access, "the accessibility to the individual of the channels leading to political decision-making centers."

Direct participation takes many forms, most of which were observed in San Judas: partisan activities, such as campaigns and fund-raising efforts; membership in voluntary associations such as political parties, pressure groups, partisan youth groups, and civic-minded communal organizations; the formation of patron-client relationships; voting; contacting public officials; attending political meetings; collective problem-solving; participation in political discussions; political protest; and political violence. Goldrich's salience and efficacy components are directly influenced by the individual's political culture and the political socialization process that people experience throughout their lives and especially since their move to the urban area. Access to the

²Mathiason and Powell define two types of political efficacy. "Direct" efficacy is the feeling that individuals are able to influence the creation and/or implementation of government policy themselves. "Mediated" political efficacy is the feeling that a person "can influence the government because he enjoys an instrumental relationship with a network of mediators, or brokers, who are in turn influential in the local and national political systems" (1972: 327-328.) A form of this latter type of efficacy is the most applicable to the present study. See John R. Mathiason and John D. Powell, "Participation and Efficacy: Aspects of Peasant Involvement in Political Mobilization," Comparative Politics, IV (April, 1972), 303-329.

policy-making levels of government is provided by linkages which may be collective (structures such as political parties, interest groups, labor unions, voluntary associations, etc.) or particularistic (patron-client relations, compadrazgo, etc.) Such access may originate from below, i.e. from the barrio level, in an attempt to influence the creation and implementation of government policy or merely to acquire material resources for personal use; or the access may be imposed upon the barrio residents by the larger political system, as in the case of mobilization parties (Nie et al., 1969:826), as a means of co-opting and controlling the political activities of a broad segment of society. In the case of San Judas, the primary means of access to the municipal political system were the partisan-affiliated voluntary associations led by barrio caciques who acted as the middlemen in a patron-broker-client triad.

In sum, politicization is a concept which involves behavioral, perceptual, motivational, and structural factors. It is affected by the awareness of the individual and/or the group, by the relevance of the government to the needs of the individual and/or group, and by the structural opportunities which allow contact with the larger political system.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND AWARENESS

The most recent political survey of the Caleño electorate was the 1979 "Estudio de Opiniones," financed jointly by the Fundación Para La Educación Superior y el Desarrollo (FEDESARROLLO) and Colciencias, and carried out under the direct supervision of Colombian political scientist Rodrigo Losada Lora.³ A primary purpose of the survey was to acquire data on the political attitudes, awareness, and tendencies of the potential voters of Cali in order to predict the outcome of the 1980 mitaca election for the city's municipal council. In retrospect, the survey's findings proved to be quite accurate in their predictive ability.⁴ They also revealed some interesting aspects of the political culture and political socialization patterns of Cali's residents, aspects which most probably exerted a direct influence on the political behavior of those residents in the 1980 elections.

In response to the question "How do you usually find out about what is going on in the city and the country?"

³The data in the Losada survey was gathered by interviewing 662 residents of Cali, ages eighteen and above. Small adjustments were made to make the sample more representative of the actual male-female breakdown of the potential Caleño electorate (as defined by DANE). The final results contain a 3.5% margin of error at the 50% level.

⁴The Losada survey predicted a Liberal victory over the Movimiento Cívico in the 1980 mitaca elections. The actual election results, discussed below, bore this out.

(question #5), 76% of the respondents answered "by radio," 61% "by television," and 60% "by newspaper."⁵ These responses surely have implications for the success of the Movimiento Cívico because Pardo Llada's daily radio program, "Mirador en el Aire," was one of the most popular radio programs in Cali and, according to the survey, (question #52), 52% of the respondents said they did indeed listen to Pardo's program. In this respect, the radio is an important medium in the political socialization pattern and the political awareness of many Caleños.

Another survey finding indicated the relative importance of different variables which influenced the individual's political affiliation. When that affiliation was cross-tabulated with several variables, a strong positive correlation of .66 was found between political affiliation

⁵In Colombia the political parties, factions, and movements have traditionally used newspapers and periodicals as political socialization tools to shape the political culture of the diverse segments of Colombian society. In Bogotá the principal Liberal Party newspapers are El Tiempo, owned by the family of former president Eduardo Santos, and El Espectador, founded in 1887 by Fidel Cano and now directed by Guillermo Cano. El Siglo and La República are the two major Conservative Party dailies in the capital. The former, founded in 1936, is the mouthpiece of the Alvarista faction of the party and is directed by Alvaro Gómez Hurtado; the latter is published by the Ospino-Pastranista wing of the party. In Cali the major Conservative newspapers are El País (Ospino-Pastranista), founded in 1950 by Alvaro Lloreda, and El Occidente (Alvarista), owned by the influential Caicedo family. The local Liberal newspaper is El Pueblo, founded during the 1970's by the Londoño family. Two politically-oriented periodicals are Nueva Frontera, directed by former Liberal president Carlos Lleras Restrepo, and Alternativa, a leftist-oriented publication associated with the well-known Colombian author, Gabriel García Márquez.

and the individual's birthplace. This finding supports the Gemeinschaft claim, discussed in Chapter III, that political affiliation in Colombia is largely influenced by the individual's birthplace. As for the other variables, the correlations were not as strong as that between affiliation and place of birth. The correlations with those other variables were +.23 for "social mobility experienced," +.32 for "age," and a negative .16 for "acceptance of the democratic creed."

The survey also indicated many negative attitudes among the respondents concerning the government: 72% of the respondents answered that the government does more for the economically powerful groups of society than for the population in general (question #15); 61% thought there were "many" dishonest people in the government (question #17); and 80% answered that the government, in general, did not worry about the individual (question #18). Despite this apparent dissatisfaction with the civilian government, only 10% of the respondents "definitely" believed that a military government could better solve national problems than the traditional civilian government and 58% of the respondents were "definitely" against the idea of a military government (question #12).

The personal efficacy component of politicization was measured by question #19 which asked "In your opinion can people like you influence, in some way, the decisions of

the government, no or yes?" The response was 67% negative.

In regard to the respondents' opinions on the importance of voting, the findings of the survey were surprising in light of the high abstention rates which have traditionally characterized Colombian elections and the low measure of personal efficacy recorded in question #19. 59% of the respondents did not agree with the opinion that "when the political group with which people sympathize has no chance of winning the election, it's not worth voting" (question #20). 57% disagreed with the opinion that "in general, it's not worth the time to vote in elections for municipal councils and departmental assemblies" (question 21). And 63% disagreed with the opinion "why vote in presidential elections if, with so many votes, one vote more or one less won't make any difference?" (question #22).

The Losada survey also measured citizen perceptions of what should be done by Cali's municipal government for the city's residents. Table 26 indicates what the respondents perceived the obligation of their municipal government to be.

A comparison of these perceptions with actual citizen grievances yields interesting results. In order to gain insight into the grievances of a broad spectrum of Caleño society, I undertook a newspaper survey in Cali from January to March, 1980. The purpose of the survey was to obtain an unofficial and informal gauge of those problems

TABLE 26

PERCEPTIONS OF OBLIGATIONS OF MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENT TO CITIZENS OF CALI,^a CALI, 1979
(N = 662)

1. Provide educational facilities.	29%
2. Provide housing.	19%
3. Provide employment opportunities.	14%
4. Lower the cost of living.	7%
5. Provide health services.	6%
6. Lower taxes.	4%
7. Nothing.	5%

^aThose interviewed were asked: "...what do you most want the municipal government to do for families like your own?"

Source: Question #24 of Rodrigo Losada, "Estudio de Opiniones en Cali, 1979" (Bogotá: FEDESARROLLO, 1979 b).

faced by local barrio residents which were deemed important enough by those residents to bring to the attention of the local authorities, via written complaints to the local newspapers, in an attempt to effect a response from those authorities. Of ninety seven distinct complaints published by two Caleño newspapers in special columns whose main purpose is to act as forums for communal grievances, are recorded in Table 27.⁶

Comparing the complaints of Table 27 with the perceived obligations of Table 26, one notes a significant divergence between the two (except for #3 of the former which is directly related to #5 of the latter.) The data of the two

⁶See Appendix F for a breakdown of the citizen complaints according to barrio.

TABLE 27

SUBSTANCE AND FREQUENCY OF NEWSPAPER-PUBLISHED
CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, CALI, JANUARY-MARCH, 1980

<u>Complaint Related to:</u>	<u>Frequency of Complaint</u>
1. Public security and vigilance	25
2. Public lighting and electric service	19
3. Public sanitation and sewage	21
4. Public road service	15
5. Potable water	6
6. Others	11

Source: El País (Cali), January 22 - March 9, 1980; El Occidente (Cali), January 4 - March 13, 1980.

tables raise the question as to why such a great divergence exists between people's perceptions of what their government should provide for them and their actual demands on that government for public goods.⁷

Losada's pre-electoral survey also investigated the intention of the sample of the Caleño electorate to vote and to abstain.⁸ When asked whether or not they would vote

⁷Booth describes "public goods" as "a special kind of collective goods supplied by the governments or by communities through their collective expenditure." Examples of such goods are regime stability, national security, monetary systems, roads, community centers, schools, etc. Once these goods are provided for any member of a community, they exist, in effect, for all the other members. That is, access to these goods cannot be controlled as can access to private goods such as government licenses, patents, etc. See John A. Booth, "Political Participation in Latin America: Levels, Structure, Context, Concentration, and Rationality," Latin American Research Review, XIV (1979), 31.

⁸Suffrage in Colombia is guaranteed by Article 179 of the Constitution of the Republic. Women were given equal political rights with men, including the right to vote, as

a result of the constitutional amendments enumerated in the 1957 Sitges Agreement and officially adopted in the national plebiscite of December of that year. In October, 1977, eighteen-year olds were granted the right to vote, a right which they exercised for the first time in 1978. Although there are no literacy or property requirements for voting, the individual, in order to vote, must have a valid citizenship card (cédula) and must be registered to vote.

As of 1980, the traditional practice of identifying those who had cast their ballot by sticking their index finger into a vial of indelible red ink had been discontinued.

Colombian voters directly elect representatives to municipal councils, departmental assemblies, the Cámara (lower house), the Senate (upper house) and also elect the President of the Republic (article 171 of the constitution). At the municipal and departmental levels, elections are held every two years (elección de mitaca). Senators are elected every four years (article 95) as are Representatives (article 101). The president is also elected for a four-year term, but the election takes place at a later date in the same year as that of the congressmen (article 114). Thus every four years the Colombian electorate participates in two separate elections. In the first election they choose municipal concejeros, departmental diputados, and national congressmen. A few months later they vote for the president. In such an electoral system, the partisan composition of the national legislature is decided before the election of the chief of the executive branch.

Colombia has a proportional representation electoral system which uses party lists and the electoral quotient formula (article 172). The number of municipal councilmen varies from six to twenty depending on the population of the municipality (article 196). Departmental assemblies are composed of from fifteen to thirty delegates according to the respective population of the individual department (article 185). The composition of the bicameral Congress also fluctuates according to the population of the departments. Each department is entitled to two Representatives and one more for every 100,000 residents or fraction greater than 50,000 over the first 100,000 (article 99). And each department is represented by two Senators and one more for each 200,000 residents or fraction greater than 100,000 over the first 200,000 (article 93). In both houses of Congress, as well as in the municipal councils and the departmental assemblies, each elected representative has a designated replacement (suplente) whose name also appears

in the upcoming mitaca elections (question #29), 32% responded that they would "certainly" vote and 12% that they would "probably" vote. 5% answered they "probably" would not vote and 39% said they "certainly" would not vote. Of those who would "certainly" vote, 18% were Conservatives, 44% were Liberals, and 18% were supporters of the Movimiento Cívico. Of those who said they would "probably" vote, 20% were Conservatives, 40% were Liberals, and 10% supported the Movimiento Cívico.⁹ The most common reason given for not intending to vote (question #32) was a "disinterest in politics" (29%). Of those who planned not to vote, a large percentage would most likely be convinced to vote if "honorable and capable" candidates were offered by the elections (question #33). The actual voter turnout for the March, 1980, election is described below.

on the party list opposite that of the principal candidate. The suplente system allows well-known políticos to run for several offices at different levels of government at the same time by lending their names for use on different lists. This tactic of using a popular name to draw votes to a list is very common in Colombia. In many cases the principal candidate will not occupy the office to which entitled but will relinquish it to the suplente. If an individual's name is on two or more winning lists, the person will generally take the more important position and leave the suplente(s) with the other(s).

⁹Of those who "probably" would vote, the figures indicate a relatively small reserve of potential voters for the Movimiento Cívico and a much larger reserve for the Liberal Party. This Liberal reserve was one of the factors resulting in the Liberal victory over the Movimiento Cívico in the municipal election of March, 1980.

SAN JUDAS: ELECTORAL TENDENCIAS

In the case of the residents of San Judas, the present study's political survey also attempted to find out how many of the eligible pobladores in the barrio planned to vote in the mitaca election.¹⁰ Question 1a of the political survey of San Judas asks, "Will you vote in the March elections?" 125 (41.5%) of the 301 respondents answered positively. This percentage compares favorably to the same question (#29) asked by Losada's survey in which 44% of the Caleño sample specified that they "certainly" or "probably" would vote in the elections. But the 41.5% figure encountered in San Judas, like Losada's 44% figure, was above the actual

¹⁰For the 1980 mitaca elections, San Judas and seven other nearby barrios comprised electoral district #40 of Cali. The district had a total population of 46,680 of which 25,114 were eligible to vote (53.8%). Of this potential electorate, 1,972 men and 2,092 women, a total of 4,064 citizens, had preregistered in order to be able to vote at the San Juan Bautista parish center located in the barrio of Guabal. No post-electoral statistics were available as of May, 1980, regarding the total amount of actual voters from the district or from San Judas. But past electoral statistics indicate a low voter turnout for the general region. For example, in 1972 San Judas was in electoral district #22 with six other barrios - Departamental, Panamericano, Santo Domingo, Guabal, Residencias Cali, and Jorge Zawadsky. The total district vote for the departmental assembly election of that year was 2,735 of which ANAPO received 1,431 votes, the Liberals received 862 votes, the Conservatives received 296 votes, and 146 votes were cast for other lists. See DANE, "Resultados Electorales Frente Nacional, 1958-1972: Asambleas Departamentales," in DANE, Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 250-251 (May-June, 1972 b), p. 130. An indication of the potential 1980 voter turnout from San Judas is offered by question #1 of the pre-electoral political survey of the barrio carried out by the present study.

voter turnout for Cali of 25% in March, 1980. Several possible explanations may account for this divergence between the predicted and actual turnouts. First, perhaps those interviewed intended to vote but had failed to register and were therefore unable to reach the voting table on election day.¹¹ Second, some respondents, suspicious

¹¹According to Colombia's recent electoral reform, (Law 28 of 1979), citizens who do not register their cédula (identification card) at least one month before the election must vote in the town where that cédula was originally issued. They only have to register their cédula if they wish to vote in, or near, the barrio in which they are presently living. Thus the amount of voters for any given election is usually greater than the amount of those who registered their cédulas for the purpose of voting in a convenient location. For example, in 1976 those who registered in Cali numbered 75,144 while those who voted numbered 102,497 (see El País, February 10, 1980). Because of the extensive migration pattern of the Colombian people, the new electoral law had important implications for the nation's electoral process. If, for example, the pobladores of San Judas wished to vote in the nearest polling place (the San Juan Bautista parish center in the barrio Guabal), they had to register their cédula by February 9, 1980. If they failed to do so, they could still vote on election day, but only in the city where their cédula was originally expedited. If that city happened to be Cali, the pobladores could catch one of the election-day busses rented by the political parties and travel downtown, free of charge, to vote. If the cédula was originally issued in another city, as was the case with many of Cali's residents, the individual had to spend time and money traveling to that city in order to vote. However, transportation to another city, besides being costly and time-consuming for the pobladores, was almost impossible because of a government ban on inter-city bus service for election day. Thus, Law 28 of 1979 was certainly a factor in the 68% abstention rate recorded in Valle del Cauca in 1980.

of surveys in general, may not have wanted the interviewer to know that they were not planning to vote and thus answered that they did indeed plan to vote. Third, some respondents may have answered "yes" because they felt it was their civic duty to vote, regardless of whether or not they intended to do so. And finally, others may have answered positively because they felt indebted to the barrio leader of their political faction and were thus morally obligated to vote if they wished to continue in their patron-client relationship with the barrio cacique.

Table 28 shows how the respondents answered the question according to geographic zone within the barrio. Zone 4, which is the lowest socio-economic sector of the barrio, does not stand apart from the other four zones in terms of those intending to vote. In fact, only Zone 5 has more positive than negative responses. This result may be partially caused by the relatively non-representative sample (both by sex and age) of Zone 5 (see Chapter III).

Table 29 indicates that only among the women of Zone 5 did a majority of the respondents answer question la positively.

However, the general pattern of Table 29 indicates no significant difference between the responses of the men and women. 40.6% (54/133) of the men answered "yes" as did 42.3% (71/168) of the women.

TABLE 28

"WILL YOU VOTE?"^a BY ZONE, BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO,
FEBRUARY, 1980
(N = 301)

Zone ^b	Yes	No	Not sure/ No response
1	25	35	0
2	31	66	1
3	29	32	0
4	23	25	2
5	<u>17</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	125	172	4

^aThose interviewed were asked, "Will you vote in the March elections?"

^bZones 1, 2, 3, and 5 are classified by DANE as "lower-class"; Zone 4 is classified by DANE as "low-lower" class. For a geographic description of the zones within the barrio, see Chapter II, Figure 4.

TABLE 29

"WILL YOU VOTE?"^a BY SEX AND ZONE,
BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, FEBRUARY, 1980
(N = 301)

Zone	Yes	Men		Not sure/ No response
		No		
1	13	16	0	
2	13	29	0	
3	14	14	0	
4	9	13	2	
5	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	
Total	54	77	2 (N _m = 133)	
		Women		
1	12	19	0	
2	18	37	1	
3	15	18	0	
4	14	12	0	
5	<u>12</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>	
Total	71	95	2 (N _f = 168)	

^aThose interviewed were asked, "Will you vote in the March elections?"

Table 30 indicates that in only one age group did the majority respond positively to question 1a:

TABLE 30
 "WILL YOU VOTE?"^a BY AGE AND ZONE,
 BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, FEBRUARY, 1980
 (N = 301)

Age Group	Yes	No	Not Sure/ No Response	Row Total
1 (18-19 years)	8	24	1	33
2 (20-29 years)	31	52	0	83
3 (30-39 years)	24	31	0	55
4 (40-49 years)	28	26	0	54
5 (50-59 years)	23	23	1	47
6 (60 +)	<u>11</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>29</u>
Total:	125	172	4	301

^aThose interviewed were asked, "Will you vote in the March elections?"

Yet the most striking finding in Table 30 is among the 18-19 year old group (group #1) which overwhelmingly answered negatively. This high abstention rate among the youngest age group may be due, among other factors, to dissatisfaction with government policies, to a negative sense of personal efficacy, or to a protest against the traditional party system. But in general, as one goes up the age group list, the difference between those who will and will not vote decreases. The only exception to this tendency is the

sixty-year or over age group in which voting habits may be affected by the individual's physical condition.

Part b of question 1 asks "For whom will you vote?" Only those 125 respondents who answered "yes" to the first part of question 1 were asked part b. Table 31 presents the findings. Of the 125 respondents who intended to vote, 109 specified the party they would vote for. As expected, 58 (53.2%) of those people stated that they would vote for the Liberal Party, 27 (24.8%) for the Conservative Party, and only 20 (18.3%) for the Movimiento Cívico. In this respect, these respondents of San Judas compared quite favorably with the sample of potential Caleño voters polled in Losada's survey which indicated that, with a maximum turnout of 28% of the city's potential electorate, 45% would vote for the Liberals, 20% for the Conservatives, and 17% for the Movimiento Cívico.

As can be seen from Table 31, in no zone of San Judas did the Conservative Party receive more votes than the Liberal Party. On the other hand, the Conservative Party received more votes than the Movimiento Cívico in three of the barrio's five zones. Also the table does not indicate any disproportionate support of the two anti-status quo parties (i.e. the Movimiento Cívico and ANAPO) among the respondents of zone 4, the zone with the lowest socio-economic classification, according to DANE, in the barrio.

TABLE 31
 "FOR WHAT PARTY WILL YOU VOTE?" BY ZONE,
 BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, FEBRUARY, 1980
 (N = 125)^a

Zone	Liberal Party	Conservative Party	Movimiento Cívico	ANAPO	Other	Not sure/No response
1	15	4	5	0	0	1
2	8	8	7	1	1	6
3	16	6	4	0	1	2
4	10	7	2	0	0	4
5	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
Total:	58	27	20	2	2 ^b	16

^aThese 125 respondents indicated in part A of question 1 that they intended to vote in the March, 1980, elections.

^bIn both cases UNO was named.

The small total of two votes for ANAPO is merely indicative of the demise of that political party throughout the entire country. Nevertheless, the small total is surprising in view of the popularity of the Anapista, M.T.H., in the barrio (see Tables 22, 23, and 24). This incongruence between the cacique's popularity and the lack of popularity, among the pobladores of San Judas, for the political party he represents warrants further investigation and may imply that the cacique's popularity is based on factors external to his partisan affiliation.

Table 32 presents the relationship between the voter's sex and his/her party affiliation. No clear pattern based on sex emerged as 48.1% (26/54) of the men and 45.1% (32/71)

of the women indicated they would support the Liberal Party while only 16.7% (9/54) of the men and 25.4% (18/71) of the women indicated they would vote for the Conservative Party:

TABLE 32
PARTY AFFILIATION^a BY SEX AND ZONE,
BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, FEBRUARY, 1980
(N = 125)

Zone	<u>Men</u>						Row Total
	Liberal	Conservative	Movimiento Cívico	ANAPO	UNO	NS/NR ^b	
1	9	2	2	0	0	0	13
2	4	2	2	1	1	3	13
3	8	2	3	0	0	1	14
4	2	2	2	0	0	3	9
5	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
Sub-total	26	9	9	2	1	7	54
Zone	<u>Women</u>						Row Total
	Liberal	Conservative	Movimiento Cívico	ANAPO	UNO	NS/NR ^b	
1	6	2	3	0	0	1	12
2	4	6	5	0	0	3	18
3	8	4	1	0	1	1	15
4	8	5	0	0	0	1	14
5	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>12</u>
Sub-total	32	18	11	0	1	9	71
Total	58	27	20	2	2	16	125

^aThose interviewed were asked "For whom will you vote?" This question was asked only of those who previously said they intended to vote in the mitaca elections of March.

^bNS/NR = not specified / no response.

Table 33 demonstrates the relationship between party affiliation and age. Two interesting findings in the table warrant mention. First, the highest percentage of support for the Movimiento Cívico in San Judas comes from the 20-29 year age group. And second, the Liberal party generally gains more support relative to the Conservative party in San Judas as the age of the respondent increases.

TABLE 33
 "FOR WHAT PARTY WILL YOU VOTE?" BY
 AGE, BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, FEBRUARY, 1980
 (N = 125)^a

Age Group ^b	Liberals	Conservatives	Movimiento Cívico	ANAPO	OTHER	Not sure/ No response
1	3	2	1	0	1	1
2	11	9	8	1	0	2
3	10	5	3	0	1	5
4	14	4	5	0	0	5
5	14	6	2	0	0	1
6	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
Total:	58	27	20	2	2	16

^aThese 125 respondents indicated in part A of question 1 that they intended to vote in the March, 1980, elections.

^bSee Table 30 for an explanation of the age groups.

In sum, parts a and b of question 1 show that the inhabitants of San Judas were fairly representative of the larger Caleño electorate. The majority of those interviewed in the barrio indicated that they would abstain from voting in the mitaca elections, and the data generated by question 1 indicated that the largest abstention rate would come, as expected, from the 18-19 year old group, newly enfranchised as of 1978. Furthermore, of those who declared their intention to vote (part a of question 1), the large majority overwhelmingly cited the Liberal Party as the recipient of that vote.

At this point the question arises as to why so many of the pobladores of San Judas planned to abstain in the mitaca elections of 1980. Perhaps question 2 of the survey will shed some light on one of the motives for this apparent lack of political participation.

Question 2 asks "Who do you think should be the mayor of Cali?"¹² The reason for asking this question was twofold. First, I wanted to get a general idea of how familiar the barrio residents were with the political actors at the municipal level. That is, this question would indicate

¹²Of course mayors in Colombia are not popularly elected but are appointed by the departmental governor. With this fact in mind, those individuals who seemed confused by question 2 during the interview were then asked for whom they would vote if they had the opportunity to vote for the mayor of Cali.

the degree of awareness on the part of the residents of San Judas as to who they considered to be the principal political personalities at the municipal level. The logic underlying this question is that one of the major reasons for voter abstention in Colombia has been a lack of interest on the voters' part due to their lack of knowledge regarding the political system. In this respect, the aim of question 2 was similar to that of several of the questions in Losada's survey examined above. Second, I wanted to examine whether or not a relationship existed between the individual's political affiliation (as indicated in question 1b) and the political affiliation of the person nominated for mayor by that individual. One would expect that party loyalty would cause an individual to nominate Holguín Sardi (or some other top Conservative leader in Cali) for mayor if that individual had previously indicated that he intended to vote for the Conservative party.

Table 34 shows the responses to question 2 according to barrio zone. As is evident from the table, the Alvarista, Holguín Sardi, and Pardo Llada, of the Movimiento Cívico, received the most nominations. Escobar Navia, the Liberal mayor of Cali at the time of the survey, and a purported follower of the Llerista faction of the Liberal party, was in second place, followed by Holmes Trujillo, the leader of the Holmista faction of the Liberal party in Cali and Valle del Cauca.

TABLE 34
 PREFERENCE FOR MAYOR^a BY ZONE, BARRIO SAN
 JUDAS TADEO, FEBRUARY, 1980
 (N = 301)

Zone	Carlos Holguín Sardi	Carlos Holmes Trujillo	José Pardo Llada	Rodrigo Escobar Navia	Others ^b	Not Sure/ No Response
1	2	0	4	0	4	50
2	2	1	7	1	7	80
3	5	4	3	0	1	48
4	2	1	3	10	0	34
5	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>23</u>
Total:	17	7	17	11	14	235

^aThose interviewed were asked, "Who do you think should be mayor of Cali?"

^bGermán Romero T., a Balcarcista Liberal, received three votes. Rodrigo Lloreda, an Ospino-Pastranista Conservative, received two votes. Nine other individuals received one vote each.

The findings presented in Table 34 can be compared with those of two other surveys. An unscientific survey conducted by the Movimiento Cívico during the final week of December, 1979, asked the question "What leader do you want for Cali?" The three top choices were Pardo Llada with 23%, Holguín Sardi with 15% and Holmes Trujillo with 6%.¹³ Losada's more scientific survey of late 1979 asked the question "In your opinion, what people have done the most for Cali in the last ten years?" (question #7). The results were: Pardo Llada (20%), Holguín Sardi (7%),

¹³El Occidente (Cali), January 6, 1980.

Jaime Arizabaleta Calderón (5%), Escobar Navia (4%)...

Table 35 shows the socio-economic origin of the support for each of the top four nominees in Losada's survey:

TABLE 35

"WHO HAS DONE THE MOST FOR CALI?"^a BY
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASS, CALI, 1979

Name	Low-lower Class	Lower Class	Low-middle Class	Middle Class	Upper-middle and Upper Classes
José Pardo Llada	17	22	20	26	22
Carlos Hol- guín Sardi	3	5	9	6	4
Jaime Ariza- baleta Cal- derón	6	5	5	6	4
Rodrigo Es- cobar Navia	3	2	5	2	4

^aThose interviewed were asked, "In your opinion, what people have done the most for Cali in the last ten years?"

Source: Question #7 of Rodrigo Losada, "Estudio de Opiniones en Cali, 1979" (Bogotá: FEDESARROLLO, 1979 b).

The first thing one notices about the findings is that each individual received votes from all the socio-economic strata of Cali. Pardo Llada in particular received 59 of his nominations from the three lowest classes and 48 from the three highest classes.

Comparing the three surveys, it becomes apparent that Pardo Llada was probably the most popular political figure in Cali during the 1979-80 period and probably would have been elected mayor if such an election had ever been held. The surveys also indicate that the second most popular figure was probably Holguín Sardi of the Alvarista faction of the Conservative party.

The most significant aspect of the data presented in Table 34 is the fact that only 66 (21.9%) of the 301 people interviewed were able to offer the name of a political figure for mayor. The fact that 78.1% of those interviewed failed to nominate anyone may very well indicate a general ignorance, on the part of the pobladores of San Judas, of the larger political system of which the barrio is, a part. Such political myopia is most certainly, one of the factors contributing to high abstention rates among the residents of San Judas.

To determine the political affiliation of those who responded to question 2, I relied on the information provided by the respondents to part b of question 1. Unfortunately not everyone who answered question 2 answered part b of question 1. Nevertheless, Table 36 presents the findings:

TABLE 36

POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF NOMINATORS OF TOP
FOUR MAYORAL NOMINEES, BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO,
FEBRUARY, 1980

Nominee	Political Affiliation of Nominator			
	Liberal	Conservative	Movimiento Cívico	Other or not Specified
José Pardo Llada	3	1	5	8
Carlos Hol- guín Sardi	5	5	1	6
Rodrigo Esco- bar Navia	4	2	0	5
Carlos Holmes Trujillo	3	0	1	3

The small number of respondents with identified political affiliations detracts from the validity of these findings. Yet the figures shown in Table 36 generally support the assumption that an individual, if given the opportunity, will nominate a person of his own party for mayor. Five of the nine respondents (with specified political affiliation) who nominated Pardo Llada for mayor were supporters of the Movimiento Cívico. Of the eleven respondents whose political affiliation was identified and who nominated the Conservative leader, Holguín Sardi, for mayor, five were Conservatives and five were Liberals. Escobar Navia, the Liberal mayor of Cali, received four of his six identified

nominations from Liberals. And, finally, Holmes Trujillo, the Liberal leader of the Holmista faction, received three of his four identified nominations from Liberal supporters. The only oddity in the findings is the fact that Holguín Sardi received five nominations from Liberal Party supporters. But, once again, conclusions based on the findings are subject to error because of the small numbers involved.

MITACA ELECTIONS OF 1980

The electoral campaigns of early 1980 were very typical of past Colombian campaigns. In the months preceding the elections the national government began to disburse funds for projects in many of the nation's diverse regions. This tactic of distributive politics at a strategic point in time was utilized as a vote-gathering device for Liberal party lists throughout the country. Cali was among the recipients of this government largesse. During his visit to Cali of January 20, 1980, to inaugurate a new recreational park in Barrio Olímpico, President Turbay Ayala announced that the national government had authorized a loan of U.S. \$7 million for the municipality of Cali for the purpose of paving roads in the city's tugurios.¹⁴ This tactic did not

¹⁴El País (Cali), January 21, 1980.

have much noticeable impact on the voting behavior of the Calēños as the statistics below demonstrate.

The potential electorate of Colombia in March, 1980, was 13,800,000. 984 municipal councils and 22 departmental assemblies were renewed and 8,617 concejeros, 406 diputados, 41 concejeros intendenciales, and 20 concejales comisariales were elected. Lists proliferated and numbered more than 5,000 throughout the country. There were more than 30,000 candidates for the 8,617 curules and about 6,800 candidates for the 406 available assembly seats.¹⁵ In Bogotá alone there were 52 lists, with 2080 candidates, just for the 20 seats on the municipal council.¹⁶ The department of César had 31 lists for 15 assembly seats, Vallé del Cauca had 18 lists for 25 assembly seats, and in Cali there were 14 lists, with a total of 312 names, for 20 council seats.¹⁷ This proliferation of planchas (lists) reflected the factionalized nature of the Colombian political system and was a cause of concern among the major parties which stood to lose seats to dissident parties because of the effects of the electoral quotient formula.¹⁸

¹⁵El País (Cali), March 9, 1980.

¹⁶El País (Cali), February 11, 1980.

¹⁷El Espectador (Bogotá), February 19, 1980.

¹⁸In a country where the proliferation of lists for any given election is the rule rather than the exception, the electoral quotient formula plays an important role in the electoral system. As the number of lists increases, so does the number of seats won by the electoral residual or remainder. An examination of elections in the department of Cundinamarca from 1972 through 1978 illustrates this direct relationship.

Table 37 presents data on four recent elections in Cundinamarca:

TABLE 37
ELECTORAL REMAINDER IN CUNDINAMARCA
1972-1978

Year	Electoral Quotient	Number of Lists	Number of Seats Won by Remainder	Number of Votes Required for Smallest Remainder	Remainder as % of Quotient
1972	14,505	21	5	6,233	43
1974	30,349	17	4	19,376	64
1976	12,720	40	11	5,488	43
1978	21,113	24	6	11,849	56

Source: Alternativa, No. 250 (Bogotá, February 7-14, 1980), p. 6.

By analyzing the data in Table 37, several interesting relationships can be discerned and conclusions drawn:

- a. Although the electoral quotient itself is not affected by the number of lists, as the number of lists increases less seats will be won with the amount of votes equal to the electoral quotient. That is, as the number of lists increases so does the number of seats won by the electoral remainder.
- b. The remainder generally tends to be smaller in size as the number of lists increases.
- c. For the four elections presented in Table 37, the average remainder was slightly greater than 51% of the electoral quotient. Thus minor parties had the opportunity to win at least one seat for their list because the amount

Cali's Ospino-Pastranista daily observed:

It is pertinent to point out that never has such a high number of lists been presented throughout the country, which opens up the possibility that at a given moment an aspirant may be elected with very few votes thanks to the mechanisms of the electoral quotient system.¹⁹

The election results of the 1980 mitaca elections in Colombia were similar to those of the 1970's. In the first place, the abstention rate was approximately 75%²⁰ which

of votes needed for that one seat was not exceedingly high. For example, if 260,000 votes are cast for the 20 municipal council seats of Bogotá, the electoral quotient is 13,000. But if there are many lists, a minor political party may be able to capture a curul (council seat) with only about 6,630 votes or approximately half (51%) of the electoral quotient. This remainder of 6,630 means that a seat can be captured if a list receives only 2.5% of the votes cast (6,630 = 2.5% of 260,000).

Thus the list system and the electoral quotient formula used in the Colombian electoral system are factors in the number of political parties represented in the governmental system. As the number of lists increases, so does the likelihood of a small party capturing a seat. If that party does so with only 2.5% of the votes cast, as in the above example, it is gaining more representation on the popularly-elected council than it is proportionally entitled to since one seat out of twenty is equivalent to 5% of the seats and this 5% may be won by receiving only 2.5% of the votes. Theoretically, in a proportional representation system, a faction with only 2.5% of the popular vote would only be entitled to half a seat on a twenty-member council.

¹⁹El País (Cali), February 10, 1980.

²⁰This figure is based on voting statistics provided by the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil from 891 of the nation's 963 municipalities. See El País (Cali), March 12, 1980. When all the data are tabulated, the abstention rate will drop a few percentage points. Losada estimates the abstention rate at 70 to 71% based on a potential electorate of 13,665,000. See Rodrigo Losada L., "Reflexiones Sobre Las Elecciones de 1980," Javeriana, XCIII (April, 1980), 206.

prompted one Conservative newspaper to refer to all those who had abstained as members of the "abstentionist party."²¹ This rate, the highest recorded in the country since the 1930's (see Tables 40 and 41 below), indicates that the trend of the decreasing political participation of the residents of Colombia, as measured by voting, is continuing into the 1980's.

Second, the Liberal Party maintained its political dominance throughout the country in 1980. Voting returns based on data from 92.5% of the nation's municipalities showed that the Liberal Party had received 1,834,205 votes as opposed to 1,319,096 for the Conservative Party. The leftist-oriented Movimiento Firmes received only 51,076 votes nationwide and the Frente de Unidad Popular, the dissident Anapista faction, captured 27,039 votes.²²

In Valle del Cauca, 25 assembly seats and 294 council seats were at stake in 1980.²³ When the official period

²¹The article expressed shock at the high rate of nationwide abstention and called on the newly elected political authorities to rectify the situation: "For the moment, the task of rescuing the great abstentionist party corresponds to the new concejales and diputados who should demonstrate their interest in the solution of municipal and departmental problems through effective actions that will once again attract the potential voters to the voting tables." See El País (Cali), March 11, 1980.

²²El País (Cali), March 12, 1980.

²³Decree 3026 of 1979 stipulated the number of seats which were to comprise each departmental assembly as of March, 1980. The number of seats is directly proportional to the population of the department. Decree 3025 of the same year specified that as of March, 1980, municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants would have municipal councils comprised of six seats; eight seats would correspond

for cédula registration had ended,²⁴ only 350,000 voters (25%) of the department's more than 1,400,000 potential voters had registered. This number included roughly 120,000 from Cali and 230,000 from the rest of the department.²⁵ The total amount of voters in Valle del Cauca who participated in the 1980 departmental assembly election was approximately 450,000,²⁶ or 32% of the potential electorate. In 1978, 29% (404,789) of the department's potential electorate had voted. The abstention rates of 71% in 1978 and 68% in 1980 were not atypical of the department's long tradition of abstentionism (see Table 38) and reflected the national tendency toward increased rates of abstention since 1970.

In the race for the department's twenty five assembly seats, the Liberals maintained their success by receiving approximately 50% of the department's 450,000 votes to the 33% received together by the two factions of the Conservative Party. In third place at the departmental level was the

to municipalities with populations between 5,001 and 10,000; ten for a population of 10,001 to 20,000; twelve for a population of 20,001 to 50,000; fifteen for a population of 50,001 to 100,000; and one more seat for each increase in population of 100,000 until reaching a maximum of twenty seats on the council. In 1980 the Valle del Cauca Assembly had twenty five seats and the municipal council of Cali had twenty.

²⁴Decree 2540 of 1979 states that cédula registration must end exactly one month before the upcoming election. In the case of the mitaca elections of March 9, 1980, cédula registration ceased at 6 P.M. on February 9, 1980.

²⁵El País (Cali), February 10, 1980.

²⁶El País (Cali), March 12, 1980.

TABLE 38
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN VALLE DEL CAUCA,
1935-1980^a

Year	Type of Election ^b	Total Votes	Votes as % of Potential Electorate
1935 ^c	C	37,917	29.5
1937	C	52,037	36.6
1938	P	47,632	31.9
1939	C	84,405	53.8
1941	C	89,201	51.7
1942	P	119,292	65.9
1943	C	79,903	42.1
1945	C	80,053	38.3
1946	P	143,928	65.7
1947	C	149,386	65.0
1949	C	175,787	69.4
1949	P	103,015	40.7
1951	C	84,104	30.1
1953	C	103,361	34.6
1957 ^f	Plebiscite	503,836 ^d	77.0 ^e
1958 ^f	C	389,028	61.0
1958 ^e	P	n.a.	51.1
1960 ^f	C	276,318	41.0
1962 ^f	C	311,691	43.7
1964 ^f	C	218,504	28.8
1966 ^g	C	281,024	35.1
1966 ^e	P	n.a.	31.7
1968 ^g	C	245,539	29.0
1970 ^g		407,760	45.6
1972 ^d	C	346,907	40.7
1974 ^h	P	546,759	n.a.
1978 ⁱ		404,789	29.0
1980 ^j	M	450,000	32.0

^aData unavailable for congressional elections of 1974 and 1976 and for presidential elections of 1962.

^bC=Camara election (based on total vote for candidates for House of Representatives). P=presidential election; M=mitaca election.

^cSource of data from 1935 to 1953: DANE, "Tendencias Electorales," Colombia Política (Bogotá: DANE, 1972 a), pp. 159-160, Table 8.2.1.

^dSource: El País (Cali), March 9, 1980.

^eSource: DANE, 1972 a, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-165, Table 8.2.3.

^fSource: DANE, 1972 c, *op. cit.*, p. 216, Table 1.4.

^gSource: Ibid., p. 217, Table 1.5.

^hSource: "Elecciones Presidenciales," in DANE, Boletín Mensual de Estadística, No. 283 (February, 1975), p. 70.

ⁱSource: El País (Cali), March 9, 1980. Potential electorate included all those citizens over 18 years of age.

^jSource: El País (Cali), March 12, 1980.

Movimiento Cívico which captured about 13% of the total vote in its first attempt at becoming a departmental rather than a strictly municipal movement. The Movimiento Cívico was followed by UNO with a little more than 3% of the total departmental vote. Within the Conservative Party, the Ospino-Pastranista faction emerged victorious over its Alvarista opposition. The former received 62.5% of the total Conservative vote while the remaining 37.5% went to the latter.²⁷

In the city of Cali there were 596,512 citizens eligible to vote in the mitaca elections of 1980 (315,668 men and 280,844 women).²⁸ Of this total, 117,914 (59,489 women and 58,425 men) Caleños, or 19.8% of the city's potential electorate possessed cédulas issued outside of Cali. The only way these individuals could vote without leaving Cali was to register their cédulas in Cali by February 9, 1980. Many of them did not do this so and thus became abstention statistics. Only 58,405 men and 59,471 women residing in Cali did register their cédulas before the February 9 deadline. There is no way of telling how many of those people with cédulas issued outside of Cali were among those who registered to vote in Cali. Most probably they formed a large

²⁷These figures were determined by computations using data published in El País (Cali), March 12, 1980.

²⁸These figures are based on data provided by the Registraduría del Estado Civil and cited in El País (Cali), January 20, 1980. According to the Registraduría Municipal of Cali, the city's potential electorate was 609,933 as of November, 1979. These statistical variations are commonplace in Colombia.

percentage of the non-voters which accounted for 75%²⁹ of Cali's potential electorate in the 1980 election for municipal council.³⁰

Cali's 75% abstention rate in 1980, in comparison to the department's 68% rate in the same year, supports the claim that abstentionism is generally higher in the urban areas (especially among the marginal barrios) than in the rural areas (DANE, 1972 b:105). Furthermore, based on 95% of the municipal returns, the three major political parties of Cali, especially the Liberal Party, had suffered from the abstention phenomenon.³¹ Compared to the voter support of 1978, the Liberal Party experienced a 21% decrease in total votes received in 1980; the Conservative Party total

²⁹This figure was determined by calculating the number of Caleños who voted in the 1980 municipal election as a percentage of the city's potential electorate and then subtract that percentage from 100%. According to the Municipal Registry of Cali, 596,512 Caleños were eligible to vote in the council election. With the ballots of 89.0% of the 1,615 voting tables in Cali scrutinized, the total number of votes cast was 131,444 and the Municipal Registry was projecting a maximum of 150,000 votes when all the ballots were tabulated. Using this maximum figure of 150,000, about 25% of Cali's potential electorate voted in March 1980. That would put the abstention rate at about 75%. See El País (Cali), March 11, 1980.

³⁰The two-step process of registering and voting on two separate days would most naturally be more burdensome to members of the lower socio-economic classes than to those of the upper classes. Thus Law 28 of 1979 was certainly a factor in the high abstention rates among the residents of Cali's barrios populares. A great percentage of those residents were not originally from Cali and, from the political economy perspective, perceived the costs of registering as outweighing the benefits of voting.

³¹The calculations that follow are based on data published in El País (Cali), March 11, 1980, in which the results of 178 of Cali's 1615 voting tables were not included.

decreased 14%; and the Movimiento Cívico experienced an 11% decrease in total votes received. UNO reversed this trend of declining votes when, in 1980, it received 29% more votes than it had received in 1978 when it had been in coalition with other political movements. But its total number of votes was only 4,036 in Cali compared with 50,853 for the Liberals, 23,678 for the Conservatives, and 48,445 for the Movimiento Cívico. Translated into municipal council seats, it appeared soon after the election that the relative weight of each party in the municipal political system would not differ from that of 1978. That is, based on 95% of the 1980 municipal returns, the Liberal Party was entitled to eight seats (seven won by the electoral quotient and one by the electoral remainder); the Movimiento Cívico had won seven seats (all by the electoral quotient); the Ospino-Pastranista faction of the Conservative Party again had two council seats (both won by the electoral quotient) as did the Alvarista faction (one of which was won by the electoral remainder);³² and UNO, because of the electoral remainder, was granted one seat on the council.

In short, although the partisan alignments within Cali's political system did not change as a result of the 1980

³²The Ospino-Pastranista faction received 13,603 votes compared to 10,075 for the Alvarista faction. Thus the Ospino-Pastranistas maintained their dominance over their Alvarista rivals among Cali's Conservative supporters. But, because of the electoral remainder, both factions were awarded two curules on the 1980-1982 municipal council.

municipal election, the political participation of the Calēños, as measured by voting, reached its lowest point in the last decade (see Table 39). This high abstention rate, combined with the increase in votes for the leftist Unión Nacional de Oposición and the continued success of the Movimiento Cívico despite a vicious campaign against the movement by the two traditional parties, suggests an increasing disillusionment with the Liberal and Conservative parties among the residents of Cali. Moreover, the fact that those two parties have been capturing a smaller proportion of the total municipal vote since 1976 may signify trouble for the parties in the future.

ABSTENTIONISM IN COLOMBIA

The high abstention rates of 1980 in Cali, Valle del Cauca, and the rest of the country were foreseen by many government and party officials during the pre-electoral registration process of early 1980. Fernando Hinestroza Forero, the president of the Electoral Court, suggested that the only way to end the high rate of abstention in Colombia would be to make the vote mandatory,³³ a tactic currently used in other Latin American countries such as Peru and Venezuela. Victor Mosquera Chaux, the president of the National Liberal Directorate, proposed that

³³El País (Cali), February 4, 1980.

TABLE 39

ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN CALI, MUNICIPAL
ELECTIONS, 1966 and 1972-1980

Year	Liberal Party	Conserv- ative Party	ANAPO	Total Votes (including other parties)	Potential Electorate	Total as % of Potential Electorate
1966 ^a	66,773	17,189	18,606	102,568	n.a.	n.a.
1972 ^b	61,601	23,645	37,166	127,886	320,243	40
1974 ^c	131,852	40,388	29,454	215,002	332,051	65
1976 ^d	59,860	25,978	6,691	101,692	371,148	27
1978 ^e	64,737	27,493	8,818 ^f	146,502 ^g	572,273 ^h	25.6
1980 ⁱ	50,853	23,678	n.a.	150,000	596,512	25

^aSource for 1966 data: Stephen L. Rozman, A Comparison of Liberal and Conservative Party Leadership in Cali, Colombia, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1968, p. 48, Table 7.

^bSource for 1972 data: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, 1972 (Bogotá, 1973), p. 129.

^cSource for 1974 data: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, 1974 (Bogotá, 1975).

^dSource for 1976 data: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, 1976 (Bogotá, 1977), p. 161.

^eSource for 1978 data: El País (Cali), March 9, 1980.

^fANAPO and UNO (Unión Nacional de Oposición) ran together on the same list.

^gIncluded among the total votes are 54,272 votes for the Movimiento Cívico.

^hThe legal voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 in 1977.

ⁱ1980 statistics are based on 95% of the municipal returns. See El País (Cali), March 11, 1980.

the March, 1980, election be postponed for four or five months because of the low registration turnout nationwide which would inevitably result in high abstention rates.³⁴ Neither Hinestroza's nor Mosquera's proposals were acted upon by the national government because high abstention rates have traditionally characterized the Colombian electoral system and have not had very detrimental effects on the stability of the nation's political system.

High abstention rates in Colombia during the National Front coalition were cited as the most salient indicator of crisis in the Colombian political system.³⁵ The 4.5 million abstentions in the elections of 1964 were said to be proof of the inevitable popular discontent with the two-party coalition government, discontent which would invariably lead to a social revolution and the subsequent destruction of the traditional political structures of the state (López, 1964).

³⁴El País (Cali), January 9, 1980.

³⁵Many analysts of the Colombian political system point to the high abstention rates of Colombian elections as an indication of increasing disillusionment with the traditional party system and of a serious crisis within the Colombian political system. See Humberto Uribe, "Las Elecciones del 26 de Febrero de 1978," Elecciones 1978, II (Bogotá: CINEP, 1978); "Reñido Final," Hoy (Santiago), Año 11, No. 54 (June 7-13, 1978); Francisco López, Factores de la Revolución (Bogotá: Editorial Iquieima, 1964). For a study which focuses on the specific case of a decline in the abstention rates, see the analysis in John A. Peeler, "Colombian Parties and Political Development: A Reassessment," Journal of Inter-American Studies, XVIII (May, 1976), 203-224.

Pessimistic interpretations of the significance of the high abstention rates within the Colombian electorates have continued into the post-National Front period. Critics of the Colombian two-party system have cited the high abstention rates during the congressional and presidential elections of 1978 as symbolic of the pathology of the Colombian party system. Regarding the congressional election of February of that year, Humberto Uribe claimed that socio-economic and demographic factors underlay the decrease in partisan support for the Liberal and Conservative parties:

The parties of the Right, the Liberals and Conservatives, ...will keep losing electoral support each time as long as urbanization and industrialization continue... The new urban class, and the industrial and agrarian proletariat, are progressively escaping the domination of the hegemonic class while the traditional parties are only able to conserve...the rural clientele and the bureaucratic clienteles (1978:175-176).

An analysis of the June presidential election appeared in a Chilean periodical and claimed that the high abstention rate and the slim margin of victory for the Liberal candidate³⁶ signified the imminent failure of the new government and the decay of the Liberal Party (Hoy, Santiago,

³⁶In June, 1978, Turbay Ayala was elected with barely 18% of the electorate. His margin of victory over the Conservative candidate, Belisario Betancur, was only 147,061 votes (3.3% of the total votes cast). In the 1974 presidential election, the Liberal candidate, Alfonso López Michelsen, had defeated his Conservative rival, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, by 1,294,840 votes (28.4% of the total votes cast). See El País (Cali), January 24, 1980.

June 7, 1978). Another article in the same periodical pointed out with alarm the high abstention rates which have characterized the Colombian electoral system since 1962 (Vargas, 1978).

Most of these studies correctly cite high abstention rates in Colombia. But the conclusions they draw from these statistics are spurious for two reasons. First, the studies fail to analyze the abstention rates from a longitudinal perspective. If they did they would find that the Colombian electoral system has always been plagued by high abstention rates and that the high rates of the post-1958 period are not uncharacteristic of traditional Colombian voting patterns. Second, the researchers erroneously assume that the high abstention rates signify a major crisis in the Colombian political system and they therefore fail to seek other factors which might explain the high rates.

There has never existed a "golden age of electoral participation" in Colombia (Losada, 1977:182) and the recent high abstention rates do not indicate a political crisis in the country. Since the 1930's high abstention rates have been the norm in Colombian politics (Weiss, 1968) and the rates have not been characterized by a steady increase over time but have fluctuated during the past fifty years. Table 40 presents the abstention rates at the national level from 1935 to 1953. As the table

indicates, the highest abstention rates occurred during the 1930's. The rates then decreased during the 1940's and began to increase in the early 1950's. The average abstention rate for the 18-year period was 55.4%.

TABLE 40
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN COLOMBIA,
1935-1953

Year	Type of Election ^a	Voters as % of Potential Electorate (Men over 21)	Abstention as % of Potential Electorate
1935	C	23.5	76.5
1937	C	28.9	71.1
1938	P	26.4	73.6
1939	C	46.4	53.6
1941	C	43.0	57.0
1942	P	54.7	45.3
1943	C	41.2	58.8
1945	C	39.4	60.6
1946	P	60.2	39.8
1947	C	63.7	36.3
1949	C	72.9	27.1
1949	P	47.4	52.6
1951	C	37.4	62.6
1953	C	39.0	61.0

^aC=cámara election (based on total vote for candidates for House of Representatives). P=presidential election.

Source: DANE, "Buscando las Causas del 19 de Abril de 1970," Colombia Política (DANE, 1972 c), p. 214, Table 1.2.

Table 41 provides data on voter turnout from 1957 until 1980. This twenty-three year period is characterized by the abnormally high voter turnout for the 1957 national plebiscite; the progressive decrease in turnout after the plebiscite until the relatively high turnout for the 1970 presidential election in which ANAPO, the third party alternative, stimulated much voter influence; the relative decrease in abstention rates from 1970 to 1976; and the sharp increase in those rates in the post-1976 period.

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the data presented in Tables 40 and 41 is that during the 1935-1980 period in Colombia abstention rates, although generally high, fluctuated and showed no clear distinctive pattern of decrease or increase over the forty-five year period.

The second area in which earlier studies on Colombian voting patterns have produced misleading conclusions is in the determination of those factors which are claimed to have contributed to the high rate of voter abstention in the nation's electoral system. In contrast to the studies of the 1960's, those of the 1970's have examined more closely the validity of the hypothesized relationship between voter non-participation and voter dissatisfaction with the political party system. Although they have found a direct correlation between the two variables, they also have found alternative factors which have contributed to the high abstention rates.

TABLE 41
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN COLOMBIA, 1957-1980^a

Year	Type of Election ^b	Turnout as % of Registered Voters	Turnout as % of Potential Electorate ^c	Abstention as % of Registered Voters
1957	Plebiscite	72.3	n.a.	27.7
1958	C	68.9	60	31.1
1958	P	57.9	51.1 ^d	42.1
1960	C	57.8	39	42.2
1962	C	57.9	45	42.1
1962	P	48.8	38.9 ^d	51.2
1964	C	36.9	31	63.1
1966	P	40.1	34.9 ^d	59.9
1966 ^e	C	44.5	38	55.5
1968 ^e	C	35.8	30	64.2
1970 ^f	P	52.5	47.2 ^d	47.5
1972 ^f	C	n.a.	33.0 ^d	n.a.
1974 ^f	P	58.1	54.2 ^d	41.9
1976 ^g	C	65.0	n.a.	35.0
1978 ^h	P	40.0	37.6 ^d	60.0
1980 ⁱ	M	n.a.	25	n.a.

^aData on cámara elections of 1970, 1974, and 1978 are not provided in this table.

^bC=congressional election (based on total vote for candidates for House of Representatives); P=presidential election; M=mitaca election.

^cFrom 1957 through 1976, the potential electorate included all those citizens over 21 years of age; since 1978 the potential electorate has included all those citizens over 18 years of age.

^dSource: Oscar Darío Diagama Durán and Nelson Rosales, "El Comportamiento Electoral de los Partidos Políticos Colombianos," Javeriana, XCIII (April, 1980), 217.

^eData from plebiscite of 1957 through the 1968 congressional election are based on information acquired from DANE, Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 250-251 (1972 b), p. 67, Table 2.1.1.

^fSource: República de Colombia, Estadísticas Electorales (Bogotá: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 1975), p. 374.

^gSource: Jaime Vargas, "En la Recta Final," Hoy (Santiago de Chile), Año 11, No. 54 (June 7-13, 1978).

^hSource: República de Colombia, "Votación y Abstención, Elecciones del 4 de Junio de 1978," in República de Colombia, Estadísticas Electorales: Presidencia de la República (Bogotá: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, December, 1978), p. 63.

ⁱSource: El País (Cali), March 12, 1980, p. 3. The 25% turnout rate is based on voting statistics, provided by the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, from 891 of the nation's 963 municipalities.

In the 1974 elections, Murillo and Williams found a high abstention rate (58%) among the potential voters of Bogotá. But their survey of those who abstained revealed that only a small percentage claimed political discontent as the reason for their failure to vote (Murillo and Williams, 1975). An analysis of the 1978 presidential election cited the dull, issueless contest between the Liberal candidate, Julio César Turbay Ayala, and his Conservative opponent, Belisario Betancur, as well as the massive apathy on the part of the newly-enfranchised 18-20 year-old group, as two important alternative factors which resulted in the high abstention rates recorded in that election. The study concluded that "the results of Colombia's 1978 election indicate the weakening of traditional partisan loyalties, but by no means do they portend the imminent breakdown of the traditional political parties themselves" (Ruhl, 1978:44).

Overall, some generalizations can be made about electoral tendencies in Colombia since the decade of the

thirties. Abstention has generally been higher than 50% for the past 50 years. Much of that abstention since the 1950's has been among the newly arrived migrants who settle in the marginal barrios of the urban areas (DANE, 1972 b). Voter turnout during the National Front generally decreased since inter-party rivalry was strictly limited by the 1957 Sitges Agreement and since other political parties were prohibited from running official candidates. And the rise in voter turnout at the end of the last National Front administration in 1974 was short-lived as the data from the 1978 and 1980 elections indicate in Table 41.

.In short, even though abstention rates in Colombia are currently high, traditional party affiliation is decreasing, and the political alienation of the masses is on the upswing, chances of an imminent social revolution from below are very slight because of the continued domination of the political system by the Liberal and Conservative parties and because of the disruptive influences of factionalism among the leftist movements. A more likely scenario for the future of the Colombian political system is increased military intervention in the government in order to avert a political crisis and to maintain the traditional rule of Colombian society by the nation's elite sectors.

Regarding the electoral behavior of the Caleño electorate, Judith de Campos and Francisco Martínez, of the Social Sciences Division of the Universidad del Valle in Cali, carried out a post-electoral survey of that electorate as part of their study of the 1978 municipal election in Cali.³⁷ In the study they analyzed the abstention phenomenon in that election on four dimensions: age, sex, attitude of voter toward previous government, and socio-economic level. They found that abstention rates were highest among potential voters in the 18-21 year old group (80.7%), most of whom had received the right to vote for the first time, as well as among those of the 56+ age group (51.8%).³⁸ Abstention among men was 72.5%, slightly higher than the rate of 70.9% found among women.³⁹ Among those Caleños who thought the national government of the previous four years was "good", the abstention rate was 41.1%. The figure rose to 76.4% among those who thought the national government was "bad".⁴⁰ These figures suggest that abstention may be used by citizens as a protest against the government and to exhibit dissatisfaction with the policies of that government.

³⁷Francisco Martínez and Judith de Campos, Estudio de las Elecciones de Febrero y Junio, 1978, en la Ciudad de Cali (Cali: Universidad del Valle, forthcoming).

³⁸Ibid., part 4.1.1.

³⁹Ibid., part 4.1.1.

⁴⁰Ibid., part 4.1.3.

Table 42 shows how the abstention rates, measured in the Campos-Martínez survey, generally increased as the socio-economic status of the individual decreased:

TABLE 42

ELECTORAL ABSTENTION (%) ACCORDING TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL, MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS OF CALI, FEBRUARY, 1978

Socio-Economic Class	% Abstention Within S-E Class
Upper	53.8
Upper-middle	51.7
Middle	68.0
Lower Middle	59.8
Lower	77.0
Low-lower	71.9

Source: Francisco Martínez and Judith de Campos, Estudio de las Elecciones de Febrero y Junio, 1978, en la Ciudad de Cali (Cali: Universidad del Valle, forthcoming).

In short, the results of the Campos-Martínez study indicate that the abstention rates in the 1978 municipal elections of Cali were highest among the young, the poor, and those who had a negative opinion of the national administration of the previous four years. This conclusion is supported in part by the present study's analysis of political participation among the residents of San Judas in Cali.

SAN JUDAS: MEMBERSHIP IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

The second variable to be measured by the political survey of San Judas, membership in voluntary associations, implies a certain structural and motivational organization on the part of the barrio residents. Such organizational support structures and channels political participation and, it is claimed, has resulted in more efficient and effective demand-making on the part of the urban and rural poor in Latin America (Pratt, 1971 a; Purcell and Purcell, 1973). Consequently it is also claimed that the government has generally responded more positively to inputs generated from a position of organized strength.

Question 4 of the political survey of San Judas asks "Are you a member of Acción Comunal or of any political organization here in San Judas Tadeo, and if so, which?" Table 43 indicates that only 40 of the 301 barrio residents interviewed responded that they did indeed belong to a political organization:

TABLE 43
 MEMBERSHIP IN A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION^a
 BY ZONE, BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO,
 FEBRUARY, 1980
 (N = 301)

Zone	Yes	No	Not Sure/ No Response
1	8	52	0
2	8	62	28
3	5	56	0
4	17	31	2
5	<u>2</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>2</u>
Total:	40	229	32

^aThose interviewed were asked, "Are you a member of Acción Comunal or of any political organization here in San Judas Tadeo...?"

The fact that only 13.3% of those interviewed considered themselves members of a political organization within their barrio is another indication of the low level of political participation among the pobladores of San Judas.

Of the forty persons who responded positively to question 4, twenty one were men and nineteen were women. The age breakdown of those members is presented in Table 44.

Of the thirty three 18 and 19 year olds interviewed in San Judas, not one claimed to be a member of Acción Comunal or any political organization within the barrio. Thus, according to both measures of participation used in the present study, voting and membership in voluntary associations, the youngest age group was the least politically

active group. The other five age groups had more or less the same percentage of members in political organizations.

TABLE 44
MEMBERSHIP IN A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION^a BY
AGE, BARRIO SAN JUDAS TADEO, FEBRUARY, 1980
(N = 301)

Age Group ^b	Yes	No	Not Sure/ No Response	"Yes" as Row %
1	0	26	7	0
2	12	66	5	14.5
3	7	41	7	12.7
4	10	39	5	18.5
5	7	37	3	14.9
6	<u>4</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>5</u>	13.8
Total:	40	229	32	

^aThose interviewed were asked, "Are you a member of Acción Comunal or of any political organization here in San Judas?"
^bFor an explanation of the age groups, see Table 30.

When the forty members of political organizations were asked to identify those organizations, thirty seven responded. The following results were obtained: fourteen belonged to Liberal organizations, ten to Conservative organizations, seven to Acción Comunal, two to ANAPO organizations, two to the Movimiento Cívico organization, and two to the Comité Pro-Defensa. Once again, these findings highlight the domination of the Liberal party in San Judas.

The theory that members of voluntary associations are more likely to vote than non-members has been empirically corroborated in Europe (Lipset, 1963:189) as well as among the urban lower classes of Colombia (Havens and Flinn, 1979 b:124). My survey of 301 residents of San Judas found that 41.8% (126) of the sample intended to vote and that 13.3% (40) of that sample belonged to a barrio association. A cross-tabulation of the findings indicates that 29 of the 40 association members intended to vote. That is, only 9.6% of the total sample of the barrio residents interviewed exhibited both types of political behavior.

Although that percentage represented a small segment of the total population (18 years and older) of Cali, the numbers are more revealing when used in relation to the theory expressed above. Of those who belonged to a voluntary association, 72.5% intended to vote (i.e. 29 out of 40). Of the 261 barrio residents who did not identify themselves as members of such an association in San Judas, only 37.2% (i.e. 97 out of 261) intended to vote (based on their positive response to part a of question 1). Comparing these two figures, the survey's findings verify that in the case of the pobladores of San Judas, a person is more likely to vote if he belongs to some type of communal association.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, this chapter has examined some aspects of the political participation, attitudes, and awareness of the residents of Cali and San Judas. The extent of participation of the citizenry of Cali was measured by its potential voting behavior, as expressed in Losada's pre-electoral survey, and by its actual voting behavior as demonstrated in the mitaca elections of March, 1980. The extent of participation of the pobladores of San Judas, as investigated by the political survey of the present study, was measured by their intentions to vote or abstain in the March elections as well as their membership in partisan voluntary associations within the barrio.

The findings of both surveys suggested that citizen participation in the municipal political system, as measured by voting, was very low. The validity of this finding was strengthened by the 25% turnout rate of the Caleño electorate in the mitaca elections. Moreover, the active participation of the pobladores of San Judas, as measured by their membership in voluntary associations, was found to be extremely low. A contextual analysis of the overall low level of political participation of the citizens of San Judas and Cali is offered in Chapter V.

Furthermore, the political attitude and awareness components of the potential electorate of Cali, and the political awareness component of the residents of San Judas, were also investigated by the Losada survey and the political survey of San Judas respectively. The rationale behind the investigation was to provide preliminary evidence which could be used to determine a correlation between the political attitudes and awareness of potential voters concerning their political system and the high rate of abstention among those voters. Although further research is needed to substantiate the suggested correlation, the findings of the two surveys suggest two directions which that research may follow. In the case of the Caleño electorate, Losada's survey suggests very strongly that disenchantment with the political system, as measured by individual's negative attitudes toward the system and their low feeling of personal efficacy, may be a major factor in the high abstention rates of those potential voters. In the case of the pobladores of San Judas, the political survey of the present study suggests that a lack of knowledge regarding the local political system (i.e. political non-awareness) may be another causal determinant of non-participation in that system.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

The primary aim of the present study has been to describe, investigate, and analyze the behavioral, structural, and linkage components of the political system of a Third World urban marginal barrio. The study has focused on San Judas Tadeo, a barrio popular of Cali, Colombia, and has attempted to examine the extent of two types of the political participation of the pobladores of that barrio, the political structures that exist within the barrio, and the linkages that exist on the personal level in the barrio and on the collective level between the barrio's voluntary organizations and the larger municipal political system.

Although San Judas is by no means representative of all the marginal barrios of the less developed nations of the world, it does have social, economic, and political characteristics similar to those of other Third World marginal barrios. In this respect the conclusions drawn from the present study may be applied on the comparative level to the studies of other Latin American marginal barrios as well as to those of other cultural environments. However this application can only be made while carefully keeping in mind the particular contextual factors which influenced the formation of the theories and

conclusions of the present case study.

Chapter V is the final chapter of the present study. Chapter I discussed the three objectives of this study as well as some aspects of the theoretical model employed in carrying out the study. Chapter II described the demographic and socio-economic contexts within which the study took place. Chapter III focused on the political structures of Cali and San Judas and the political linkages, both particularistic and communal, which existed within the barrio and between the barrio and the municipal political system. Chapter IV examined the extent of political participation of the pobladores of San Judas in terms of voting behavior and membership in voluntary associations. Finally, Chapter V presents the conclusions of the present study, conclusions based on the information contained in the first four chapters.

Chapter V is divided into two parts. Part 1 presents the conclusions related to the objectives set forth in Chapter I. It summarizes the characteristics and roles of the people and the political system of San Judas and points out why those pobladores act as they do and why they have so little effective impact upon the policy-making levels of the larger political system. Part 2 indicates those areas within the discipline in which further research is needed in order to increase our general knowledge concerning the political participation

structures, and linkages of Third World marginal barrios and their residents.

CONCLUSIONS

As stated in Chapter I, Objective A of the present study was to examine and analyze two different types of political behavior manifested by the inhabitants of a Colombian barrio popular.¹ In accordance with this objective, the political behavior of the pobladores of San Judas, although limited by the contextual factors to be discussed below, was found to encompass both private and public actions (Bryan, 1970: 20-21). Of

¹For additional sources of country-specific studies on the political participation of the urban poor in Latin America, see Clifford Kaufman, "Urbanization, Material Satisfaction and Mass Political Involvement: The Poor in Mexico City," Comparative Political Studies, IV (October, 1971), 295-319; José Yglesias, In the Fist of the Revolution (New York: Pantheon, 1968) on Cuba; Shepard Forman, "Disunity and Discontent: A Study of Peasant Political Movements in Brazil," Journal of Latin American Studies, III (May, 1971), 3-24; Howard Handelman, "The Political Mobilization of Urban Squatter Settlements: Santiago's Recent Experience and Its Implications for Urban Research," Latin American Research Review, X (1975 a), 35-72; Lisa R. Peattie, The View from the Barrio (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968) on Venezuela; and James M. Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970). Also see Raymond B. Pratt, "Parties, Neighborhood Associations and the Politicization of the Urban Poor in Latin America," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XV (1971 b), 495-524.

the 301 residents interviewed in the barrio, 125 (41.5%) claimed that they planned to vote in the mitaca elections of 1980 and only 40 (13.3%) responded that they belonged to the Acción Comunal junta or to any political organization within San Judas. What are the factors behind these low percentages? Perhaps this question can be answered by considering Goldrich's four components of politicization (see Chapter IV).

Goldrich's four components include direct participation in politics, salience, efficacy, and accessibility (1970:49). The barrio caciques, especially the four primary leaders of the barrio as determined by the analysis of Chapter III, were those individuals who most directly participated in the political systems of the barrio and the municipality. Their gatekeeper function as brokers or mediators between the residents of San Judas and the party leaders of Cali defined their direct involvement in politics. The vast majority of the other residents of the barrio either participated in the barrio's political system to a much more limited degree or did not participate in that system at all.

The salience component of politicization refers to the individual's awareness of, and psychological involvement in, the political system of which he or she is a part. In the case of the pobladores of San Judas, both their knowledge of that system and their political culture,

that is their beliefs, attitudes, and values, sharply influenced their political behavior. Questions 2 and 3 of the political survey carried out in the barrio demonstrated a lack of knowledge regarding aspects of both the political system of Cali and that of San Judas among the 301 residents interviewed in the survey. Losada's survey of the Caleño electorate (see Chapter IV) exhibited many negative responses among those potential voters toward the political system in general. When examined in light of the 75% abstention rate in Cali during the 1980 municipal council election, these findings suggest that the benefits to be derived by the pobladores of San Judas and Cali from participating in the municipal political system were perceived by those pobladores as not salient enough to outweigh the costs involved in such participation.

The efficacy component of politicization is also sharply influenced by the individual's political culture and the political socialization pattern he or she undergoes. Although this component was not directly measured in the survey of the residents of San Judas, it was indirectly investigated through non-structured interviews with many of those residents. The general feeling of the barrio inhabitants was that they were unable to effect any change or have any impact on the political

system through their own efforts. This feeling was supported by the data of the Losada survey which found that 67% of those Caleños interviewed felt incapable of influencing the decisions of the government through their personal participation in the political system. In short, the limited political participation exhibited by the pobladores of San Judas was strongly influenced by their perceptions and attitudes concerning their inability to influence government policies.

Goldrich's fourth component of politicization is accessibility to the political system. In the case of the inhabitants of San Judas, that access was provided from above by cooptative partisan structures imposed on those inhabitants by the larger political system. For the most part there was no spontaneous mass movement among the pobladores to pressure for access to the municipal political system from below. As a result, the government directly controlled access to the political system through collective mechanisms, such as the Acción Comunal program and the political parties with their voluntary associations at the barrio level, and indirectly through such personalistic mechanisms as the patron-client relationship so deep-rooted in Colombian culture.

In sum, from the perspective of Goldrich's four components of politicization, most of the pobladores were

passive rather than active agents in the political systems of San Judas and Cali. They perceived themselves as incapable of influencing the allocation of public goods within the barrio from the municipal to the barrio level and felt powerless to act outside the channels provided by the well-organized and cooptative structures of the party system. Those who did participate in the political system of the barrio did so for various reasons. Some were motivated to action by personalistic ties with party officials. Others sought immediate gratification, via patron-client relationships, from public authorities and barrio caciques in order to improve their socio-economic situation. Still others were defensively politicized. That is, their political behavior was motivated by the desire to defend their barrio and struggle for the public services and goods to which they felt that barrio was entitled. All three of these modes of participation are examples of the rational adaptation of the pobladores of San Judas to their urban environment.

The behavioral analysis of the modes of political participation of the pobladores of San Judas presented in Chapter IV supports the claim that those individuals pursued a non-radical course of rational adaptation to their new environment. In other words, almost all of the political behavior of those pobladores took place within legal norms and was not intended to subvert the existing governmental

structures and policies.

The pobladores in general did not fit into the pattern of the disruptive migrant. There was no unified class struggle among the inhabitants of San Judas, nor was the barrio an "incubator of revolution" (Bonilla, 1961:76). The inhabitants did not suffer from the psychological malaise claimed to be so characteristic of marginal social groups by the proponents of the Park-Wirth and "culture of poverty" theses. To the contrary, the pobladores of San Judas had adapted rather well to the urban context by adapting some of their rural traditions, such as gamonalismo, personalism, paternalism and patronage; to the specific requirements of the urban milieu. Furthermore, they had internalized many of the values and behavior patterns of the new environment so as to integrate themselves, as much as feasibly possible, into the social and economic systems of Cali.

The basis for the rational adaptation of the pobladores of San Judas to the urban barrio is adequately explained by the three components of Robert E. Lane's model of rationality.² The pobladores defined their goals, sought the most efficient and effective methods to fulfill those goals, and then took the necessary actions to do so.

²See Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959).

For the most part the goals of the residents of San Judas were related to the improvement of their socio-economic situation and in this manner these goals resembled those of the urban poor analyzed in other studies (Apter, 1958; Horowitz, 1970; Ebel, 1971; Seligson, 1978). The methods used in an attempt to attain those goals included the formation of patron-client dyads, participation in voluntary organizations within the barrio, and self-help efforts. The choice of the method depended on the perceptions of the individual as to which of the methods would maximize gains while minimizing risks. This political-economy approach of costs and benefits³ represented the most rational course of action for the pobladores and confined their actions, for the most part, to the parochial goals of solving the immediate problems of the family and then those of the barrio and not toward effecting policy changes in the larger political system. The small amount of collective political participation in the barrio was primarily directed toward improving the infrastructure of San Judas by affecting the allocation of public goods from the municipal level to the barrio. However, for most of the pobladores of San Judas, the municipal political system was not perceived as a relevant arena of personal involvement. In this respect,

³See Chapter I, footnote 12.

their socio-economic status defined the locus of their political participation.

Objective B of the present study was to describe and examine political organizations and structures which were used by the residents of the barrio popular in order to influence the allocation of essential resources both within the barrio and from the municipal level. In the specific context of San Judas, it was found that material resources within the barrio were severely limited. But human resources, in the form of barrio caciques with links to the municipal political system, were much in evidence and were used by the pobladores in an attempt to acquire material benefits from the municipal level both for themselves and for the barrio as a whole. In all cases these barrio caciques were partisan affiliated and formed the two levels of community leadership described in Chapter III. In their positions of authority, they served as representatives of those political parties, factions, and movements active within San Judas.

The caciques directed the activities of the voluntary associations that existed in San Judas and which served a dual purpose. In the first place, they served to mobilize voters within the barrio in order to provide their respective political factions with electoral support. In the second place, they acted as defense organizations (Mangin, 1967 a; Gutiérrez, 1961) in an attempt to promote the

physical development of the barrio. In this latter capacity, they rarely tried to influence the input side of the municipal policy-making process. Instead they concentrated their efforts on attempting to influence the disbursement of funds and the allocation of public goods from the municipal political system to the barrio. In short, the leaders of the voluntary associations focused their efforts on the output side of the municipal policy-making process.

The success of the efforts of the voluntary associations in San Judas was severely limited partly because of what one of the barrio caciques has termed "political racism." That is, the effectiveness of the relatively well-organized voluntary associations was diminished by the political factionalism which existed among them. This divisionism within the barrio inevitably hindered the demand-making capacity of the barrio as a whole and subsequently was a factor in the low level of benefits received by the residents of San Judas from the municipality. Thus the claims of Pratt (1971 a) and Purcell and Purcell (1973) that the degree of local organizational capacity is a causal determinant of the amount of benefits received would at first appear to apply to the case of San Judas. But as Eckstein (1977) warns us, this relationship between organizational capacity and the receipt of benefits must be analyzed in view of the context within which that organization takes place.

Eckstein found that in the case of Mexico the local organizations were formally coopted into the national party structure of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional and, as a result, the national government was able to expand its social and political controls over the barrio residents. The final result of this expansion of control was that the government effectively demobilized the residents. In effect, the national government forced the urban pobladores to reduce their demands on the government and thus to decrease their level of participation in the nation's political system (1977:85).

A phenomenon similar to that described by Eckstein was found to occur in San Judas. The party-affiliated organizations within the barrio offered the pobladores the most direct access to the municipal political system. But there was a price to pay for this access. The cooptative nature of the barrio associations exerted strong controls over the demand-articulation process of the pobladores, the success of which, in the final analysis, largely depended on the distributive policies of municipal party officials and the subsequent benefits to be derived from the allocation of resources.⁴ Also,

⁴Distributive policies allow government officials to placate those barrios with the most well-organized demand-making procedures. Once the government responds to the demands, the barrio residents will usually not continue to struggle in unity with other barrios with similar demands. In this manner distributive policies can be used to defuse dissent, control radicalism, and fractionalize the urban poor.

because of the barrio's land title problem, the party officials were often reluctant to allocate resources to San Judas. The repeated efforts of the pobladores of San Judas, through their voluntary associations, to influence the allocation of resources from the municipal level met with little success. These two factors, that is the unsuccessful pattern of interaction with the political authorities as well as the instability of residence, have been cited in other studies as factors which serve to depoliticize marginal barrio residents (Cornelius, 1973 b).

In the case of San Judas, the depoliticization of the residents took the forms of minimal active membership in the barrio's voluntary associations and the tendency to forego collective efforts at barrio improvement. At the same time this depoliticization was a factor in the stimulation of goal fulfillment through individual efforts, patron-client relationships, and self-help projects. Thus, in support of the conclusions of Eckstein's Mexican study, the political participation of the pobladores of San Judas was found to be negatively affected by the voluntary organizations of the barrio which were used by the political parties to subject the pobladores to social and political controls.

In short, the individuals who comprised the barrio power structure used the traditional political parties

as the main vehicles with which to gain access to the institutional decision-making centers of the municipal political system. But this access via the party-organized voluntary associations of San Judas tended to have detrimental effects on the demand-articulation of the barrio residents because of the cooptative nature of the associations. Consequently the barrio residents were strictly limited in their power to influence municipal government officials in the formation of policies, the implementation of programs, and the subsequent allocation of resources intended to alleviate the developmental necessities of the barrio.

Objective C of the present study was closely related to Objective B in that it sought to investigate the diverse types of linkages which served both to connect the voluntary associations of San Judas to the policy-making arena of the larger political system and to link the pobladores of San Judas to the power structure of the barrio. In other words, its aim was to define and analyze the internal and external linkage components of the political system of San Judas.

Within the barrio the traditional rural phenomenon of the patron-client relationship existed to a high degree and served as the principal link between the poblador and the primary and secondary leaders of the barrio. As discussed in Chapter III, the traditional

patron-client relationship has three components - proximity, reciprocity, and unequal status. In the case of San Judas all three components were present to varying degrees. But the unequal status component was based not so much on socio-economic differences as on the relative ability of the individual to gain favor with and influence party and government officials at the municipal level. In this respect it was the barrio cacique who, because of his role as broker between the pobladores and the municipal party leaders, was in a relatively better position than the majority of the residents of San Judas to distribute patronage among the clients of his patron-client cluster. Yet, in the case of San Judas, the effectiveness of the cacique in his role as broker was suspect.

As stated above, the cacique was usually the leader of a party-affiliated voluntary association within the barrio. In his capacity as political broker, he linked the barrio associations to the municipal political system and attempted to act as a lobbyist for barrio interests. But since the organization which he represented was controlled by the larger party structure and was not wholly the creation of his individual efforts nor those of a unified mass movement to achieve a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the political parties and an independent bargaining position vis-à-vis the municipal officials, the

cacique's ability to act as a barrio spokesman and to effectively transform barrio demands into tangible benefits was seriously limited.

This limitation on the caciques' traditional responsibilities to act as effective barrio spokesmen and to acquire material resources and benefits for the residents of their barrios also affected the perceptions of the barrio residents. As the caciques failed to fulfill the obligations of their brokerage role, their usefulness declined in the eyes of the pobladores. In turn, this negative perception of the caciques detrimentally affected the ability of those community "influentials" to mobilize the residents of the barrio. The final result of this declining "delivery capability" of the caciques was a decrease in the activities of the municipal party organizations in the barrio because of the realization that few electoral benefits would be derived from such activities. In short, the specific situation of San Judas described here raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the caciques of San Judas as local mobilizers and resource procurers, and as the middle link in the patron-broker-client triad. On a more general level, it also poses questions regarding the feasibility and viability of the institution of urban caciquismo in the context of the barrios populares of 1980 Cali.

Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the barrio caciques in San Judas also produced an additional effect. Because of the small number of material benefits allocated to the barrio by the political parties, many of the barrio residents looked past the inadequacies of their local caciques and perceived the parties themselves as disinterested entities which did not positively respond to the articulation of barrio demands. This reaction supports the findings of other studies which claim that political parties will receive more mass support if they provide adequate channels for discontent and if their "response to public demands is ordinarily perceptible" (Martz, 1965:333).

In sum, the Colombian political parties, the ubiquitous brokers between the citizens and the state, controlled and limited access to the larger political system for the pobladores of the nation's marginal barrios through their cooptative policies and structures such as the voluntary associations of San Judas and the national Acción Comunal program. These policies and structures were used in an attempt to foment the marginalization of the lower-class strata of Colombian society. That is, the Colombian government used exclusionary policies to repress the social, economic, and political aspirations of the residents of the urban marginal barrios and to maintain the traditional socio-political order of the nation. In

this fashion, the elite-dominated government was able to effectively perpetuate its control of political power within the country.

Whether or not the elite ruling class of Colombia can continue with this policy of political exclusion, especially in view of the emergence of anti-status quo political alternatives such as the Movimiento Cívico of Cali, will be decided in the near future. As the marginal residents of Colombian society become more aware of the inegalitarian nature of the nation's political system and as they begin to express their discontent with the traditional political system not by abstaining from elections but by translating this discontent into votes for non-traditional political movements, the flexibility of the Liberal and Conservative parties in the face of an increasing challenge to their traditional political hegemony will be tested.

What then is the nature of the political system of San Judas and how does that system reflect the larger political system of the nation? The political system of San Judas consisted of a series of partisan-oriented, cacique-directed voluntary associations which competed for the electoral support of the barrio residents in an attempt to win more seats on the municipal council for their respective political factions. The barrio caciques

used limited material benefits, or the promise of such benefits, acquired from personalistic municipal politicians to attract supporters in the barrio. In their struggle for these supporters and for increased influence within the barrio power structure, they caused much divisionism among the pobladores and relegated the professed objective of the human and physical development of the barrio and its inhabitants to a position of inferiority vis-à-vis the objective of obtaining electoral support and achieving self-interested ends. This divisionism weakened the organizational strength of the barrio residents and was one of many factors in the municipal government's negative responses to the demands of the barrio residents. Furthermore it created deep political cleavages within San Judas which reduced the political participation of the barrio pobladores as manifested in one respect by their high propensity towards abstention (as measured by the political survey undertaken by the present study.) But these internal cleavages, characteristic of Colombian society in general, were only one of the many contextual factors which adversely affected the extent of political participation among the residents of San Judas.

One of the underlying themes of this study of a Colombian barrio popular has been the importance of contextual factors in analyzing the behavioral, structural,

and linkage components of the barrio's political system.⁵ These are the factors which cause different political systems to function in different ways despite the apparent similarities of those systems. Although all of those economic, social, cultural, and political factors which influenced the functioning of the political system of San Judas have previously been referred to, either explicitly or implicitly, the following discussion summarizes the four most important factors which affected the structural organization of the barrio's political system and the modes and intensity of participation of the barrio pobladores within that system. These factors comprise the context within which the present study has reached

⁵Booth sums up the importance of the relationship between contextual factors and political participation: "...political participation in Latin America manifests diverse contextual influences. The (evolving) structure of socio-political institutions provides the framework within which citizens attempt to influence the distribution of public goods. Constitutional structures, regime types, elite interactions, and institutional configurations determine the opportunities, channels for, and costs of participation, thereby influencing the levels, structure, strategy, tactics, and policy influence of political activity. Shifts in structural phenomena may produce dramatic alterations in patterns of citizens' efforts to influence the distribution of national public goods. At lower levels within social systems, phenomena as varied as the availability of public services, local political culture, community size, and residence patterns provide similar frameworks that determine the motives, tactics, modes and intensity of political activity." See John A. Booth, "Political Participation in Latin America: Levels, Structure, Context, Concentration and Rationality," Latin American Research Review, XIV (1979), 39.

its conclusions.

The first contextual factor which has influenced the development, evolution, and internal dynamics of the political system of San Judas is the type of regime which has traditionally ruled the country. As explained in Chapter III, the centralized Colombian governmental structure is dominated at all administrative levels by the executive branch while the popularly elected legislative bodies are limited in power and generally act as legitimizing mechanisms for executive initiatives. The disproportionate power of the executive branch is legalized by constitutional articles which, at the national level, delegate extraordinary powers to the President of the Republic and, at the departmental and municipal levels, insure the direct transmission of executive authority from the nation's chief executive to the nation's governors and mayors respectively.

In the past the Colombian government has abused its constitutional powers in an effort to maintain control of the political system in the hands of a particular political party. The most extreme case of this abuse of power took place during the administration of Conservative President Laureano Gómez whose persecution of Liberal Party supporters, especially in the rural areas, was a major factor in the perpetuation of La Violencia. During the 1960's and 1970's, memories of the tragedy of

that era in Colombian history are claimed to have had a negative effect on the political participation of the Colombian citizens, especially upon those rural residents who fled the violence in the countryside to seek refuge in the barrios populares of Colombia's urban areas (McDonald, 1967). Whether or not those negative effects still have impact upon the political participation of the urban poblador is a question which must be answered by further research. But in general, whether or not the political activism of the residents of Colombia's poor urban barrios is a means of achieving socio-economic mobility and political reform depends greatly on the type of régime under which that activity occurs.

In the case of San Judas and other barrios populares of Colombia, the political activities of the residents, even though taking place within legal norms, have been strictly controlled by the nation's rulers. These rulers have consciously used policies of exclusion to foment the alienation of much of Colombia's population from the mainstream of the nation's political and economic systems and they have maintained those policies of coerced marginality in order to defend their own interests. In so doing, the Colombian regime has fostered a mass dependence on a paternalistic national government and has detrimentally affected the salience, efficacy, and accessibility components of the politicization of the urban pobladores.

Although many of these pobladores are industrious individuals striving for socio-economic mobility, their economic and political powerlessness has caused them to perceive of participation in the nation's political system as a very ineffective means toward the fulfillment of their aspirations.

Closely related to contextual factor #1 is factor #2, the type of party system that exists in the nation. As stated in Chapter III the history of Colombian politics is, to a large extent, the history of the nation's political parties. The oligarchic, elite-dominated Colombian two-party system has traditionally exercised much control over the political participation of the Colombian citizenry by means of its hierarchical party structures and cooptative policies. These structures and policies have been used to channel most of the political activity of the Colombian nation through the Liberal and Conservative parties and their factions. In so doing, the party system has proscribed the emergence of viable political alternatives at the national level and has mobilized the nation in such a way as to create deep political cleavages which have been perpetuated through the political socialization of the Colombian people.

Furthermore, the inegalitarian leadership structures of the two traditional parties and the power struggles among the elite members of those structures have defined

the nature of the political participation of the Colombian masses in much the same way as the nature of the polarized elite struggle in Brazil is claimed to have shaped the political participation of the Brazilian masses.⁶ The two parties have mobilized and bifurcated the Colombian nation in order to pursue their quest for political power, have controlled access to the political system in order to maintain their political hegemony, and have defused popular dissent by allowing for internal factions which, while granted a limited degree of autonomy at the regional and local levels, rally behind the national party leadership when faced with a serious challenge from the opposing party. In short, the Colombian party system is the major component of the nation's political system and has completely dominated that system for almost one and a half centuries through its successful efforts at controlling the mobilization, socialization, and politicization of the Colombian nation.

Contextual factor #3 is the political socialization pattern and political culture of the Colombian nation. The findings of the present study suggest that this socialization pattern, controlled to a large extent by the elite class of Colombia, exerts a great influence on the perpetuation of marginality among the lower socio-economic

⁶See Shepard Forman, The Brazilian Peasantry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 143-144.

strata of urban Colombian society. In other words, the political values, attitudes, and beliefs of the Colombian nation are instilled in that nation in such a way as to prevent a large segment of the populace from exercising a meaningful role in the political system of the country. Since party affiliation in Colombia has historically been determined to a great extent by factors such as place of birth and the political affiliation of one's parents, the majority of the nation's potential voters still aligns itself along the Liberal-Conservative dichotomy and thus becomes subject to the socialization patterns of those two parties, patterns which stress factionalism, patron-clientelism, personalism, and paternalism.

These four features of the political culture of the Colombian nation have served as convenient mechanisms used by political leaders to effectively control the political participation of the pobladores of San Judas and other Colombian barrios populares. With the creation of the perception of a paternalist national government among those pobladores, the political parties have propagated a sense of mass dependence on the government for material benefits. Personalistic party leaders have used demagogic approaches to the urban poor to contribute to this feeling of dependency. The use of patronage politics by the two parties has created a system of personal ties in which the political participation of the

client is controlled by the local patrón⁷ who himself is coopted into the larger political system. And finally, elite competition at the national level has manifested itself at the barrio level in the form of political factionalism in which the struggle for political power causes division among the barrio residents and impedes their efforts at effective and unified demand articulation.

In sum, the political socialization and culture of the Colombian nation has instilled the Colombian poor, moreso than the other socio-economic sectors of Colombian society, with specific beliefs, values, and attitudes which have directly contributed to their exclusion from the political system. As this exclusion continues, as abstention rates continue to increase, and as a new generation of disillusioned youth matures, the political culture of the nation will most probably undergo change. The Liberal and Conservative parties, if they continue with their cooptative policies of social and political control, will be adversely affected by that change.

The final contextual factor which influenced the political participation of the pobladores of San Judas was the insecurity of land tenure within the barrio.

⁷In this regard, a possible hypothesis arises which must be tested by further empirical research: If an individual is not drawn into a patron-client nexus, then that individual will have a greater tendency not to vote than the individual who is the client of a dyadic contract.

Unlike the first three factors, factor #4 is not systemic in nature and applies specifically to the barrio San Judas where, as asserted previously, the municipal government officials and party authorities were reluctant to allocate resources to the barrio because of the land tenure problem.

San Judas was by no means unique in having land tenure problems. However a survey of studies done in barrios with a similar problem demonstrates that the same problem does not necessarily elicit the same response from the barrio pobladores. In the case of the barriadas brujas of Panama City, the pobladores, aware of their common problem in gaining legal claim to the land they had illegally invaded, united in a common effort to "defend what they considered to be their rights" (Gutiérrez, 1961:10). This example of defensive politicization has also been cited by other studies of urban pobladores throughout the Third World. The success of this strategy depends, of course, on the contextual factors involved in the specific situation.

In direct contrast to the Gutiérrez study is a study carried out among the urban barrios of Caracas and Santiago which claims that the insecurity of land tenure "appears to be one of the principal obstacles to cooperative and organized civic or political action" among the urban pobladores (Frank, 1970:226).

In the case of San Judas, the land tenure problem has existed for eighteen years and shows no signs of being resolved in the immediate future. As of 1980 the attitudes of the barrio residents ranged from those of continued support for communal defensive politicization to those of frustration and powerlessness as a result of the unsuccessful efforts of the barrio pobladores to resolve the problem through the demand-making efforts of their voluntary associations. The leaders of these partisan-affiliated organizations have used the barrio's land tenure problem as a pawn in their struggle for power and influence within the barrio. These struggles have created cleavages among the pobladores which have diminished their possibility of unified political action. Sensing the uselessness of the situation, the predominant feeling in the barrio as of 1980 was one of disillusion with the voluntary associations and with the municipal political system in general.

In the final analysis, the four contextual factors discussed above have had serious consequences for the political participation of the residents of San Judas and have contributed to the paralysis of the barrio's political system. But this political alienation and resultant paralysis is by no means confined to this one barrio popular of Cali. Rather it is found throughout Colombia's marginal barrios and has contributed to the squandering of a large portion of the nation's human resources.

FURTHER RESEARCH

More research, both theoretical and empirical, is needed if political scientists are to succeed in adequately analyzing the functions of the diverse political structures extant in the marginal barrios of the Third World, in explaining the purpose and operation of the structural and cultural linkages existing between those barrios and the larger political system, and in understanding and predicting the political behavior of the pobladores in the urban environment. With the accumulation and evaluation of new data and evidence, this research will serve as the basis for the creation of more sophisticated theories with descriptive, explanatory, and predictive qualities. These theories may subsequently serve as effective analytical tools to be used in the formulation and implementation of public policy designed to relieve the socio-economic plight of the urban pobladores and to provide them with the tools and access necessary for their effective participation in the political system of the nation. It is with this ultimate goal in mind that this part of Chapter V offers several thoughts on those areas of investigation where further research appears necessary.

Although the rural-urban migration phenomenon throughout the Third World has been studied by many sociologists,

anthropologists, economists, and political scientists, one aspect of this phenomenon merits more examination and analysis. That aspect is the extent and intensity of change in the migrants' values, attitudes, and behavior as they leave the rural environment and enter the urban milieu. This sociological phenomenon, if proven empirically to exist, has major implications for the political system of all less-developed countries including Colombia. Although it has been studied to a limited degree (for example, Germani's concept of "residual ruralism"), more empirical research is needed to verify the validity of these theoretical hypotheses. What effect does the migration process have on the political socialization patterns of the urban poblador? Do the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft (Tönnies, 1963), ascribed status-achieved status (Linton, 1936), traditional authority-legal authority (Weber, 1968) dichotomies really exist between the rural community and the city? If so, what measures can be used to demonstrate the transformation of the individual's political attitudes and behavior as he or she migrates from the campo to the ciudad?

Declining party affiliation, increased abstentionism, and high rates of anti-regime voting patterns among the inhabitants of marginal barrios, and the cities in general, have been used to measure the change in the individual's beliefs and actions within the Colombian political

system. These measures must be more adequately tested and evaluated, while new measures are being developed, in order to determine their analytical utility. If, in the case of Colombia, they are found to be valid indicators of the political behavior of the urban poblador, then the legitimacy of the nation's regime, as well as that of its traditional two-party system, is increasingly subject to doubt. In such a case the elite ruling class has two policy options. It may either use repression to maintain the status quo; or it may open the political system so that those social groups traditionally excluded and alienated from the policy-making levels of the political system might have the opportunity to effectively participate in that system. But that mass participation, in order to be effective, implies that the urban poor must rise above the divisiveness of factionalism and act as a unified force in their pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms. Also implicit in this scenario is the assumption that the leaders of the Colombian political system will be willing to relinquish some of their control over the policy-making arenas of the local, regional, and national administrative levels of the government.

Many of the traditional theories and concepts associated with the rural-urban migration process must also be re-evaluated in view of the findings of contemporary research. What, for example, is meant by the concept of

marginality? Is it really a myth propagated by elite sectors of society to further their own narrow interests (Perlman, 1976:261-262)? Or are the residents of the so-called marginal barrios in fact outcasts from society? What effects do social-class structures and traditional values have on the perpetuation of marginal social sectors? Or should the hypotheses of cultural-determinist theory yield to those of the dependency theorists who perceive marginality from the perspective of the inequalitarian structure of the international economic system (Perlman, 1976:251-258)?

How valid is the theory of the disruptive migrant and how can radicalism be measured? In the case of Colombian politics, can a vote for the Movimiento Cívico be construed as a demonstration of radical behavior in the same manner that some scholars of Colombian politics previously claimed that anti-traditional voting among the urban poor of Colombia was a manifestation of radical political behavior (Johnson, 1965; Schoultz, 1972)? Or are these anti-traditional voting patterns characteristic not of radical behavior but of rational behavior on the part of an excluded segment of society which strives to achieve change in the cooptative, clientelistic political system by working through that system? This concept of rationality merits further examination because different actions which constitute rational behavior exist in

different environments and must therefore be studied from the perspective of those contextual factors of the specific environment under investigation which influence political behavior.

More detailed structural analyses of the political systems of Third World marginal barrios and municipalities are needed in order to better grasp the complexities and intricacies of the purposes and functions of barrio political structures and to analyze how they link the political system of the barrio to the larger municipal political system. One such study clearly explained and analyzed "the system" in the marginal barrios of Venezuela and showed how a minority of barrio residents controlled resource procurement and allocation as the basis of their local power (Bamberger, 1968). The study also demonstrated how personalism and patronage were used to effectively limit the level of popular participation in decisions on the allocation of those resources.

Broad generalizations from such case studies run the risk of falling prey to the ecological fallacy. Yet their findings and conclusions can serve a very useful purpose in the comparative analysis of specific aspects of local political systems. Moreover, such studies have supranational implications within defined geographic and cultural regions of the world. In the case of Latin America, for example, these structural analyses can further

clarify the linkage role of the urban cacique as a political broker between barrio residents and municipal políticos. They can also be used to test the validity, in most geographic and cultural contexts, of the controversial claim that voluntary community organizations tend to dissipate and disintegrate as the basic problems of the marginal barrio are resolved.⁸

⁸This phenomenon of declining participation in voluntary associations by the urban poor as a barrio consolidates has been documented by studies done in several Latin American countries. For Venezuela, see Talton F. Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); for Peru, see William Mangin, "Poverty and Politics in Cities of Latin America," in Power, Poverty and Urban Policy, eds. Warren Bloomberg, Jr. and Henry J. Schmandt (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968) and Diego Robles Rivas, "Development Alternatives for the Peruvian Barriada," Latin American Urban Research, II, eds. Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), 229-237; for Guatemala, see Bryan Roberts, "Politics in a Neighborhood of Guatemala City," Sociology, II (1968), 185-204; for Costa Rica, see Booth, 1979, op. cit., and Mitchell Seligson, "Development and Participation: The Impact of Context in Costa Rica," in Political Participation in Latin America, Volume I: Citizen and State, eds. John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978); for Panama, see Thomas M. Lutz, "Some Aspects of Community Organization and Activity in the Squatter Settlements of Panama City," unpublished manuscript, Department of Government, Georgetown University, n.d.; and for Nicaragua, see Reynaldo A. Tefel, El Infierno de los Pobres (Managua: Pez y Serpiente, 1972). The basis of the theory is that these voluntary associations are temporary structures whose function is to obtain only the most essential public goods from the government. Once that objective has been met, the communal efforts decline and the voluntary organizations disintegrate. My study in San Judas suggests that the context within which the voluntary associations pursue their objectives is an important determining factor in their effectiveness in acquiring public goods from the larger political system. It also raises the possibility that,

In the specific case of Colombia, the Acción Comunal system (and the concept of cooptation) must be further evaluated in order to determine to what extent it benefits the organizational effectiveness of the urban pobladores and to what degree it merely serves as another mechanism used by an elite ruling class to control the political activities of its subordinates. Finally, in this context, the concept of corporatism as a system of interest representation must also be studied from the structural-linkage perspective to determine its applicability to the concept of government control in a segmented and pluralistic society.

From a broader point of view, more research on the Colombian political system, and on national political systems in general, is required in order to distinguish those conditions or factors which increase the possibility of success for alternative political movements in political environments in which growing dissatisfaction

in the Colombian context, the inability of the pobladores to exert influence at the municipal level may not be due to the weakness of their voluntary associations so much as to the inability of the municipal party organizations to influence the policies and allocation of resources at the national level. Furthermore, not all studies support the theory of the gradual demise of the voluntary association. For a study which offers evidence on how these associations broaden their function over time, see Marc H. Ross, "Community Formation in an Urban Squatter Settlement," Comparative Political Studies, VI (October, 1973). In order to determine the validity of the theory of declining participation in the voluntary associations of San Judas, further research, using a longitudinal analysis, is needed.

with the traditional party system abounds. What roles do political socialization patterns play in the emergence of a new "third force" in the Colombian political system"? Is the Colombian nation undergoing a shift from a social cleavage based on partisan affiliation to one based on social-class awareness? If so, what factors in Colombian society proscribe the emergence of a strong popular movement whose aim is to topple, through legal or extralegal means, the existing regime? How much longer can the Liberal and Conservative parties continue to implement consociational strategies and tactics in times of crisis and continue to legitimate their roles as parties "of the people" while confronting high abstention rates in the electoral system and the increasing socio-economic misery of the lower strata of Colombian society? And what role can the military be expected to play as the Colombian political system enters the 1980's and as the leaders of that system continue to utilize policies which foment the social, economic, and political exclusion of the lower classes? These are questions whose answers will determine whether the path the Colombian political system follows in the future will be one of stability or one of violent political upheaval.

Perhaps the one concept that pervades all these aforementioned areas requiring further research is the

concept of contextual analysis.⁹ From the point of view of general theory building, contextual factors function as independent variables which may be used to either support, modify, or refute a theoretical statement. A general hypothesis may adequately describe the diverse

⁹For studies on the contextual analysis of the political participation of the rural and urban poor in Latin America, consult Richard R. Fagen and William S. Tuohy, Politics and Privilege in a Mexican City (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); Howard Handelman, "Unionization, Ideology and Political Participation Within the Mexican Working Class," in Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, editors, Political Participation in Latin America, Volume II: Politics and the Poor (New York: Holmes and Meier, forthcoming); and Christopher F. Arterton, "Patterns of Political Participation in Four Rural Mexican Villages," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1973, for Mexico. For Guatemala, see Bryan R. Roberts, Organizing Strangers: Poor Families in Guatemala City (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973). For Costa Rica see Mitchell A. Seligson, "Development and Participation: The Impact of Context in Costa Rica," in Booth and Seligson, eds., Political Participation in Latin America, Volume I: Citizen and State (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978); and Seligson and Booth, "Structure and Levels of Political Participation in Costa Rica: Comparing Peasants to City Dwellers," in Seligson and Booth, Vol. II, *op. cit.* For Peru, see Dietz, "Becoming a Poblador: Political Adjustment to the Urban Environment in Lima, Peru," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1974; and Susan C. Bourque and Kay B. Warren, "Female Participation, Perception and Power: An Examination of Two Andean Communities," in Seligson and Booth, Vol. II, *op. cit.* For Chile, see Alejandro Portes, "Cuatro Poblaciones," Santiago: Monograph Report to the University of Wisconsin Sociology of Development Program, 1969. For Ecuador, see Richard Moore, "The Urban Poor in Guayaquil, Ecuador: Modes, Correlates and Context of Political Participation," in Seligson and Booth, Vol. II, *op. cit.* For Venezuela, see Lars Schoultz, "Urbanization and Political Change in Latin America," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (1972 a), 367-387. And for Brazil, see Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

aspects of the dynamics of one political system while at the same time it may fail dismally in its attempt to describe those of a seemingly similar system. The difference lies, for the most part, in those internal factors which exist in the one context but which are absent from the other. How do contextual factors influence the individual's perception of the salience of local government? In those cases where the linkage system operates so as to offer the individual effective access to the higher levels of the political system through local government channels, the salience of local government to the individual would be expected to be high. But in other cases where the local government is used as an extension of a regime's cooptative policies and structures, the salience of local government to the individual may be quite low because the access he is permitted to the political system is controlled in such a way as to prevent his effective participation in the policy-making arenas of that system.

In short, contextual analysis is a technique whose implications for theory-building cannot be overlooked. Because of contextual factors it will probably be necessary for students of Third World political systems to first operate on the middle-range level, rather than on the systemic level, of theoretical analysis. By doing so they will avoid the problems inherent in broad

theoretical generalizations which quickly lose their analytical applicability when applied to specific political contexts. At the same time these students will be providing other scholars with detailed information, based on case studies, which can be evaluated in relation to the findings of other investigations in an overall attempt at cross-national comparative analysis and the subsequent development of valid theoretical assertions based on empirical data.

APPENDIX A

DANE'S CRITERIA OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION
COLOMBIA, 1980

VARIABLES	LOW-LOWER	LOWER	LOWER-MIDDLE	MIDDLE	UPPER-MIDDLE	UPPER
I. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS						
Condition of Construction	Precarious, Unstable	In Construction	Finished	Finished	Finished	Finished
Construction Materials	Discarded Material	Solid with Bad Finish	Solid with Regular Finish	Solid with Good Finish	Solid with Excellent Finish	Solid with Excellent Finish
Type of Housing	Tugurios	One-family Two-family	One-family Two-family	One-family Two-family	One-family Two-family Multi-family	One-family
Free Areas	No	No	Some with yard	Yard and garage	Yard, patio, and garage	Yard, patio, and double garage
II. INFRASTRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS						
Urbanization	Invasions, pirate settlements	Invasions, pirate settlements	I.C.T. ^a (Minimum requirements)	I.C.T. (Horizontal property ^b)	B.C.H. ^c and privately financed	Privately financed
Public Services	At least one is lacking	Not all are legalized	All are legalized	All are legalized	All are legalized	All are legalized

Streets and Sidewalks	Not clearly delimited	Delimited without pavement	Delimited with pavement	Delimited with pavement	Delimited with pavement	Delimited with pavement
Green Zones and avenues	None	None	There are some	Acceptable	Good	Exceeds necessities

III. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS

Electric Appliances	None	Scarce	Radio, T.V., Blender	Radio, T.V., Blender, Refrigerator	All	All
Private Vehicles	None	None	Less than 50% with one vehicle per home	More than 50% with one vehicle per home	One Vehicle/Home	More than one vehicle/Home
Others	-	-	-	Some with domestic servant	All with domestic servant	More than one domestic servant

^a Financed by Instituto de Crédito Territorial

^b For example, government-built apartment buildings

^c Financed by Banco Central Hipotecario (Central Mortgage Bank)

Source: Ricardo Marín, DANE (Cali), Colombia, 1980.

APPENDIX B

The following is a list of general works dealing with diverse aspects of the causes and effects of the urbanization process in the Third World. Only the last name of the author(s), or editor(s), and the date(s) of publication are provided. More complete information can be found in the bibliography which follows Appendix F. Sources with an asterisk deal specifically with Latin America.

Abrams (1966)
 Abu-Lughod and Hay, eds. (1977)
 Balán (1969*)
 Beyer, ed. (1967*)
 Bock and Iutaka (1969*)
 Booth (1979*)
 Booth and Seligson, eds. (1978*)
 Boyce (1970*)
 Breese (1966, 1968)
 Butterworth (1973*)
 Chance (1980*)
 Clarke (1971)
 Cornelius (1971,* 1973 b,* 1974*)
 Cornelius and Dietz (1976*)
 Dorselaer and Gregory (1962*)
 Fox (1975*)
 Frank (1970*)
 Frankenhoff (1967)
 Froidure (1958)
 Germani (1967)
 Giusti (1971*)
 Hardoy (1972*)
 Hauser (1963)
 Hauser, ed. (1962*)
 Herrick (1971*)
 Hobsbawm (1967,* 1969*)
 Hoffman et al. (1969*)
 Horowitz (1967*)

Howton (1969)
Huntington (1968)
International Development Research Center (1977)
Iaquian (1972)
Leeds (1968, 1969*)
Lerner (1958)
Levine (1979 a*)
Lloyd (1972)
Mangin (1967 a*)
Matos Mar (1968*)
Morse (1965*)
Musgrove and Ferber (1979*)
Nelson, J. (1969,* 1972)
Park (1928)
Patch (1961*)
Peeler (1977)
Portes (1971 b,* 1976*)
Portes and Walton, eds. (1976*)
Pratt (1971 a,* 1971 b,* n.d.*)
Rao and Desai (1965)
Redfield (1961)
Rogler (1967*)
Sanchez (1967*)
Sattler (1969*)
Schoultz (1972 a*)
Seligson (forthcoming*)
Stokes (1962)
Todaro (1977)
Turner, J. (1968 a, 1968 b, 1969)
Ugalde et al. (1974*)
Vekemans (1967*)
Wirth (1938)

APPENDIX C

The following is a list of country-specified studies on the diverse aspects of the urbanization process and marginal barrios in Latin America (except for Colombia). Only the last name of the author(s) and the date(s) of publication are provided. More complete information can be found in the bibliography which follows Appendix F.

Argentina: Bugatti (1969); Germani (1961); Tobar (1972).

Brazil: Bonilla (1961); Brandao L. (1962); Hutchinson (1960, 1963); Morse (1971); Pearse (1961); Perlman (1975, 1976); Portes (1979).

Chile: Comisión Promoción Popular (1964); Darghan (1968); Goldrich (1970); González C. (1978); Handelman (1975 a); Herrick (1965); Portes (1971 b); Pratt (1971 a); Rosenbluth (1963); Vanderschueren (1973).

Costa Rica: Seligson and Booth (forthcoming).

Ecuador: Moore (1977, forthcoming).

Guatemala: Roberts (1968), 1970, 1973).

Mexico: Alschuler (1967); Butterworth (1962, 1973); Cooper (1969); Cornelius (1969, 1972, 1973 a, 1975); Eckstein (1977); Fagen and Tuohy (1972); Hansen (1971); Kaufman, C. (1971); Klapp and Padgett (1960); Purcell and Purcell (n.d.); Ugalde (1970); Ugalde et al. (1974); Wolf (1965).

Nicaragua: Tefel (1972); Toness (1967).

Panama: Gutiérrez (1961); Lutz (1968, 1970, n.d.).

Peru: Andrews and Phillips (1970); Collier (1971, 1976); Delgado (1971); Dietz (1969, 1974, 1977); Dietz and Moore (1977); Goldrich (1970); Manaster (1968); Mangin (1963, 1965, 1967 a, 1967 b, 1968); Mangin and Cohen (1965); Matos Mar (1961); Michl (1973); Powell, S. (1969); Pratt (1971 a); Robles Rivas (1972); Tullis (1970); Turner J. (1965).

Venezuela: Bamberger (1968); Mathiason (1972); Peattie (1968); Powell, J. (1969); Ray (1969); Sanabria (1967).

APPENDIX D

The following is the text, in English, of the political survey undertaken by the present study in the barrio San Judas Tadeo. It was administered orally, in Spanish, in order to avoid the problems of illiteracy I expected to find among the pobladores of the barrio.

1. a. Will you vote in the March elections? Yes___, No___.
b. For whom will you vote (Liberal Party, Conservative Party, Movimiento Cívico, ANAPO, other)?
2. Who do you think should be the mayor of Cali?
3. Can you name three leaders of the barrio San Judas Tadeo?
4. a. Are you a member of Acción Comunal or of any political organization here in San Judas? Yes___, No___.
b. If yes, which?

APPENDIX E

Semi-Structured Interview Used With Positional Leaders, San Judas Tadeo, 1980

- I. Background information on individual
 - A. place of birth
 - B. length of time in San Judas
 - C. past positions of formal authority held in barrio
 - D. positions presently held

- II. Political affiliation and party structure
 - A. political affiliation before coming to San Judas
 - B. current political affiliation
 - C. organizational structure and party personalities of leader's faction in Valle del Cauca
 - D. structure and personalities in Cali
 - E. structure and personalities in San Judas
 - F. process used by faction (or party) to select candidates and make lists for mitaca elections.

- III. Political linkages
 - A. Who do you speak with or contact at the municipal and departmental levels when you need information, advice or help to solve a problem, either that of an individual or of the barrio?
 - B. Who are your political colleagues with whom you organize activities in San Judas?

- IV. View of the barrio San Judas
 - A. What are the principal problems presently confronting San Judas?
 - B. What has your political party (faction) done to help resolve the barrio's problems?
 - C. Can you name three influential people or leaders within San Judas who have given their time and energy to improve the barrio?
 - D. What is your view of the future of San Judas?

- V. The mitaca elections of 1980
 - A. What is your party (faction) doing in San Judas during the pre-electoral campaign period?
 - B. How do you obtain votes for your party (faction) among the residents of San Judas?
 - C. How many votes do you think you can "deliver" for your party (faction) on election day from the residents of San Judas?
 - D. Have you participated in the selection of candidates for your party's (faction's) municipal list?
 - E. What is your opinion of José Pardo Llada and the Movimiento Cívico?

APPENDIX F

Newspaper Survey, Cali (1980)

The data for the survey was obtained from two sources: "El País en los Barrios," El País (Cali), January 22, 1980 to March 9, 1980; and Barrios de Cali," El Occidente (Cali), January 4, 1980 to March 13, 1980.

The following table indicates the barrio where the complaint originated and the nature of the complaint. In most cases the complaint was directed toward a municipal agency (eg. EMCALI, EMSIRVA, municipal police department, etc.) and was made by the "inhabitants" of the individual barrio. There is no way of knowing how many complaints communicated to the newspapers were not published.

NEWSPAPER SURVEY, CALI, 1980

Barrio of Origin	Nature of Complaint(s)
Aguablanca	road conditions, security
Alameda	lighting, sanitation, security
Alfonso López	road conditions, sanitation
Antonio Nariño	security
Asturias	lighting, security
Belalcázar	sanitation
Benjamín Herrera	road conditions, lighting
Boyacá	road conditions
Bretaña	security, sanitation, water system, lighting
Caldas	security
Ciudadela Bueno Madrid	lighting, water system
Colima	road conditions
Colseguros	lighting, sanitation
Cristóbal Colón	bus service

El Jardín	lighting
El Jordán	security, road conditions
El Rodeo	telephone service, road conditions
El Sena	security
El Templete	sanitation
El Troncal	lighting, sanitation
Industrial	sanitation
Joaquín Borrero Sinisterra	water system, telephone service, sanitation
La Base	sanitation
La Carolina	telephone service
La Floresta	lighting
La Fortaleza	road conditions
La Rivera (Segunda Etapa)	sanitation
Las Acacias	security
Las Ceibas	sanitation, arborization
Las Delicias	lighting
Libertadores	security, sanitation, road conditions
Lleras Camargo	water system
Los Alamos	sanitation, lighting, security
Los Andes	sanitation
Los Conquistadores	road conditions
Lourdes	security
Manzanares	lighting
Maracaibo	security
Miraflores	road conditions, sanitation, water system
Nueva Floresta	security
Nueva Salomia	lighting
Nueva Tequendama	telephone service
Obrero	sanitation, security
Olímpico	security
Pampa Linda	lighting
Salomia	bus service
San Antonio	security, lighting, sanitation
San Bosco	street vendors
San Carlos	security
San Fernando	security, sanitation, lighting
San Fernando Viejo	security
San Judas Tadeo	bus service, lighting
San Luis	invasions, security
San Nicolás	lighting, sanitation, security, road conditions
Santa Elena	lighting, sanitation, security
Santo Domingo	road conditions
Siete de Agosto	road conditions
Siloé	security
Sucre	road conditions
Vipasa	security

Sources: El País (Cali), January 22 - March 9; El Occidente (Cali), January 4 - March 13, 1980.

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